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Abstract
Due to the open nature of radio propagation, information security in wireless communi-
cations has been facing more challenges compared to its counterpart in wired networks. Au-
thentication, defined as an important aspect of information security, is the process of verifying
the identity of transmitters to prevent against spoofing attacks. Traditionally, secure wireless
communications is achieved by relying solely upon higher layer cryptographic mechanisms.
However, cryptographic approaches based on complex mathematical calculations are ine-
cient and vulnerable to various types of attacks. Recently, researchers have shown that the
unique properties of wireless channels can be exploited for authentication enhancement by pro-
viding additional security protection against spoofing attacks. Motivated by the vulnerability of
existing higher-layer security techniques and the security advantages provided by exploring the
physical link properties, this study proposes five novel physical layer authentication techniques
to enhance the security performance of wireless systems.
In order to eectively and eciently detect spoofing attacks in multipath fading environ-
ments, both spatial and temporal information of the signal propagation environment can be
exploited to provide a comprehensive analysis for improving authentication performance. A ro-
bust channel-based authentication scheme is proposed by using the unique properties of chan-
nel impulse response (CIR) and monitoring the dierence between two adjacent CIRs under a
binary hypothesis testing. In fast fading environments, the reliability of CIR-based authenti-
cation is challenged by the fast channel variation. In order to solve the problem of unreliable
spoofing detection, we exploit a long-range channel predictor to predict future CIRs in order to
enhance the authentication performance. Multiple observations of CIR dierence are used to
form the final decision in the authentication process. In practice, the performance of channel-
based physical layer authentication mechanisms is substantially degraded due to the large chan-
nel variation induced by the environmental changes and terminal mobility. In order to address
this issue, we integrate additional multipath delay characteristics into the channel-based au-
thentication framework, and propose an enhanced physical layer authentication scheme based
on a two dimensional quantization method.
Furthermore, since the feasibility of traditional channel-based physical layer security schemes
is hampered by the severe channel conditions, a novel physical layer authentication scheme is
iii
proposed by exploiting the advantages of amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative relaying. The
essence of the proposed scheme is to select the best relay among multiple AF relays, such that
the legitimate transmitter would experience better channel conditions than a spoofer. Towards
this goal, two best relay selection schemes are developed based on the notion of maximizing
the SNR ratios of the legitimate link to the spoofing link at the destination and relays, respec-
tively. To evaluate the performance, we define our performance metrics based on the outage of
eective SNR ratios and the probability of spoofing detection.
To prevent eavesdropping attacks in conventional orthogonal frequency division multiplex-
ing (OFDM) systems, a continuous physical layer authentication system is developed based
on an adaptive OFDM system with time-varying transmitter-receiver interaction enabled by
the precoded cyclic prefix (PCP) and outlined in the final part of the dissertation. Instead of
traditional CP in an OFDM system, PCP sequences are employed as guard intervals and sig-
naling links as well, which are generated with the same temporal and spectral characteristics
of data-carrying OFDM signals in order to conceal system parameters to adversaries.
Keywords: Wireless communications, physical layer authentication, CIR, channel
predictor, 2-D quantization, AF cooperative relaying, best relay selection, PCP-OFDM.
iv
Contents
Acknowledgements ii
Abstract iii
Table of Contents v
List of Figures x
List of Tables xii
List of Appendices xiii
List of Abbreviations xiv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Motivations and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Dissertation Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Dissertation Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Security Challenges and Solutions in Wireless Communications 9
2.1 An Overview of Wireless Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1 Security Challenges of Wireless Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2 Major Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Traditional Wireless Security Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Seven Layers of the OSI Model and Their Security Vulnerabilities . . . 11
2.2.2 Security Limitations of Traditional Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Physical Layer Security Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
v
2.3.1 Wireless Channel-Based Physical Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2 RF-DNA Based Physical Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3 Diversity Technique-Based Physical Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3.1 PHY Layer Security in Multiple-Antenna Systems . . . . . . 21
2.3.3.2 Cooperative Relaying and Security Enhancement . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Wireless OFDM System and its Security Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.1 OFDM Introduction and System Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 Security Weaknesses of OFDM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Noise-Mitigated CIR-Based Physical Layer Authentication 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 System Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.1 Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2 Hypothesis Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 CIR-based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.1 Noise Impact on CIR Dierence Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.2 Adaptive Threshold for Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4.1 Simulation Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4.2 Numerical Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 CIR-Based Authentication Enhancement Using Channel Predictor 47
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Authentication Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.1 Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.2 Hypothesis Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 Channel Prediction Based Authentication Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.1 Noise-Mitigated CIR Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.2 Channel Predictor based on CIR estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
vi
4.3.3 Authentication Analysis Using Channel Predictor . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3.4 Multiple Observations of CIR Dierence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.5 Parameter Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4.1 Simulation Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4.2 Numerical Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5 CIR-Based Authentication Enhancement Using 2-D Quantization 68
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2.1 Channel Model and Variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.2 Channel Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.2.3 Hypothesis Testing based on 2-D Quantization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3 Statistical Analysis of 2-D Quantization under Two Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . 77
5.3.1 Under Hypothesis H0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.3.2 Under Hypothesis H1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.4 Performance Analysis for Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.4.1 Derivation of FAR and PD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.4.2 Parameter Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5 Benchmark Method and Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5.1 Performance Analysis for Benchmark Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.5.2 Numerical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6 Channel-based Authentication Enhancement Using AF Cooperative Relays 99
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.2 System Model Based on AF Cooperative Relaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.2.1 Direct Transmission (DT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.2.2 Amplify-and-Forward (AF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.3 Best Relay Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
vii
6.4 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.4.1 Outage Analysis of First Relay Selection Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.4.2 Outage Analysis of Second Relay Selection Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.4.3 Authentication Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.5.1 Example 1 : Eect of Alice-Eve distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.5.2 Example 2 : Eect of the number of available relays . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7 Continuous Physical Layer Authentication Using PCP-OFDM System 131
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.2 Transmitter Design of Continuous Physical Layer Authentication System . . . . 133
7.2.1 PCP-OFDM Transmitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.2.2 PCP Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.3 Receiver Design of Continuous Physical Layer Authentication System . . . . . 137
7.3.1 PCP-OFDM Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.3.2 PCP Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.4 Performance Analysis for Cross Layer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.4.1 Stealth Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.4.2 System Robustness Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4.3 Cross-layer Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8 Conclusions and Future Work 154
8.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Bibliography 158
A Derivation of the Probability P(S = k) 172
viii
B Derivation of CDF of Wi 174
C Derivation of Integral F(t) 176
Curriculum Vitae 177
ix
List of Figures
2.1 The OSI model with examples of applications and security vulnerabilities. . . . 16
2.2 An adversarial multipath environment including multiple scattering surfaces. . . 19
2.3 An illustration of direct transmission and cooperative transmission. . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Example of an OFDM symbol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 ISI cancelation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 The block diagram of an OFDM system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 CIR-based Authentication in the “Alice-Bob-Eve” Scenario. . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Adaptive threshold values for authentication versus SNRs under dierent false
alarm rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Probability of detection versus SNRs at dierent false alarm rates. . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Receiver operating characteristic for the CIR-based authentication under three
dierent SNRs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 The envelope of CIR for one path component in the multipath Rayleigh fading
channel under two dierent maximum Doppler frequencies. The sampling rate
fs = 1MHz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 MSE of the total error versus SNR values under three dierent scenarios. . . . . 57
4.3 The procedure of achieving multiple CIR dierences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4 Probability of detection versus SNRs at P f a = 0:1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.5 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) at SNR of 5dB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1 Channel model and channel variations in the dimensions of amplitude and time
delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
x
5.2 Probability of detection and false alarm rate under various threshold values of
T and Z , respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.3 False alarm rate versus dierent values of  under the optimized threshold val-
ues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.4 False alarm rate versus dierent SNRs under the optimized threshold values. . 95
5.5 Probability of detection versus dierent values of  under the comparison of
theory and Monte Carlo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.6 Probability of detection versus dierent SNRs under the comparison of theory
and Monte Carlo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.1 Our cooperative system with multiple relays under the “Alice-Bob-Eve” sce-
nario. The best relay is selected based on the proposed relay selection schemes. 103
6.2 Comparison of outage probabilities based on closed-form expressions andMonte-
Carlo simulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.3 Outage probabilities versus Alice-Eve distance under dierent values of trans-
mit power ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4 PD versus Alice-Eve distance under dierent values of transmit power ratio. . 125
6.5 PD versus Alice-Eve distance under dierent values of FAR. . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.6 Outage probability versus the number of available relays under dierent values
of transmit power ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.7 PD versus the number of available relays under dierent FAR values. . . . . . . 129
7.1 Transmitter block diagram of the proposed continuous authentication system. . 134
7.2 Sparse input to OFDM modulator used for PCP sequence generation. . . . . . . 136
7.3 Receiver block diagram of the proposed continuous authentication system. . . . 138
7.4 Auto-correlation of PCP-OFDM, CP-OFDM and AWGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.5 PCP detection error rate under dierent lengths of PCP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.6 Overall detection error rate under dierent lengths of PCP. . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.7 Overall detection error rate under three dierent channels. . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
xi
List of Tables
3.1 Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1 Optimal values of parameters under dierent values of  . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2 Optimal values of parameters under dierent SNRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
xii
List of Appendices
Appendix A Derivation of the Probability P(S = k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Appendix B Derivation of CDF of Wi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Appendix C Derivation of Integral F(t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
xiii
List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description First use
AF Amplify-and-Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ARP Address Resolution Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
AWGN Additive Gaussian White Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
CF Compress-and-Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CFR Channel Frequency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CFO Carrier Frequency Oset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CIR Channel Impulse Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CJ Cooperative Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CP Cyclic Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CSI Channel State Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
DF Decode-and-Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DoS Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
DT Direct Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
FAR False Alarm Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FFT Fast Fourier Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
ICI Inter-Carrier Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
xiv
IDFT Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform . . . . . . . . . . . 27
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers . . . . 4
IFFT Inverse Fast Fourier Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
IP Internet Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ISI Inter-symbol Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LLC Logical Link Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
LOS Line-of-Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
LS Least Squares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
LTE Long-Term Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
MAC Media Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
MISO Multiple-Input Single-Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
MSE Mean Square Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing . . . . . . 3
OSI Open Systems Interconnection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PCP Precoded Cyclic Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PD Probability of Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PDF Probability Density Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
QoS Quality of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
RF Radio Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
RF   DNA Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute . . . . . . . 2
RIP Routing Information Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
xv
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
RSS Received Signal Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
SER Symbol Error Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
SIMO Single-Input Multiple-Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
TCP Transmission Control Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
UDP User Datagram Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
WiMax Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access . . . 4
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
WSNs Wireless Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivations and Objectives
Information security is critical for any communication systems. Compared to wired net-
works, wireless communication networks face more security challenges primarily due to the
nature of openness [1]. Moreover, high-level security mechanisms in wired communications
cannot be directly applied in wireless communication systems. Therefore, it is certainly worth
investigating techniques to secure wireless communications. Traditionally, wireless security
techniques are achieved by relying solely on the upper layers of the open systems intercon-
nection (OSI) network model. However, existing higher-layer security mechanisms are de-
signed based on the computational hardness of mathematical functions, which are not feasible
for practical wireless communication systems with limited resources. Additionally, traditional
cryptographic techniques are susceptible to various types of attacks and do not directly leverage
the unique properties of the wireless medium to address security threats. To this end, physical
layer security has drawn a lot of attention in recent years; this security is achieved based on
the lowest layer of the OSI model by exploiting physical link properties to provide additional
security protection [2].
In wireless communications, spoofing is a severe security threat due to the broadcast na-
ture of radio signal propagation, in which adversaries attempt to impersonate the legitimate
user within a network in order to gain illegitimate advantages [1]. In order to defend systems
against spoofing attacks, the receiving end should be equipped with authentication mecha-
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
nisms, which provide systems with the ability of validating the identities of involved users.
By exploiting the advantages of securing wireless transmissions at the physical layer, a variety
of physical layer authentication schemes have been proposed by using the inherent properties
of wireless channels [3–12] or the imperfections of hardware devices [13–17]. The funda-
mental principle behind channel-based physical layer authentication is that the spatial, spectral
and temporal properties of the wireless fading channel have natural randomness and they are
rapidly decorrelated between dierent geographic locations. As a consequence, the properties
of the channel link between legitimate terminals are only available to the intended receiver
but cannot be duplicated by adversaries. Additionally, radio-frequency distinct native attribute
(RF-DNA) fingerprint-based physical layer authentication exploits device impairments, such as
I/Q modulator imbalance and carrier frequency oset (CFO), for device discrimination. These
device imperfections, which are unclonable and unforgeable to intruders, are caused by manu-
facturing variability. Therefore, the intrinsic characteristics of the physical layer attributes can
be adopted as a way to improve the authentication performance of wireless communication
systems via the physical layer.
Based on a comprehensive study of channel-based physical layer authentication, exploit-
ing the physical layer properties of the wireless channels brings the potential to enhance au-
thentication performance in spoofing detection. Mathematically, channel-based physical layer
authentication is formulated as a binary hypothesis testing problem. As the channel state in-
formation (CSI) measurements over dierent links can be dramatically distinguished at the
receiving end, two hypotheses are defined based on the dierence of adjacent CSI measure-
ments in time. In the presence of spoofers, the final decision is made by comparing the channel
dierence with a threshold in order to determine if a spoofing attack has occurred. In [6, 8, 9],
the characteristics of channel frequency response (CFR) were well studied for authentication
enhancement; however, the CFR analysis in the received signal fails to exploit the spatial in-
formation related to the signal propagation environment. Thus, eective, ecient and robust
channel-based authentication approaches are needed to defend against spoofing attacks.
In rich scattering environments, it is noteworthy that the properties of channel impulse
response (CIR) represent the spatially geographical locations of wireless terminals. More-
over, the multipath components are independent of each other, but they are highly correlated
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over time. Therefore, the characteristics of CIR of a multipath fading channel represent the
spatial and temporal information related to the signal propagation environment, which can
be exploited to develop robust physical layer authentication schemes. However, in fast fad-
ing environments, the processing delay and outdated CIR measurements may result in large
channel variation. Moreover, the variation between two successive CIRs can also be caused
by the movement of mobile terminals or environmental changes. As a result, the reliabil-
ity of channel-based physical layer authentication schemes is challenged by the fast channel
variation. Also, the robustness of decision-making for authentication is degraded as the final
decision is just based on a single observation of the channel variation. Therefore, we argue
that reliable channel-based authentication approaches are needed to improve the authentication
performance under a fast fading environment.
In practical wireless communication systems, it has been noticed that user mobility may
aect and complicate the functioning of applications and protocols. In high mobility envi-
ronments, the performance of CIR-based physical layer authentication schemes is significantly
degraded due to the large channel variation induced by the environmental changes and terminal
mobility. It is therefore important to enhance the performance of CIR-based authentication in
high mobility environments.
Physical layer authentication techniques for wireless communications can prevent ma-
licious attacks without upper layer data encryption. However, the reliability of traditional
channel-based physical layer authentication schemes is hampered by severe channel condi-
tions. In order to overcome this limitation, the application of multiple antennas has been ex-
plored to combat channel fading and improve the performance of secure wireless communica-
tions. However, as a result of cost and size limitations of multiple antennas, these scenarios are
rarely implemented in practice. For the practical implementation of channel-based authenti-
cation systems, eciently exploiting the advantages of multiple antenna arrays to enhance the
performance of spoofing detection has yet to be investigated.
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) is a multiplexing method in which
data are transmitted over the equally spaced, overlapped carrier frequencies. The advantages
of OFDM include: 1) It can achieve high data rates with great bandwidth eciency and flex-
ible underlying modulations; 2) It can easily eliminate intersymbol interference (ISI) with the
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help of cyclic prefix (CP); 3) Channel equalization becomes much simpler compared to single
carrier systems. Due to these advantageous features, OFDM has been included in the physi-
cal layer specifications of a large variety of wireless standards, from the well-established and
widespread wireless local area network (WLAN) transmissions of the family Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 to the more recent worldwide interoperability
for microwave access (WiMax) and long-term evolution(LTE) protocols. However, conven-
tional OFDM systems do not have inherent security features due to the distinct time and fre-
quency characteristics of OFDM signals. In order to secure OFDM-based wireless systems,
conventional higher-layer cryptographic techniques provide secrecy without considering the
lower layer. The virtual physical layer transparency brings security vulnerability to the infor-
mation protected by higher-layer cryptographic techniques, as the information can often be
deciphered by using exhaustive trial. Consequently, an additional physical layer based security
approach is necessary to enhance the security of OFDM systems.
Considering the aforementioned wireless security issues, our contributions to authentica-
tion enhancement in wireless communications are discussed in the next section.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows:
 A comprehensive survey of existing wireless security techniques is illustrated and the
weaknesses of the existing state-of-the-art security approaches are explained in detail.
Security vulnerabilities of OFDM-based wireless networks are discussed as well. These
wireless security issues were the motivation for five of the contributions of the disserta-
tion.
 A robust physical layer authentication scheme is proposed to detect anomalous behaviors
through the statistical analysis of the inherent properties of CIR dierence in a time-
varying multipath environment. The variation between two consecutive CIR estimates
from a transmitter of interest is monitored at the receiver in order to distinguish the
identities of dierent transmitters for authentication purposes. To minimize the impact
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of noise and interference from wireless environments, we develop a new test statistic
based on the dierence between noise-mitigated CIRs.
 In fast fading environments, the reliability of CIR-based physical layer authentication
is challenged by the fast channel variation. To address this issue, a long-range channel
predictor is utilized to predict future CIRs in order to compensate for the eects of fast
channel variation in the authentication performance. Moreover, by exploiting the long-
range channel predictor, multiple CIR dierences are calculated by the receiver in an
observation window, and a final decision is formed based on the multiple observations of
CIR dierences in order to increase the robustness of decision-making for authentication.
To find an optimal threshold in decision-making, the ratio of the threshold to the window
size is optimized by minimizing the total error rate subject to false alarm constraints
under dierent channel conditions.
 In a high mobility environment, the performance of spoofing detection for CIR-based
physical layer authentication is degraded significantly due to the large variation in the
channel amplitude over time. In contrast with the temporal variation of channel am-
plitude, another characterization of wireless channels, viz., the multipath delay spread,
is relatively stationary over long time intervals [18]. More importantly, multipath de-
lay spread profiles are distinct from one location to another if the locations are spatially
separated. Therefore, we propose an enhanced CIR-based physical layer authentica-
tion scheme by integrating additional multipath delay characteristics into the CIR-based
authentication framework. A two-dimensional quantization method is developed to pre-
process the temporal channel variations in the dimensions of channel amplitude and path
delay. Based on the quantization method, the decision rule in the authentication process
is simplified.
 Motivated by the security advantages of cooperative transmissions, a novel physical layer
authentication scheme is developed by exploiting the advantages of amplify-and-forward
(AF) cooperative relaying. Considering multiple trusted AF relays in the scenario, only
one relay is selected to provide the best end-to-end path between legitimate end nodes
in the presence of a spoofer. To achieve this goal, two best relay selection schemes are
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developed based on the notion of maximizing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) ratios of
the legitimate link to the spoofing link at the destination and relays, respectively. In
order to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, we define our performance
metrics in terms of the outage probability of the eective SNR ratios and the probability
of spoofing detection.
 In order to enhance the security of OFDM systems, a new continuous physical layer
authentication system is proposed based on an adaptive OFDM platform by exploiting
precoded cyclic prefix (PCP) instead of conventional CP to convey time-varying trans-
mission parameters and secure the legitimate transmissions as well. The PCP sequences
are generated with the same time and frequency domain characteristics as data-carrying
OFDM signals in order to be concealed from eavesdroppers. By using the PCP, the trans-
mitter can adjust its operating parameters continuously and only share the link adaptation
information with legitimate receivers. Additionally, cross-layer design is utilized to con-
tinuously generate optimal PCPs according to dynamic communication conditions.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The following details the organization of remaining chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 includes a comprehensive discussion on wireless communication security, in-
cluding wireless security issues and countermeasures, as well as major security requirements
and security design principles. Additionally, the security vulnerabilities of wireless OFDM
systems are discussed after a general introduction of OFDM technology.
In Chapter 3, a robust physical layer authentication scheme is proposed by studying the
statistical analysis of the inherent properties of CIR in a time-varying multipath environment.
Specifically, a new test statistic is developed based on the variation between two consecutive
noise-mitigated CIRs in order to distinguish between dierent transmitters for authentication
purpose. Based on the defined authentication test, false alarm rate (FAR) and probability of
detection (PD) are theoretically derived for evaluating the performance of the proposed scheme.
To address the problem of unreliable spoofing detection caused by fast channel variation,
we exploit a long-range channel predictor to predict future CIRs in order to compensate for the
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negative impacts of fast channel variation in Chapter 4. By exploiting the long-range channel
predictor, multiple CIR dierences are achieved by the receiver in an observation window to
form a final decision under a simple hypothesis testing. In order to optimize the threshold of
decision-making, an optimization problem is defined based on minimizing the total error rate
under false alarm constraints.
In Chapter 5, we develop an enhanced physical layer authentication scheme by integrat-
ing additional multipath delay characteristics into the CIR-based authentication framework. A
two-dimensional quantization method is developed to preprocess the temporal channel varia-
tions in the dimensions of channel amplitude and path delay. More specifically, two one-bit
quantizers are used in the two dimensions, respectively, to quantize the dierence between ad-
jacent channel realizations (i.e., channel amplitudes and time intervals). The quantizer output
becomes identical if the dierence is larger than a threshold, otherwise it is zero. By exploiting
the quantization method, the decision rule for authentication test is simplified. In order to ver-
ify the performance of the proposed authentication scheme, FAR and PD are defined and their
closed-form expressions are derived as well.
In Chapter 6, a novel physical layer authentication scheme is proposed based on an AF
cooperative relaying system, where one best relay is selected to provide the best end-to-end
path between the source and destination in the presence of a spoofer. To achieve this goal,
two best relay selection schemes are developed. Specifically, the first scheme is based on the
notion of maximizing the end-to-end SNR ratio of the legitimate link to the spoofing link, while
the second scheme is based only on the first-hop SNR ratio in order to reduce computational
complexity and resource consumption. For performance analysis, the outage of the eective
SNR ratios and the probability of spoofing detection are derived.
A new continuous physical layer authentication technique with time-varying transmission
parameters is investigated in Chapter 7 to enhance the security of conventional OFDM sys-
tems. A PCP sequence, which introduces an additional signaling link to carry the time-varying
transmission parameters, is employed in each OFDM symbol for physical layer authentication.
The new PCP sequences are generated with the same time and frequency domain character-
istics as data-carrying OFDM signals to be concealed from unauthorized receivers. With the
proper recovery of system parameters and interference cancellation, only legitimate users can
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successfully decode the PCP sequence and obtain necessary parameters to decode OFDM data.
In addition, a cross-layer design approach is introduced to continuously generate optimal PCPs
according to dynamic communication conditions.
Finally, conclusions and future research directions are illustrated in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2
Security Challenges and Solutions in
Wireless Communications
Advances in communications and networking technologies are rapidly making ubiquitous
network connectivity a reality. Wireless networking technologies bring convenience into our
lives, whereas the open nature of the wireless medium and limited options of transmission
techniques have introduced many security challenges that do not exist in the wired networks.
In this chapter, security issues in wireless communications are illustrated and addressed, based
on a comprehensive literature survey of existing wireless security techniques. Additionally, the
system modeling of OFDM is given, and the vulnerabilities of conventional OFDM systems
for secure data transmission are discussed as well.
2.1 An Overview of Wireless Security Issues
2.1.1 Security Challenges of Wireless Communications
Security is an implicit part of any communication system that is relied upon for the trans-
mission of private information. Consequently, the reliability to share secret information in the
presence of malicious attackers is critically important. From a general perspective, security is
concerned with unauthorized users trying to access, forge or modify messages intended for le-
gitimate receivers. In wired networks, signals travel through the wires, which makes the wired
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communications secure as long as only authorized users have access to the data. Unlike wired
data communications, wireless communications is based on electromagnetic waves using radio
frequencies (RF) propagating through open space, which provides the freedom of user mobility
and the flexibility of data transmission, but also brings significantly more security challenges
than traditional wired communications. Therefore, secure wireless communications becomes
critical for wireless data transmission.
There are many factors contributing to the increasing security challenges in wireless com-
munications. Primarily, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes transmitted signals
available to any receiver within the transmission range, which leads to easy access to adver-
saries. Moreover, the mechanisms of high-level security in a wired network cannot be directly
applied in wireless scenarios. Additionally, limited processing power is incurred by the limited
space, cost and power constraints of wireless devices. Considering these essential limitations
of wireless communications, security mechanisms for wireless systems should be developed to
address increasing threats.
2.1.2 Major Security Requirements
Security aims at defending information from various malicious attacks, such as eavesdrop-
ping [2], communications jamming [20], injection and modification of data [20], trac anal-
ysis [21], and spoofing [22]. Generally, the requirements of security can be mainly divided
into six categories, i.e., confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, availability, non-repudiation and
privacy. Their functions are explained as follows:
 Confidentiality: This is also known as secrecy, which means that only authorized users
can access information. This level of confidentiality should be maintained while data is
transmitted from source to destination within the network.
 Authenticity: This means an ability of a system to validate the identities of involved
users and establish trust in provided information.
 Integrity: This means that only authorized users can modify data in authorized ways. A
system should ensure completeness as well as accuracy in all its components and prevent
from unauthorized modification.
2.2. Traditional Wireless Security Techniques 11
 Availability: This means that authorized users can access data and resources of a system
in a timely manner, which ensures the reliability of all components in a system. Failing
to meet this feature can cause a denial of service.
 Non-repudiation: This means an ability of a system to prove a certain message sent by a
sender or received by a receiver, an action cannot be falsely denied by either the sender
or receiver.
 Privacy: This is usually addressed separately from confidentiality, which means an abil-
ity of a system to protect the identities of users and enable feasible control of one’s
personal information by users.
In the implementation of every security mechanism, one or several of these principles are
required to assure the secrecy of communications systems. In order to address the afore-
mentioned security issues in wireless communications, eective, ecient and robust security
approaches are required. In the next section, a comprehensive literature review on existing
wireless security techniques is presented from two perspectives, i.e., traditional security and
physical layer security.
2.2 Traditional Wireless Security Techniques
2.2.1 Seven Layers of the OSI Model and Their Security Vulnerabilities
The OSI model was introduced by the International Standards Organization in 1978, as a
first step toward the requirement of internationally standardized protocols for data communi-
cations. It defines a hierarchical architecture that logically separates networking functions re-
quired to support system-to-system communications. Consequently, each layer can be viewed
as an independent module. Due to this layered architecture, network problems can be more eas-
ily solved through a divide-and-conquer methodology, and a protocol can also be theoretically
substituted by another at the same layer, as can network services.
From a high-level application perspective, data is sent down the stack layer-by-layer in one
station, proceeding to the bottom layer. Then it is transmitted over the physical medium to the
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next station and back up the hierarchy. In what follows, the seven layers of the OSI model
are illustrated (starting from the top layer) in terms of their general functionality and security
vulnerabilities.
 Application layer:
The application layer is the top layer of the OSI model and refers to the user interface
supporting the end user functions. It provides a variety of high-level functions such as
file transfer, access and management, virtual terminal, electronic mail and messaging
handling, and common management information protocol. It also provides application
access security checking and information validation.
From the security perspective, the open-ended nature of the application layer brings var-
ious threats to the end of the stack. One of the primary threats at the application layer is
that the weak security design of applications allows unauthorized users to freely use the
application resources. Applications may establish identity or set privilege over untrust-
worthy channels. However, this “all or nothing” approach of security controls, which
forces administrators to give either unlimited access or none at all, results in either ex-
cessive or insucient access.
 Presentation layer:
The presentation layer is responsible for converting incoming and outgoing data from
one presentation format to another, where the syntax and semantics of the transmitted
information are managed, making it possible for dierent computers to communicate
with each other. More specifically, this layer provides various communications services
related to information representation, such as data compression and encryption.
Vulnerabilities at the presentation layer are mainly caused by weaknesses or shortcom-
ings in the implementation of the presentation layer functions. In particular, format string
vulnerability takes advantage of the poor handling of unexpected incoming data, which
can crash applications, surrender the controls of data format and transmission, or ex-
ecute arbitrary instructions. Additionally, the flaws of cryptography protocols may be
exploited to circumvent the protections of privacy and authentication.
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 Session layer:
The session layer is responsible for session handling between applications by establish-
ing, maintaining, synchronizing, controlling and terminating connections. It also pro-
vides security services, such as login passwords and exchange of user IDs, to control
access to session information.
Since the session layer is concerned with the control of access to applications, it falls prey
to the weaknesses of handling passwords and authentication. In particular, password-
based access is prone to attackers, who are allowed to use unlimited and undetected
attempts to guess the passwords. Additionally, most of protocols at this layer lack strong
authentication, as they allow lower layers to intercept their credentials.
 Transport layer:
The transport layer is concerned with the transmission by breaking up data streams from
the upper layer into packets passing to the lower layer, and reassembling the incoming
data packets from the lower layer back into a coherent stream for the upper layer, without
modification, loss or duplication during the transmission. This layer provides the end-to-
end communications control, and the aforementioned transmission needs are achieved
based on transport protocols such as transmission control protocol (TCP) and user data-
gram protocol (UDP). Data flow control and error checking are provided as well at this
layer.
Most transmission protocols usually do not implement strong controls to identify the
source of a transmission, which leads to interruption or redirection of the flow of the
transmission. For instance, UDP protocol can be trivially spoofed due to a complete lack
of sequencing or state at the transport layer. In addition, the use and re-use of ports for
multiple functions is another security vulnerability of the transport layer.
 Network layer:
The network layer deals with the global network topology to handle the operation of
taking packets from source to destination over multiple possible paths, where basic func-
tions of routing and congestion control are provided. This layer typically relies on In-
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ternet protocol (IP) addresses and routing tables to identify nodes and construct paths
over the Internet. Address resolution protocol (ARP) is implemented to convert the IP
addresses to the link layer addresses, routing information protocol (RIP) is utilized to
distribute routing information within the network, and IP protocol is used to identify the
transmission protocol (such as TCP or UDP) from the higher layer in order to direct the
higher layer how to handle the incoming data. Additionally, if all the networks send
packets at the same time, such congestion is managed by the network layer. More gen-
erally, the network layer provides the quality of service (QoS) such as transmitting time,
jitter and delay.
To achieve the aforementioned goals at the network layer, protocols at this layer lack
necessary protection against malicious attacks. In particular, most routing protocols have
only a basic level of security, which can be exploited by spoofers propagating false net-
work topology. Additionally, most network layer protocols lack authenticating source
addresses, thereby unsecured third parties located therein can use false addresses to im-
personate the source.
 Data link layer:
The data link layer is concerned with frame transmission between two directly connected
local devices, which has two sublayers, i.e., logical link control (LLC) and media access
control (MAC). The main tasks of this layer are (1) to split the input bits from the physi-
cal layer into data frames so that no apparent errors can be seen by the network layer, and
(2) to encapsulate the network layer data packets into frames structured based on MAC
addresses whose headers contain the source and destination addresses. This layer pro-
vides error control, frame synchronization and flow control for the physical level based
on the attached link-layer headers.
Due to the insecure addressing structure and weak encryption algorithms, the data link
layer is prone to several types of attacks [23]. For instance, ARP spoofing can be
achieved by an attacker because the ARP protocol, as a stateless protocol, does not
provide a method to a host to authenticate the peer from which the packet originated.
Moreover, MAC addresses are used to uniquely identify devices in this layer; however,
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they can be easily modified. Additionally, link-layer encryption has been used to pro-
tect information in transit between two points. However, a lack of authentication in the
transmission link can cause vulnerability at the link when messages must be transmitted
between unauthorized hosts.
 Physical layer:
The physical layer is the lowest layer of the OSI model and responsible for transmit-
ting raw bits across a communication medium. This layer is concerned with the actual
data encoding, modulation, synchronization and transmission through the network at the
electrical and physical level.
Reviewing the flow of information through the OSI model, we can see that all of the
above layers depend upon the physical layer for data delivery. Therefore, the physical
layer is critical to data communications. However, it is the most vulnerable and change-
able among the seven layers, as all information security assets are based on the physical
security. For instance, from a networking perspective, communications can be easily
stopped if one can disconnect a device from the network or physically switch it with
another. Additionally, errors at the physical layer can be kept and passed through all the
above layers [24].
Figure 2.1 illustrates the OSI model referred to as a layered protocol architecture, where a
specific set of network functions is allocated to each layer that provides services to the upper
layer and receives services from the lower layer. From the security point of view, security pro-
vision of each layer of the OSI model can be achieved independently, and secure data transmis-
sion is accomplished generally based on the use of strong authentication and data encryption
at higher layers. However, these higher-layer based security solutions are vulnerable to various
types of attacks. It is also noteworthy to mention that higher layers cannot be secured without
secured lower layers. Therefore, secure data transmission at the lowest layer can fundamentally
address the security issues in wireless communications.
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Figure 2.1: The OSI model with examples of applications and security vulnerabilities.
2.2.2 Security Limitations of Traditional Approaches
Traditionally, wireless security is achieved by relying on the upper layers of the OSI ref-
erence model. Traditional wireless security techniques can be discussed in two parts, i.e.,
authentication and encryption. Authentication is a policy of verifying the identity of commu-
nication partners, whereas encryption is responsible for encrypting transmitted data using an
encryption key so that the data can only be decrypted by legitimate users in the presence of
adversaries.
Typically, authentication relies on the MAC addresses of hardware at the link layer or IP
addresses at the network layer to identify users. However, this mechanism is vulnerable for
three reasons. First of all, devices can be stolen by adversaries, thereby unauthorized user can
get access to the network. Moreover, MAC addresses can be changed in some hardware. A
malicious device can duplicate the MAC address to spoof the legitimate user and use it to gain
access to the network. This type of attacks in wireless networks is called identity-based attacks,
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which is one serious threat that can be launched easily [25]. Additionally, intruders can use
an IP address of a trusted user with modified packet headers to get unauthorized access to the
network.
Furthermore, encryption is generally implemented at all the upper four layers, in which
case the transmitted messages are encrypted based on a secret key. Encryption approaches can
be classified into asymmetric-key and symmetric-key schemes [26]. Specifically, asymmetric-
key encryption schemes use a public and private key-pair to perform the opposite functions by
encrypting data with the public key and decrypting data with the private key. Therefore,they
do not require a secure initial exchange of the secret keys between the legitimate users. On the
other hand, symmetric-key encryption supposes that a secret key is privately shared between
the legitimate users, and that key is used to secure the transmission against potential intrud-
ers. However, key-based encryption techniques may cause key distribution and management
problems especially in large number node networks [27, 28].
Additionally, traditional higher-layer security techniques mainly rely on complex mathe-
matical calculations that consume considerable resources. Consequently, these traditional se-
curity solutions are not feasible for wireless networks such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
and ad hoc networks, which exploit resource-constrained nodes within the network. Moreover,
traditional encryption techniques are inecient in certain existing scenarios, as they do not di-
rectly leverage the unique properties of the wireless medium to defend against security threats
[19, 26, 29].
2.3 Physical Layer Security Techniques
Physical layer security, which exploits physical link properties, is a promising paradigm
to provide energy-ecient security solutions and enhance the security performance of wire-
less communications systems [30]. Security from the information-theoretic perspective was
pioneered by Shannon [31], who introduced the definition of perfect secrecy and theoretically
characterized that the fundamental ability of the physical layer can provide secure communi-
cations. In this section, a comprehensive literature survey on existing wireless security tech-
niques at the physical layer is undertaken, and physical layer security techniques are classified
18 Chapter 2. Security Challenges and Solutions in Wireless Communications
into three major categories based on the wireless channel, RF-DNA and diversity technique,
respectively.
2.3.1 Wireless Channel-Based Physical Layer Security
In wireless communications, due to the presence of scatterers and reflectors in the envi-
ronment, a transmitted signal undergoes multiple paths that combine constructively or destruc-
tively at the receiver. Consequently, the received signal is the superposition of multiple copies
of the transmitted signal via dierent paths from the transmitter to the receiver, where each
copy experiences dierences in attenuation, phase shift and propagation delay. In a multipath
propagation environment, the wireless channel can be mathematically modeled by using the
method of the impulse response in the time domain,
h(t; ) =
L 1X
l=0
l(t)el(t)(   l); (2.1)
where L is the number of multipath components. l(t), l(t) and l are amplitude, phase and
propagation delay of the lth path, respectively.
From the expression of the multipath channel in equation (2.1), the wireless channel char-
acterized by CIR has the following major properties:
 Reciprocity: As during the coherence time, the observed channel impulse responses at
two geographically separated communicating terminals are the same.
 Correlated temporal variation: Wireless channels vary with time but the variation is usu-
ally highly correlated in time.
 Spatial decorrelation: According to the propagation theory [32], the radio channel re-
sponse decorrelates rapidly in space from one transmitter-receiver pair to another if these
two pairs are at least half a wavelength away.
Based on the above properties, the wireless channel has unique location-specific character-
istics that are only determined by the two specific ends of the channel. Therefore, the char-
acteristics of the wireless channels can be exploited to provide a complementary guarantee
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of secure wireless communications. Additionally, exploitation of the physical link properties
by the channel-based physical layer security tends to convert the open nature of the wireless
medium from a security disadvantage into a security advantage.
To illustrate the general idea of channel-based physical layer security, Figure 2.2 shows a
typical adversarial multipath scenario including multiple scattering surfaces, where terminals
A, B and E are located in spatially dierent locations. It indicates that the legitimate commu-
nications between terminal A and terminal B experiences dierent paths from the transmission
between the adversary E and terminal B. Therefore, exploiting the unique characteristics of the
wireless propagation environment can discriminate among dierent transmitters.
E
A
B
Figure 2.2: An adversarial multipath environment including multiple scattering surfaces.
A variety of channel-based physical layer security schemes have been proposed in the liter-
ature. Specifically, by exploiting the channel reciprocity in wireless communications, a multi-
path channel randomness-based secret key generation system was developed in [33]. Two-way
training signals were employed by legitimate communicating terminals to obtain the same
observations of the multipath fading channel coecients under a static channel over two suc-
cessive time slots. A secret key was generated based on the observations of the legitimate
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channel; however, it is unavailable for an adversary due to the fast spatial decorrelation of mul-
tipath channels. Moreover, the received signal strength (RSS), which is a location-dependent
feature associated with the transmit power and CSI, was utilized to dierentiate between trans-
mitters [4, 5]. However, such physical layer security schemes are vulnerable to intruders who
can adjust transmitting power to spoof the legitimate user.
Alternatively, using the temporal and spatial properties of radio signal propagation in wire-
less networks, Xiao [6, 8, 34], He [9, 35] and Tugnait [10] proposed physical layer security
approaches, and obtained performance enhancement in detecting spoofing attacks. In particu-
lar, Xiao explored the properties of channel dierence between two consecutive CFR measure-
ments in multipath fading environments, and not only analyzed the characteristics of channel
dierence from single carrier communication networks to multi-carrier wireless systems, but
also extended her method from the assumption of time-invariant channel to mobile terminals.
In [9], He considered both the amplitude and phase information of CFR to fully achieve au-
thentication based on Xiao’s work, and this work was expanded by using the RAKE receiver
to distinguish users [35]. Following the approaches provided by Xiao, Tugnait [10] used time-
domain training-based CIR to accomplish authentication instead of the CFR-based method,
which considered the time-invariant channel.
2.3.2 RF-DNA Based Physical Layer Security
RF-DNA fingerprinting involves exploiting natural imperfections and unclonable variations
of a unique device induced by the analog components to identify and authenticate devices at
the physical layer, which cannot be changed post-production and mimicked by adversaries in
a manner analogous to biometrics. Various RF characteristics, such as transient amplitude and
phase, I/Q modulator imbalance and CFO, are extracted from the intrinsic physical proper-
ties of devices. These hardware impairments are observed dierentially even in two devices
constructed with the same manufacturing and packaging processes, and they are allowed by
manufacturers as wireless transceivers as such minor imperfections are acceptable for practical
implementations in the communication standards [36, 37]. Therefore, the distinct features of
the RF-DNA fingerprint can be utilized to provide additional protection against identity-related
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threats via the physical layer.
Many RF-DNA fingerprint-based device identification and authentication schemes have
been proposed in the literature. Specifically, a RF fingerprinting system was designed to
identify WiFi devices in [38] by exploiting the amplitude and phase of transient signals to
enhance wireless security. Moreover, [39] investigated a RF fingerprinting approach by ex-
ploiting transient signal features for hardware-specific identification based on 802.11a OFDM
signals. In [13], a stable and robust identification technique was proposed based on combining
several device-specific characteristics, including the frequency oset, modulated phase oset
and in-phase/quadrature-phase oset. Furthermore, a RF identification system was introduced
in [40] relying on the RF characterization of integrated circuits to defend against counterfeit-
ing. [16] proposed a novel physical layer authentication scheme by exploiting the unique bias
in RF oscillators between a specific transmitter-receiver pair that is characterized by the device-
dependent CFO. In [17], a physical layer authentication approach was developed by exploiting
the time-varying clock osets. Additionally, [15] investigated a device fingerprint-based esti-
mation method by exploiting device-specific I/Q imbalance to dierentiate dierent wireless
devices.
2.3.3 Diversity Technique-Based Physical Layer Security
2.3.3.1 PHY Layer Security in Multiple-Antenna Systems
Since the capacity of single antenna systems is bounded by the Shannon limit, diversity
techniques have been developed to improve system performance by using multiple replicas of
transmitting signals passed over multiple channels of dierent characteristics. Multiple antenna
techniques provide physical layer secrecy with new and exciting opportunities, and also provide
extremely high spectral eciency as well as link reliability through space diversity for wireless
communications [41].
By exploiting multiple antenna array structures, secure transmissions in multiple-antenna
systems were investigated in the literature [42–50], where the channel from source to legit-
imate destination was modeled as single-input multiple-output (SIMO) [42], multiple-input
single-output (MISO) [43–45], and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [46–50]. Further-
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more, [51] designed a MIMO authentication system by superimposing a stealthy fingerprint
on transmitted data, and also studied the tradeos between stealth, security and robustness.
Moreover, a channel-like fingerprint signal was introduced to MIMO transmissions, where the
fingerprinting was generated to mimic distortions like time-varying channel eects [52]. In a
rich multipath environment, by exploiting the location-specific properties of the wireless chan-
nels, CFR-based physical layer authentication in [6] was extended to a MIMO scenario that
analyzed the impact of MIMO techniques on the performance of spoofing detection based on
the ability of security gain [53]. By exploiting the properties of array redundancy and chan-
nel diversity, Li et al. [54] developed a MIMO security scheme to eectively randomize the
reception at the eavesdropper.
Innovative cross-layer designs for security enhancement combining physical layer security
with upper-layer traditional security are desirable for wireless networks. In [55], a cross-layer
security scheme for MIMO systems was proposed by using an extra dimension provided by
MIMO systems to add artificial noise to the transmitted signals; as a result, received signals
by the eavesdropper became a degraded version of legitimate signals. Additionally, [56] com-
bined cryptographic techniques operating in higher layers with security approach exploiting
redundant antennas at the physical layer to provide enhanced security performance for wire-
less networks.
2.3.3.2 Cooperative Relaying and Security Enhancement
MIMO systems use the technique of space diversity to improve communications perfor-
mance where multiple antennas are equipped at the transmitter and receiver. However, the
hardware implementation of MIMO systems is not feasible, particularly in mobile equipments,
due to size, weight and cost limitations [57]. As an alternative, cooperative diversity is achieved
through user cooperation, in which information is allowed to be transmitted between source and
destination via other nodes in a network in order to enjoy the advantages of MIMO systems
with single antenna equipped users. More specifically, cooperative communications provides
the advantages of higher spatial diversity and achievable data rates, lower transmission delay
and power, better frequency reuse and more adaptability to network conditions. Additionally,
cooperative communications techniques exploit user cooperation to combat channel fading and
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enhance the security performance of wireless networks.
A classic cooperative communications network is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which consists
of one source, one destination and N nearby relay nodes. The message transmission over the
direct channel between the source and the destination is called direct transmission, and the
message transmission with the help of relay nodes is called cooperative transmission. Informa-
tion transmission takes place in two phases. In the first phase, the message is broadcast from
the source, and received by the destination and the N relays. In the second phase, a subset or
all the relays process the received message then forward it to the destination based on a specific
cooperation transmission protocol.
By a careful investigation of the relaying strategies, cooperative transmission protocols can
be categorized into three types: the amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol in which relays amplify
the source signals and then retransmit them to the destination, the decode-and-forward (DF)
protocol in which relays first decode source signals and then encode and forward them to the
destination, and finally the compress-and-forward (CF) protocol in which relays first maps
source signals into another signals in a reduced signal space and then encode and forward them
as new codewords to the destination. Depending on the network topology and the quality of
the channel between the source and the relays, one protocol may perform better than the others
in terms of system capacity or diversity. Generally, the AF protocol is usually preferable due
to its low complexity on the relays.
The advantages of the cooperative communications come at the price of a reduced spectral
eciency. Particularly, during the second phase, the data transmission from each relay to the
destination occurs through orthogonal channels, which in turn leads to the spectral ineciency.
The concept of best relay selection is an ecient and simple method to resolve this shortcom-
ing of the cooperative communications. Specifically, instead of using all the available relays,
the best relay is selected based on a specific criterion. Similar to the original cooperative com-
munications, the best relay selection also can achieve the full diversity [58, 59]. It is worth
mentioning that the best relay selection scheme can be extended to multiple relay selection
schemes in which multiple relays are selected among the set of the available relays. In the case
of single relay selection, only one node is selected as a cooperative relay, which minimizes
the overhead due to orthogonal channels and reduces the complexity of the selection process.
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Also, single relay selection has higher bandwidth eciency and lower energy consumption
compared with all-participate relaying scheme. In contrast, multiple relay selection fully ex-
ploits the available degrees of spatial diversity, and better leverages the trade-o between error
performance and spectral eciency.
In what follows, a comprehensive summary on the existing cooperative communications
techniques is provided followed by introducing security enhancement in cooperation commu-
nications.
Rn
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Source Destination
…
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Direct Transmission
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Figure 2.3: An illustration of direct transmission and cooperative transmission.
 Existing cooperative communications schemes:
In wireless networks, cooperative mechanisms achieve space diversity with the help of
relay nodes. The concept of relay channel was introduced by van der Meulen [60, 61]
and studied later in [62], where a three-node relay channel, consisting of a source, relay
and destination, was investigated for channel capacity analysis. To illustrate the scenario
that relay nodes help a pair of terminals communicate, the model of relay channels was
developed in [63]. Furthermore, wireless relay channels and their modeling, cooper-
ative relay techniques and hardware implementations of cooperative diversity systems
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were explained in [64] for dierent scenarios in an application perspective. Also, re-
search work in [65] showed a survey of cooperative communication schemes and the
applications of cooperative relaying schemes in LTE-advanced systems, which proved
that cooperative relaying can dramatically improve the spectrum eciency and overall
system performance. Additionally, [66] introduced a distributed weighted cooperative
routing algorithm where relay selection was achieved by exploiting the weights of the
relays based on the residual energy and CSI of each end-to-end link. In [67], a sur-
vey of distributed relay selection schemes was presented for ad hoc cooperative wireless
networks.
Alternatively, cross-layer design in cooperative wireless communications provides a sig-
nificant solution for achieving energy eciency and system reliability [68]. In [68], a
new CoopMAC protocol was proposed by collaborating the physical layer with higher
layers of the protocol stack to significantly improve the system robustness, throughput
as well as delay, and reduce the interference with the coverage range extension. A uni-
fied cross layer technique in cooperative networks was proposed in [69] by considering
the physical and network layers for resource allocation among multiple nodes to max-
imize the nodes utility. Additionally, a distributed cross layer technique was proposed
in [70] by exploiting opportunistic relaying mechanisms to achieve QoS in the coopera-
tive communications, where energy savings and low bit error rates can be achieved under
cross-layer cooperation.
 Security enhancement in cooperative relaying:
The feasibility of traditional physical layer security schemes is hampered by the severe
channel impairment caused by multipath channel fading. Compared with the application
of multiple antennas, the cooperative transmission approach is emerging as a more ef-
fective way to combat channel fading and enhance the security performance of wireless
networks [71].
In the context of secure cooperative relaying, three cooperative schemes were proposed
in [72] by exploiting cooperating relays to enhance the security performance in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Moreover, [73] and [74] investigated the secrecy
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through user cooperation for secure wireless communications. Also, a physical layer se-
curity system was designed in [75] by using collaborative relays to form a beamforming
structure to achieve the goal of maximizing the secrecy rate. Furthermore, cooperative
jamming(CJ) is another method by implementing cooperation to enhance physical layer
security with secrecy constraints [76,77], where each relay transmits weighted jamming
signals with the purpose of degrading the eavesdropper’s signal. By exploiting multi-
antenna relays, two cooperative approaches were introduced in [78] for secure wireless
transmissions, and a hybrid scheme was also proposed by exploiting cooperative relaying
and cooperative jamming simultaneously at the relay for achieving secure transmission.
Additionally, a cross-layer scheme for detecting malicious relay nodes in the cooperative
communications was proposed in [79] by using adaptive signal detection at the physical
layer and pseudorandom tracing symbols at the application layer simultaneously.
From the aforementioned discussions related to cooperative communications schemes and
security enhancement, it can be concluded that the unique properties of the cooperative commu-
nications make it possible to develop new physical layer security strategies, which can address
the drawbacks of the traditional security schemes.
2.4 Wireless OFDM System and its Security Vulnerabilities
Modern high-speed wireless communication techniques, such as the well-established and
widespread WLAN transmissions of the family IEEE 802.11 [80, 81], the more recent WiMax
[82] and LTE protocols [83, 84], are all standardized, developed and deployed based on the
OFDM technique, due to its spectral eciency, high achievable data rates and robust perfor-
mance in multipath fading environments [85]. However, OFDM systems lack built-in security
capabilities. Consequently, investigating the security weaknesses of OFDM is critical to design
security mechanisms for secure existing wireless communications systems.
In what follows, a conventional OFDM system for wireless communications is introduced
followed by a discussion of its security vulnerabilities.
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2.4.1 OFDM Introduction and System Modeling
OFDM is a multiplexing method where data are transmitted over equally spaced and over-
lapped carrier frequencies, thereby providing a simple and ecient solution to deal with fre-
quency selective channels [86]. OFDM, which was first introduced by S. B. Weinstein and P.
M. Ebert in 1971 [87], allows for the multiplexing of various subchannels over the transmission
medium to be obtained through the fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm. Mathematically,
OFDM can be seen as a time-limited form of multicarrier modulation. fX(m)gN 1m=0 is denoted as
complex symbols to be transmitted by OFDMmodulation, thus, a time domain OFDM symbol
consisting of N subcarriers can be expressed as
x(t) =
N 1X
m=0
X(m)e j2 fmt; 0  t  Ts; (2.2)
where fm is the frequency of the mth subcarrier, and fm = m f . Ts and  f are denoted as the
symbol duration and subcarrier space of OFDM, respectively. In order to demodulate OFDM
signals at the receiver, orthogonality condition is satisfied, that is, Ts f = 1.
Substituting fm = mTs and t = n
Ts
N into (2.2), the transmitted OFDM symbol in the discrete-
time domain can be written as
x(n) =
N 1X
m=0
X(m)e j2m
n
N ; n = 0; 1;    ;N   1: (2.3)
Notice that x(n) is expressed by applying inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT) to X(m),
in which IDFT can be eciently implemented by using inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT)
for fast calculation. Figure 2.4 illustrates an OFDM symbol with five subcarriers shown in the
frequency and time domain.
In order to avoid ISI and maintain subcarrier orthogonality, a CP is prefixed to time-domain
OFDM symbol as a guard interval, which is a repetition of the end of the time-domain OFDM
symbol. Figure 2.5 demonstrates that ISI can be eliminated between consecutive OFDM sym-
bols when the length of multipath channel L is shorter than the guard interval.
Additionally, since CP repeats the end part of the OFDM symbol, the linear convolution
of the OFDM symbol and a frequency-selective multipath channel is modeled as circular con-
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Figure 2.4: Example of an OFDM symbol.
volution. Specifically, the OFDM symbol after IFFT can be written according to the equation
(2.3),
x = [x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(N   1)]T : (2.4)
Prefixing the symbol with a CP of length Ncp, the OFDM symbol becomes
x˜ = [x˜( Ncp); : : : ; x˜( 2); x˜( 1); x˜(0); x˜(1); : : : ; x˜(N   1)]T
= [x(N   Ncp); : : : ; x(N   2); x(N   1); x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(N   1)]T : (2.5)
Assume that the frequency-selective multipath channel is expressed by
h = [h(0); h(1); : : : ; h(L   1)]T : (2.6)
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Figure 2.5: ISI cancelation.
Consequently, the received signal samples in the time domain y(n) can be expressed as
y(n) = h  x˜ + w(n)
=
L 1X
l=0
h(l)x˜(n   l) + w(n);  Ncp + 2L   1  n  N   1; (2.7)
where  denotes linear convolution, and w(n) is zero-mean complex circular Gaussian noise
with variance 2w, i.e., w(n)  Nc(0; 2w). Since x˜(n   l) is equal to x(n   l mod N), the
convolution of the OFDM symbol and the channel becomes circular convolution. Therefore,
using CP can significantly simplify the receiver design for channel estimation and equalization.
Figure 2.6 shows the block diagram of an OFDM system.
From the aforementioned discussion of OFDM system, the advantages of OFDM can be
summarized as follows:
 High data rate can be achieved with high bandwidth eciency and flexible underlying
modulations.
 ISI can be eliminated with the help of CP.
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Figure 2.6: The block diagram of an OFDM system.
 Channel equalization and estimation become quite simpler because information is carried
over parallel orthogonal subchannels.
2.4.2 Security Weaknesses of OFDM
OFDM has been employed in various communications systems due to its spectral e-
ciency, high achievable data rates and robust performance in multipath fading environments.
Despite these advantageous features, OFDM signals are transparent to potential eavesdrop-
pers, as OFDM-based communication systems lack built-in security capabilities. Typically,
since OFDM employs pilot tones or preamble symbols for channel estimation, equalization
and synchronization at the receiver, the implementations of OFDM are highly susceptible to
signal jamming attacks [88–90]. Additionally, due to the distinct time and frequency charac-
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teristics of OFDM signals, physical layer transmission parameters of OFDM signals can be
blindly estimated by any user within the same network, and no prior information of the signals
is required for them [91, 92]. Hence, additional encryption algorithms should be implemented
in OFDM systems for data security.
In order to achieve data security in OFDM, traditionally, information encryption approaches
relying on the high layers of communication stack (such as application and network layers) are
used to encrypt the information with a secret key. The key is initially exchanged between
the legitimate users, and the legitimate receiver uses the knowledge of the key to decrypt the
message, while the eavesdropper cannot decrypt the data without the key. However, due to
the improvement of terminal processing capacity, the transmitted information can be possibly
decrypted by adversaries using exhaustive trials, and key distribution and management become
more dicult to achieve in high-layer encryption mechanisms.
Alternatively, a few physical layer encryption techniques for OFDM systems were proposed
in [93–95] based on encrypting the frequency domain symbols. Specifically, [93] proposed a
physical layer security scheme by scrambling OFDM constellation symbols to encrypt the data
transmission in the presence of various denial of service (DoS) attacks. The scrambling matrix
is based on a key derived from a one-dimensional chaotic map. Moreover, in [94], a symmetric
key physical layer encryption was developed by using non-orthogonal FDM signals to mask
the OFDM signals. Additionally, a noise-enhanced encryption approach was proposed in [95]
by using traditional cryptographic ciphers and adding truly random noise at the transmitter to
reduce eavesdroppers’ knowledge of the transmitted information.
Despite the respective contributions to secure the transmission of OFDM signals, the main
limitations of these physical layer encryption systems can be summarized as follows:
 Transmission power is sacrificed to maintain the bandwidth eciency of OFDM, which
is not suitable for power constrained devices.
 The requirements for modulating symbols in OFDM are restrictive and their violation
can potentially lead to information leakage to adversaries.
 The large length of key sequences for encrypting signals can potentially create problems
by decreasing the speed of data transmission.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, security challenges in wireless communications have been discussed by
comparing with the wired networks. To address wireless security issues, traditional wireless
security techniques relying on the higher layers of the OSI model have been studied. Due to the
security weaknesses of the traditional security techniques, physical layer security is emerging
as a promising paradigm by exploiting physical layer properties to complement the traditional
wireless security mechanisms. A comprehensive literature survey of existing physical layer
security techniques has been illustrated and these physical layer security approaches have been
divided into three categories based on wireless channel, RF-DNA and diversity technique. Ad-
ditionally, OFDM technology has been widely employed in modern wireless communication
techniques; however, OFDM is vulnerable to adversaries due to its distinct time and frequency
characteristics at the physical layer. Therefore, secure OFDM-based wireless systems is critical
for secure wireless communications.
Chapter 3
Noise-Mitigated CIR-Based Physical
Layer Authentication
In this Chapter, a robust physical layer authentication scheme for wireless communications
is proposed by exploiting the inherent properties of CIR in a time-varying multipath environ-
ment. The variation between two consecutive CIR measurements from a transmitter of interest
is utilized by the receiver in order to distinguish between dierent transmitters for authentica-
tion purpose.
Under a binary hypothesis testing, we develop a new test statistic based on the dierence
between noise-mitigated CIR estimates in order to minimize the impact of noise and inter-
ference from the wireless environment. To achieve this goal, a SNR-dependent threshold is
utilized to eliminate the excessive noise in the estimated CIRs prior to conducting the authen-
tication process. For performance analysis, FAR and PD are theoretically defined based on
the developed test statistic, and an adaptive threshold for the authentication test is achieved
under a constant FAR. Additionally, the proposed authentication scheme is analyzed based on
an OFDM system and validated by Monte-Carlo method.
3.1 Introduction
Wireless communications face increasing challenges in combating various additional se-
curity threats comparing with traditional wireline networks, primarily due to the broadcast
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and open nature of the wireless communication environment. Existing wireless security tech-
niques are mainly focused on processing techniques in the data or protocol domains to prevent
potential security threats. Due to the vulnerability of existing higher-layer wireless security
mechanisms to spoofing attacks [19], new wireless security techniques exploiting the physical
link properties provide additional protection for the communication process.
As a major aspect of wireless security, authentication is a process to verify the identities of
terminals, and has been explored at the physical layer in recent years. Physical layer authenti-
cation methods are generally developed by formulating authentication as a hypothesis testing
problem [6,8–10,34,35,96,97]. Xiao et al. [6,8,34,97] and He et al. [9,35] separately proposed
authentication approaches under a binary hypothesis testing by exploring channel dierences
between two consecutive CFRs. Nevertheless, CFR analysis fails to exploit spatial information
related to the signal propagation environment in the received signals for security enhancement
purpose. Following Xiao’s works, time-domain training-based CIR was used in [10] to achieve
an authentication system. However, a simple time-invariant wireless environment was consid-
ered [10].
In this Chapter, we propose a physical layer authentication scheme using a channel-based
hypothesis testing method to detect anomalous behaviors through the statistical analysis of the
inherent properties of CIR dierence in a time-varying multipath environment. Specifically, a
new test statistic is developed by exploiting the noise-mitigated CIR dierence and tracking the
significant channel taps, where we utilize a SNR-dependent time-domain threshold to eliminate
the excessive noise. To achieve eective authentication, an adaptive threshold is derived at the
receiver based on the statistical properties of CIR variation and used for distinguishing the
legitimate transmitter from intruders.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, the system model and chan-
nel model are provided, and then the proposed CIR-based authentication scheme is presented in
Section 3.3. In order to verify the proposed authentication scheme and the corresponding the-
oretical analysis, we illustrate numerical results in Section 3.4, and this Chapter is summarized
in Section 3.5.
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3.2 System Modeling
Our proposed scheme is presented under the ubiquitous “Alice-Bob-Eve” scenario shown
in Figure 3.1. Here, Alice, Bob and Eve are located in spatially dierent positions. Alice, as
the legitimate transmitter, delivers data to the intended receiver Bob, while Eve serves as an
adversary attempting to impersonate the transmission from Alice. Our objective is to develop
the capability for Bob to verify whether signals are from Alice or not. Since CIR reflects all the
properties of a wireless channel, it indicates the spatial geometry of the wireless environment
between the transmitter and the receiver. Consequently, the variation of CIR at Bob can be
exploited to authenticate the identity of the transmitter (Alice or Eve). Specifically, the current
CIR is compared with historical channel statistics between Alice and Bob under a binary hy-
pothesis testing. The proposed authentication scheme and the related theoretical analysis are
verified based on an OFDM system.
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Figure 3.1: CIR-based Authentication in the “Alice-Bob-Eve” Scenario.
3.2.1 Channel Model
The wireless channel model for multipath fading environment can be expressed as
h(n) =
L 1X
l=0
al(n)(n   l); (3.1)
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where al(n) is the channel gain of the lth multipath component at discrete time n, l represents
the index of dierent path delay normalized to the sampling time interval, and L is the length
of CIR. In a Rayleigh fading channel, at any sampling time, al(n) can be modeled as a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance2l , i.e., al(n)  Nc(0; 2l ), the paths are
assumed to be statistically independent, and the average power is normalized, i.e.,
L 1X
l=0
2l = 1.
To improve the authentication performance of the proposed technique, two types of normal-
ization with CIR are considered [98] – time delay normalization and amplitude normalization.
Time delay normalization means the time delay of the line-of-sight (LOS) multipath compo-
nent is set to be zero to avoid a large timing oset between two CIRs on the same path. In
addition, since there is the possibility of dramatic variation in received signal power from po-
tential spoofers, amplitude normalization is needed to mitigate this kind of attack and achieve
a robust system performance. Therefore, the measurement of normalized CIR can be obtained
as h˜ = h=k h k, where k  k means the Euclidean norm. In the following sections, we use h as
the normalized ideal CIR for simplification.
3.2.2 Hypothesis Testing
In this subsection, we propose a physical layer authentication approach by using the prop-
erties of the CIR dierence. In this new authentication scheme, the current CIR estimated by
Bob in Figure 3.1 is compared with the previous CIR estimate for transmitter identification
(Alice or Eve). Mathematically, a binary hypothesis testing problem can be formulated as
H0 : hˆt = hˆAB
H1 : hˆt , hˆAB;
(3.2)
where hˆAB is the noisy version of CIR from Alice to Bob, and hˆt is the estimated CIR from an
unknown terminal (Alice or Eve). Additionally, H0, the null hypothesis, stands for Alice as the
claimant, while the alternative hypothesis, H1, means the terminal is someone else.
Due to the statistical independence between any two paths, the properties of a single path
are analyzed here without loss of generality. Therefore, in (3.2), the noisy version of CIR on
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the lth multipath component can be written as
hˆt;l(k) = ht;l(k) + nt(k) ; 0  l  L   1; (3.3)
where hˆt;l =
n
hˆAB;l; hˆEB;l
o
. The first term ht;l stands for the ideal CIR, and nt is zero-mean white
complex Gaussian noise with variance 2N .
Additionally, due to the correlation of adjacent CIRs on the same path (i.e., hAB;l(k   1)
and hAB;l(k)), an autoregressive model of order 1 (AR-1) [8] is utilized to describe the temporal
process of hAB;l(k),
hAB;l(k) = hAB;l(k   1) +
q
(1   2)2A;lul(k   1); 0  l  L   1; (3.4)
where the AR coecient  represents the correlation of two successive CIRs which can be con-
sidered as a constant, and ul is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance
one, which is independent of hAB;l.
Consequently, according to the AR-1 model in (3.4), we can determine the distribution of
hAB;l as
hAB;l  Nc  0¯ ;MM ; (3.5)
where
 =
2666666666666666666666664
R0;0 R0;1    R0;(M 1)
R1;0 R1;1    R1;(M 1)
           
R(M 1);0 R(M 1);1    R(M 1);(M 1)
3777777777777777777777775
; (3.6)
and Rk1;k2 = 
jk1 k2 j2A;l. M is the number of OFDM symbols in an observation window.
3.3 CIR-based Authentication
3.3.1 Noise Impact on CIR Dierence Evaluation
In the following analysis, a sparse channel with a few significant multipath components on
integer delays is considered. In addition, comb-type pilots are employed for CIR estimation in
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an OFDM system. Let Np be the number of pilots, which is larger than the length of ideal CIR
(i.e., L) to avoid any loss of channel information. Without the knowledge of the actual CIR at
the receiver, the CIR estimate based on the comb-type pilots can be expressed as
hˆt;l(k) =
8>>><>>>: ht;l(k) + nt(k); i f 0  l  Np   10; i f Np  l  N: (3.7)
From the equation above, we can see that both strong and weak multipaths are corrupted
by noise. Noise components are introduced at the receiver side to the original zero-valued
channel taps, which will aect the determination of the true channel variation related to the
significant channel taps. Thus, it is necessary to study the impact of the noise nt in (3.7) for
CIR dierence evaluation due to the channel sparsity. To address this issue, first of all, the
CIR dierence between two consecutive estimated CIRs, which are both from the legitimate
transmitter Alice, can be expressed as
hˆAB =
Np 1X
l=0
hAB;l(k)   hAB;l(k   1) + nA(k)   nA(k   1)
=
Np 1X
l=0
hAB;l + nA : (3.8)
Let us denote Q as the set of time indices for significant channel tap coecients. The above
CIR dierence can be rewritten as
hˆAB =
X
l2Q
hAB;l + nA +X
l<Q
jnAj : (3.9)
The second term in (3.9) is induced totally by noise which should be eliminated. To avoid
the impact of the noise on evaluating the CIR dierence, we need a noise dependent threshold
to mitigate the noise impact. In particular, we compare the absolute value of each tap with
the threshold dce. All the insignificant taps with absolute value below the threshold are set to
zeros. The general expression of the threshold-based CIR estimates corresponding to (3.7) can
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be represented as
hˆt;l(k) =
8>>><>>>: hˆt;l(k); i f
hˆt;l(k) > dce
0; i f
hˆt;l(k)  dce; (3.10)
and the second term of the CIR dierence in (3.9) is eliminated after the threshold in (3.10) is
applied.
In order to determine the threshold dce, the mean square error (MSE) of estimation errors
is minimized. In [99], the authors proposed a criterion for obtaining a sub-optimal threshold
value without the knowledge of the channel statistics. Thus, the threshold dce can be expressed
by
dce 
q
2N ln

Np=Po f a

; (3.11)
where Po f a is the overall FAR, which is assumed to be a constant parameter according to
a specific security level. The numerical results in [99] also confirmed that using the sub-
optimal threshold value for channel estimation can achieve same system performance as using
the optimal threshold. Moreover, noise variance is needed to calculate the threshold value in
(3.11). A proposed approach in [100] is utilized here for noise variance estimation, in which
the redundancy introduced by the CP was exploited. Thus, the estimated noise variance can be
written as
2N =
1
2M(Ncp   u)
M 1X
v=0
Ncp 1X
m=u
y(v(N + Ncp) + m)   y(v(N + Ncp) + N + m)2 ;
L  u  Ncp   1; (3.12)
where M is the number of observed OFDM symbols. Since the actual length of CIR (i.e., L)
is unknown at the receiver side and it was assumed that L  Np, L is replaced here by Np for
noise variance estimation.
3.3.2 Adaptive Threshold for Authentication
In this Chapter, the proposed CIR-based authentication method is based on the noise-
mitigated CIR estimates given in (3.10). Under the binary hypothesis testing, a new test statistic
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is developed based on the dierence between adjacent noise-mitigated CIR estimates. That is,
T =
1
2
Np 1X
l=0
jTlj2
=
1
2
X
l2Q1[Q2
hˆt;l(k)   hˆAB;l(k   1)2
=
1
2
X
l2Q1[Q2
ht;l(k) + nt(k)   hAB;l(k   1)   nA(k   1)2 ; (3.13)
where 2 is the variance of the estimated CIR dierence for normalization. Q1 and Q2 denote
two sets of indices as the set Q, which are corresponding to the CIR estimates hˆt;l(k) and
hˆAB;l(k   1) respectively.
Based on the distributions of both hAB;l and nt, we can derive the distributions of random
variable Tl under the two hypotheses H0 and H1. That is,
H0 : Tl  Nc(0¯ ; 
2
H0;l
I)
H1 : Tl  Nc(lI; 2H1;lI);
(3.14)
where I is the identity matrix, l = E

hEB;l
   E hAB;l, 2H0;l = 2(1   )2A;l + 22N and
2H1;l = 
2
E;l + 
2
A;l + 2
2
N . The subscripts “A” and “E” represent the transmitters Alice and
Eve respectively.
Since only significant multipath components are maintained after applying the noise-mitigated
threshold on CIR estimates, the test statistic T can be further separated into three parts under
the two hypotheses, respectively. Specifically, under H0, the test statistic T is expressed by
T =
X
l2Q1 C
2
2A;l + 
2
N
hˆAB;l(k)2
+
X
l2Q2 C
2
2A;l + 
2
N
hˆAB;l(k   1)2
+
X
l2C
2
2H0;l
hˆAB;l(k)   hˆAB;l(k   1)2
= T1;H0 + T2;H0 + T3;H0 ; (3.15)
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where C is equal to Q1 \ Q2. Similarly, under H1, the test statistic T is rewritten as
T =
X
l2Q1 C
2
2E;l + 
2
N
hˆEB;l(k)2
+
X
l2Q2 C
2
2A;l + 
2
N
hˆAB;l(k   1)2
+
X
l2C
2
2H1;l
hˆEB;l(k)   hˆAB;l(k   1)2
= T1;H1 + T2;H1 + T3;H1 : (3.16)
With a closer look at the two equations above, one can find that the estimated CIR dierence
under two hypotheses is dominated by the first and the second terms combined, which means
unexpected significant paths lead to a large CIR dierence. Therefore, an adaptive threshold
dau is necessary for the receiver to make reliable authentication decisions.
Additionally, the distributions of the six separated parts of T given in (3.15) and (3.16) can
be obtained, which follow the chi-square distribution with dierent degrees of freedom. That
is, 8>>><>>>: T1;H0  
2
0;2(Q1 C)
T1;H1  20;2(Q1 C);
(3.17)
8>>><>>>: T2;H0  
2
0;2(Q2 C)
T2;H1  20;2(Q2 C);
(3.18)
and 8>>><>>>: T3;H0  
2
0;2C
T3;H1  2;2C:
(3.19)
Due to the property of chi-square distribution [101] (i.e., if X  2v1 and Y  2v2, we have
X+Y  2v1+v2), the test statistic T under the two hypotheses still follow chi-square distribution,
which can be expressed as
H0 : T  20;2(Q1+Q2 C)
H1 : T  2;2(Q1+Q2 C);
(3.20)
where  =
PC 1
l=0
22l
2E;l+
2
A;l+2
2
N
.
Based on the developed test statistic in (3.13), theoretical FAR P f a and PD Pd can be derived
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by
P f a = P(T > daujH0) = 1   F20;2(Q1+Q2 C)(dau); (3.21)
and
Pd = P(T > daujH1) = 1   F2
;2(Q1+Q2 C)
(dau); (3.22)
where F2N () denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the chi-square distribution
with the order N. For military communications, P f a is normally set below 0:1. Thus, after
calculating the value of Q1 + Q2   C, the threshold dau can be obtained under a given value of
P f a. i.e.,
dau = F 120;2(Q1+Q2 C)
(1   P f a); (3.23)
where F 1() is the inverse function of F().
3.4 Simulation Results
3.4.1 Simulation Scenarios
In this section, simulation results are presented to confirm the eectiveness of the proposed
approach. For all simulation cases, an OFDM system is employed with QPSK modulation.
Comb-type pilots are inserted into each OFDM symbol for CIR estimation. Regarding the
channel model, a random Rayleigh fading channel is utilized with sparse sample-spaced sig-
nificant taps, uniform power delay profile, where paths on dierent tap positions are statis-
tically independent with normalized average power. The particular parameters related to our
simulations are list in Table 3.1.
3.4.2 Numerical Results and Discussion
In this subsection, we mainly present the simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis
related to the performance of our proposed authentication system.
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Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters
Subcarrier Number 1024
CP Length 256
Pilot Number 64
Significant Path Number (Alice-Bob) 6
Significant Path Number (Eve-Bob) 10
In Figure 3.2, it is shown both the theoretical and the simulated lower bound of the adaptive
threshold for spoofing attack detection. Three pairs of curves of the adaptive threshold are plot-
ted under three dierent FARs, which meet the requirement of low FAR for military commu-
nications. It is clear that the simulation results and the theory are approximately overlapping,
especially at high SNR. The results indicate that smaller probability of rejecting signals from
Alice (i.e. smaller value of FAR) needs larger threshold values, and the values of the threshold
also decline while SNR rises.
Figure 3.3 shows the PD vs SNRs under three dierent false alarm rates. With dierent
FAR requirements, it is observed that theoretical analysis and simulation can simultaneously
achieve great performance in terms of PD. When the value of SNR reaches to 8 dB, a very high
PD of 0.9 is achieved. Although low FAR aects the performance of PD, the impact is limited
and the overall performance of spoofing detection remains robust.
In Figure 3.4, a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is sketched for simulated and
theoretical cases at SNR of 0 dB, 5 dB and 10 dB, respectively. It is found that the theoretical
analysis and simulation are approximately matching even at low FAR region for various SNR
values. The performance of spoofing detection remains great even at low SNR of 5 dB.
3.5 Summary
In this Chapter, we have proposed a physical layer authentication scheme under a new hy-
pothesis testing based on the statistical analysis of estimated CIR dierences in time-varying
multipath fading channels. The impacts of background noise and interference from wireless
environments have been mitigated by removing the excessive noise in sparse CIRs with a SNR-
dependent threshold. The FAR and PD have been theoretically derived to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed authentication scheme. Under a given FAR, an adaptive threshold for
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Figure 3.2: Adaptive threshold values for authentication versus SNRs under dierent false
alarm rates.
the authentication test was achieved in dierent channel conditions. An OFDM system has
been utilized to validate the performance of our proposed scheme. The eectiveness of the
proposed CIR-based authentication scheme has been verified by using the theoretical analysis
and Monte-Carlo method.
3.5. Summary 45
−10 −5 0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SNR (dB)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 D
et
ec
tio
n
 
 
Monte−Carlo Pfa=0.01
Theory Pfa=0.01
Monte−Carlo Pfa=0.05
Theory Pfa=0.05
Monte−Carlo Pfa=0.1
Theory Pfa=0.1
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Chapter 4
CIR-Based Authentication Enhancement
Using Channel Predictor
The inherent properties of CIR, which are considered as location-specific characteristics
of the physical link, have been exploited to develop a robust physical layer authentication
scheme in Chapter 3. However, the reliability of CIR-based physical layer authentication is
challenged by the rapid channel variation in fast fading environments. In this Chapter, we
exploit a long-rang channel predictor to predict future CIRs in order to compensate for the
negative eects of fast channel variation. Specifically, the predicted CIR is achieved based on
the historical CIR estimates, and then it is utilized as the previous CIR measurement in the
authentication process. Under a binary hypothesis testing, a test statistic is developed based on
the dierence between current CIR and the predicted CIR. In order to increase the robustness
of authentication performance, a final decision is formed based on multiple CIR dierences
that are calculated by the receiver based on the long-range channel predictor. Based on the
developed test statistic, theoretical FAR and PD are derived to validate the performance of the
proposed authentication scheme. An optimization problem is defined based on minimizing the
total error rate under false alarm constraints in order to find optimal value of the threshold for
decision-making. Finally, the performance of the proposed scheme is compared with that of a
traditional channel-based authentication method in simulations.
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4.1 Introduction
In wireless communications, there are many emerging challenges in combating various ad-
ditional security threats compared with traditional wired networks, due to the broadcast nature
of the wireless medium. Typically, most existing security mechanisms are based on crypto-
graphical techniques at the higher layers of protocol stack to prevent any potential security
threats. Due to the vulnerability of existing higher-layer wireless security techniques against
spoofing attacks [109], new wireless security techniques utilizing the physical link character-
istics are proposed to provide an additional protection for secure data transmissions.
According to the information-theoretic security introduced by Shannon, the fundamental
ability of the physical layer has been theoretically verified that it can provide secure com-
munications in perfect secrecy. In addition, a reliable transmission in approximately perfect
secrecy has been proven in [110] by introducing the concept of the wiretap channel with noise.
Furthermore, the existence of channel codes can be explored to guarantee a secure commu-
nication on a broadcast channel [111]. Without clear definition of perfect authenticity in the
theory of secrecy, information-theoretically secure message authentication has been initially
proposed by Simmons, and a model of message authentication has been developed under a
noiseless channel [112]. In [96], a generalized and simplified authentication technique has
been proposed based on a binary hypothesis testing. Also, a message authentication scheme
has been designed in [113] with the consideration of channel and authentication coding in a
noisy environment.
More recently, the physical layer authentication is further investigated in [9, 10, 97] by
exploiting the CSI. In particular, Xiao et al. in [97] has explored the properties of channel
dierences between two consecutive CFRs in a time-variant channel. Based on this work, a
physical layer authentication scheme has been proposed in [9] by considering both the ampli-
tude and phase information of CFR. Alternatively, time-domain training-based CIR has been
exploited for authentication analysis in [10] under a simple time-invariant wireless channel.
In realistic wireless propagation environment, the characteristics of CIR are varying over time
due to the movement of terminals or the surrounded scatterers under the mobile environment,
however, they are slowly time-variant. Considering a time-varying multipath fading channel, a
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robust CIR-based authentication scheme is proposed in [104] by exploiting the channel varia-
tion between noise-mitigated CIRs.
In practice, the time-varying fading nature of the wireless channel is one of the main funda-
mental limitations in the mobile radio communications, caused by the movement of terminals
or objects in the propagation environment. Therefore, the performance of channel-based au-
thentication scenario is challenged by the environmental changes on the transmission as well
as the dynamic changing topology. Particularly, the main challenges of the channel-based
physical layer authentication schemes are: 1) Fast channel variation leads to outdated CIR
measurements at the receiver that would negatively impact the performance of authentication;
2) Unreliable decision-making for authentication is caused by forming a final decision based
on the single observation of CIR dierence.
To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose an enhanced CIR-based authentica-
tion scheme in this Chapter by exploiting a long-range channel predictor to predict future CIRs
based on the historical CIR estimates in order to compensate for the eects of the rapid vari-
ation of the fading channel. Moreover, to form a final decision in the authentication process,
multiple CIR dierences are calculated by the receiver in an observation window based on the
long-range channel predictor. Theoretical FAR and PD are defined based on a new test statistic
that is developed by calculating multiple CIR dierences between the current CIR and one of
the adjacent CIRs in the window under a binary hypothesis testing. A final decision is made
to reject the null hypothesis if partial CIR dierences are larger than a threshold, otherwise the
null hypothesis is accepted. In order to find optimal value of the threshold in decision rule, an
optimization problem is defined based on minimizing the total error rate under false alarm con-
straints. Lastly, the performance of the proposed schemes is evaluated by using Monte-Carlo
method.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, the model of the proposed
authentication system is illustrated, and an enhanced authentication scheme is proposed by
exploiting a long-range channel predictor in Section 4.3. In order to verify the theoretical
analysis of our proposed authentication schemes, we illustrate the numerical results in Section
4.4, and summarize this chapter in Section 4.5.
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4.2 Authentication Model
Our proposed authentication scheme is illustrated under the “Alice-Bob-Eve” scenario
shown in Figure 3.1. In this section, the CIR is modeled first and the properties of CIR are
indicated as well. Moreover, our authentication problem is formulated by a binary hypothesis
testing.
4.2.1 Channel Model
The continuous-time CIR of a wireless channel can be modeled as a superposition of a
certain number of paths, each characterized by its amplitude and delay, that is,
c(t; ) =
L 1X
l=0
le j2 flt(   l); (4.1)
where L is the number of channel paths, l is the amplitude for the lth path, l is the correspond-
ing delay, and fl is the Doppler frequency shift limited by the maximum Doppler frequency fd.
In a Rayleigh fading channel, the channel coecient le j2 flt can be modeled as a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance 2l . The paths are assumed to be
statistically independent, and the average power is normalized, i.e.,
L 1X
l=0
2l = 1. Assuming a
sampling rate of fs = 1=Ts, the samples of channel coecient on the lth component can be
expressed as
h(n; l) = le j2 flnTs : (4.2)
Additionally, we assume that one channel coecient is highly correlated with the succes-
sive one on the same path. Specifically, the AR-1 model in (3.4) is employed to describe
the temporal variation between h(n; l) and h(n   1; l). Herein, the AR coecient  represents
the correlation of two successive CIRs, which is calculated by using the Jakes model [32],
i.e.,  = J0(2 fdTs), and J0() is the Bessel function of the first kind and zero-th order.
Therefore, the discrete autocorrelation function of channels h(n   k1; l) and h(n   k2; l) is
Rk1;k2 = E fh(n   k1; l)h(n   k2; l)g =  jk1 k2 j2l .
In real mobile radio environments, channel parameters such as channel coecients, Doppler
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frequency shifts and path delays, and the AR coecient are slowly time-variant. Therefore, the
channel model is reasonably accurate within a finite time interval and can be assumed to be in-
variant in a small time window for the following authentication analysis and channel prediction.
4.2.2 Hypothesis Testing
The proposed authentication scheme is mathematically formulated as a binary hypothesis
testing problem. Specifically, the current CIR estimated by Bob (i.e., hˆX(n)) is compared with
the previous estimated CIR (i.e., hˆA(n   1)) to identify the identity of the transmitter (Alice or
Eve). Thus, the binary hypothesis testing problem can be formulated as
H0 :
hˆX(n)   hˆA(n   1)2 < 
H1 :
hˆX(n)   hˆA(n   1)2 > ; (4.3)
where hˆA is the noisy version of CIR from Alice to Bob, and hˆX is the estimated CIR from
an unknown terminal with X = fA; Eg. Herein, the subscripts “A” and “E” represent the
transmitters Alice and Eve, respectively.  is a threshold for the authentication test to determine
if an eavesdropper is present. Additionally, H0, the null hypothesis, stands for Alice as the
claimant, while the alternative hypothesis, H1, means the terminal is someone else.
Herein the noisy version of CIR achieved by the receiver, which is the actual CIR corrupted
by the noise through a wireless channel, can be expressed as
hˆX(n) =
h
hˆX(n; 1); hˆX(n; 2);    ; hˆX(n;Np   1)
iT
; (4.4)
where
hˆX(n; l) = hX(n; l) + d(n; l); 0  l  Np   1: (4.5)
Herein, Np is the number of estimated CIR paths, which is assumed to be larger than the length
of actual CIR (i.e., L) to avoid any loss of the channel information. d(n; l) is the zero-mean
white complex Gaussian noise with variance 2d.
We assume that the knowledge of actual CIR between two wireless terminals is unknown.
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Least-squares (LS) channel estimation is employed for channel estimation. Based on the binary
hypothesis testing in (4.3), the dierence between two adjacent CIR estimates is mathemati-
cally formulated by
hˆX(n; l)   hˆA(n   1; l)
= hX(n; l) + dX(n; l)   hA(n   1; l)   dA(n   1; l): (4.6)
Due to the independence of dierent multipath components and the assumption of uniform
power delay profile of the multipath fading channel, we can just explore the properties of CIR
on one single path without loss of generality. More specifically, based on the AR-1 model
given in (3.4) and the distribution of d in (4.5), the distribution of the CIR dierence under the
two hypotheses can be derived by
H0 : hˆA(n; l)   hˆA(n   1; l)  Nc(0; 2H0)
H1 : hˆE(n; l)   hˆA(n   1; l)  Nc(0; 2H1);
(4.7)
where Nc(; 2) expresses the complex Gaussian distribution with mean  and variance 2.
Herein 2H0 = 2(1   )2A + 22d and 2H1 = 2E + 2A + 22d.
4.3 Channel Prediction Based Authentication Enhancement
Indeed, channel prediction in mobile radio systems is the key element for many fading-
compensation techniques, where future samples of the fading channel are estimated and used
to enhance the performance of adaptive transmission systems [114]. To enable a robust au-
thentication to overcome the negative eects of fast channel variation, channel prediction can
be used to predict several symbols ahead and improve the performance of spoofing detection.
In this section, an enhanced CIR-based physical layer authentication scheme is developed by
exploiting a long-range channel predictor to predict future CIRs based on a series of historical
CIR estimates. A statistical test is developed based on the dierence between the current and
the predicted CIRs. Lastly, theoretical FAR and PD are defined based on exploring multiple
observations of the CIR dierences for performance evaluation.
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4.3.1 Noise-Mitigated CIR Estimates
In this subsection, a noise-mitigated threshold is utilized to preprocess CIR estimates in
order to eliminate negative impacts of the communication noise. In practical situations, trans-
mitted signals would be interfered by noise through a wireless channel, thereby the achieved
channel response at the receiver would be corrupted by noise as well. Recalling the formula
of the noisy version of CIR in (4.5), we can notice that both strong and weak paths are cor-
rupted by noise. Therefore, the noise components, which are superimposed on the original
zero-valued channel taps, can aect the determination of the actual channel dierence between
two CIRs on the significant paths. In order to eliminate the impact of noise, the dierence
between two consecutive CIR estimates is first formulated by
h =
Np 1X
l=0
hˆ(n; l)   hˆ(n   1; l)
=
X
l2Q
hˆl +X
l<Q
jdlj ; (4.8)
where Q denotes the set of time indices for the significant multipath components between two
CIRs. The first term in (4.8) is the actual CIR dierence, while the second term represents the
induced noise that should be eliminated. To avoid the impact of noise on evaluating the CIR
dierence, a noise-mitigated threshold is utilized. Particularly, the absolute value of each path
is compared with a threshold , which taps with absolute value below the threshold are set to
be zeros. The threshold  is determined by minimizing the MSE of the estimation error, and
the estimation error can be expressed by
eCE(n; l) = h(n; l)   hˆ(n; l): (4.9)
Therefore, the noise-mitigated threshold can be expressed by [99],
 
q
2d ln

Np=Po f a

; (4.10)
where Po f a is the overall false alarm rate with a constant value under a specific security level.
After the threshold is applied on the CIR estimates achieved by LS channel estimation, only
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significant multipath components are obtained.
Additionally, in fast varying channels, channel estimation has the drawback of potentially
yielding outdated channel state information, which can significantly degrade the authentication
performance of CIR-based authentication scheme. Figure 4.1 shows the envelop of CIR for
one path component under a multipath Rayleigh fading channel with two dierent maximum
Doppler shifts. It illustrates that the envelop of channel coecient fluctuates significantly at
higher maximum Doppler shift in a long time interval, however, it can approximately seen as a
constant within a finite time duration.
For instance, considering an OFDM system with 1024 subcarriers, the OFDM symbol du-
ration is calculated by multiplying the number of total subcarriers with the sampling period.
Thus, the symbol duration in this case is 1.024 ms. From Figure 4.1, during transmitting one
OFDM symbol, the envelop of CIR is not changed at fd = 10 Hz, while it is slightly decreased
by 1 dB at fd = 100 Hz. However, in the duration of transmitting 10 OFDM symbols, the vari-
ation of CIR envelop is slightly 1 dB at fd = 10 Hz, while it can reach to 11 dB at fd = 100 Hz.
Therefore, under high-speed movement of terminals, the outdated CIR estimate dramatically
eects the authentication analysis based on exploiting the channel variation.
In order to overcome the issue caused by the fast channel variation, a long-range channel
predictor is exploited and introduced in the next subsection.
4.3.2 Channel Predictor based on CIR estimates
A linear channel predictor [115] is employed here by linearly combining the past CIR
estimates to predict the future CIRs. The MSE of the prediction error is minimized to achieve
the predictor coecient. In particular, the predicted CIR on the lth path and the prediction error
can be written respectively as
h˜A(n; l) =
GX
i=1
w(i; l)hˆA(n   i; l); (4.11)
and
eCP(n; l) = hˆA(n; l)   h˜A(n; l); (4.12)
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Figure 4.1: The envelope of CIR for one path component in the multipath Rayleigh fading
channel under two dierent maximum Doppler frequencies. The sampling rate fs = 1MHz.
whereG is the number of past CIR estimates used for channel prediction. The optimal predictor
coecient of the lth multipath component is denoted as W(l) = [w(1; l);w(2; l); : : : ;w(G; l)]T ,
which is obtained by minimizing the prediction MSE. Thus, the MSE of the prediction error
can be minimized and expressed by
argminMSE = min
w
26666664 1Np
Np 1X
l=0
E
n
jeCP(n; l)j2
o37777775 : (4.13)
Consequently, the prediction coecient vector can be derived by solving the Yule-Walker
equations [116], resulting in
W(l) = (R(l)hh)
 1r(l)hh; (4.14)
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where
R(l)hh =
2666666666666666666666664
R˜1;1 R˜1;2    R˜1;G
R˜2;1 R˜2;2    R˜2;G
:::
:::
: : :
:::
R˜G;1 R˜G;2    R˜G;G
3777777777777777777777775
; (4.15)
and
r(l)hh = [r1; r2;    ; rG]T : (4.16)
R(l)hh is the G  G correlation matrix between historical CIR estimates for the lth multipath
component, and r(l)hh is the G  1 cross-correlation vector between the past and future CIR
estimates on the lth path. Since ideal correlation functions are unknown at the receiver and
have slowly time variations in practice, they can be derived from these noise-corrupted channel
observations (i.e., achieved historical CIR estimates). That is,
R˜i;i0 = E
n
hˆA(n   i; l)hˆA(n   i0; l)
o
 1
M
M 1X
m=0
hˆA(n   m   i; l)hˆA(n   m   i0; l); (4.17)
and
ri = E
n
hˆ(n   i; l)hˆA(n; l)
o
 1
M
M 1X
m=0
hˆA(n   m   i; l)hˆA(n   m; l); (4.18)
where i; i0 = 1; 2;    ;G. Consequently, based on the analysis of CIR predictor above, a long-
range CIR prediction can be derived as [117]
h˜A(n + ; l) =
X
i=1
w(i; l)h˜A(n +    i; l) +
GX
i=+1
w(i; l)hˆA(n +    i; l); (4.19)
where  is the prediction range and   0. Equation (4.19) shows an iterative process to
predict CIR estimates in a long range, and the predicted CIR estimates are also used for the
future CIR prediction. Additionally, the vector of predictor coecient W(l) should be updated
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and derived based on the equation (4.14).
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Figure 4.2: MSE of the total error versus SNR values under three dierent scenarios.
By using the equations (3.4) and (4.5), the predicted CIR h˜A follows a complex Gaussian
distribution. The expected value and the variance of h˜A are derived, respectively, by
˜l = E
8>><>>: GX
i=1
w(i; l)hˆA(n   i; l)
9>>=>>;
=
GX
i=1
w(i; l)E

hA(n   i; l) + d(n   i; l)

= 0; (4.20)
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and
˜2l = Var
8>><>>: GX
i=1
w(i; l)hˆA(n   i; l)
9>>=>>;
= Var

w(1; l)hˆA(n   1; l) +    + w(G   2; l)hˆA(n  G + 2; l)
+ w(G   1; l)hˆA(n  G + 1; l) + w(G; l)hˆA(n  G; l)

= Var

w(1; l)hˆA(n   1; l) +    + w(G   2; l)

2hA(n  G; l) + 
q
(1   2)2Au(n  G; l)
+
q
(1   2)2Au(n  G + 1; l) + d(n  G + 2; l)

+ w(G   1; l)

hA(n  G; l) +
q
(1   2)2Au(n  G; l) + d(n  G + 1; l)

+ w(G; l)

hA(n  G; l) + d(n  G; l)

= (2A + 
2
d)
GX
i=1
jw(i; l)j2 +
X
1i<i0G
2w(i; l)w(i0; l)( ji i
0 j2A + 
2
d): (4.21)
Due to the presence of channel estimation error in (4.9) and channel prediction error in
(4.12), the total error between the actual CIR and the predicted CIR should be studied on
evaluating the impact of these negative errors on the CIR variation. Thus, the total error can be
written by
eTotal(n; l) = eCE(n; l) + eCP(n; l) = h(n; l)   h˜(n; l): (4.22)
The MSE of the total error is plotted in Figure 4.2 under three dierent scenarios. Specif-
ically, the blue line with circle marker (labeled “Prediction based on ideal CIRs”) refers to a
lowerbound of the MSE of the total error. Herein, the total error is only the prediction error,
and the MSE of the total error is -41 dB in a wide range of SNR values. Additionally, the black
curve with triangle marker (labeled “Prediction based on LS CIR estimates (Benchmark)”)
represents a upperbound of the MSE of the total error, which is corresponding to the bench-
mark scheme. Furthermore, the red line with asterisk marker (labeled “Prediction based on
noise-mitigated CIR estimates”) indicates the performance of MSE according to the scheme
proposed in this subsection. When the value of SNR is equal to -5 dB, the performance of the
red curve is approximately 7 dB better than that of the upperbound. Overall, a comparison of
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these three curves illustrates that the CIR variation is not significantly aected by the presence
of estimation error and prediction error at a reasonable SNR value (i.e., larger than 10 dB).
4.3.3 Authentication Analysis Using Channel Predictor
Since the CIR estimated by the receiver would be outdated because of the processing delay
in high mobility environments, we compare the current CIR estimate with the predicted one.
Thus, a new statistical test is developed as
Ts =
Np 1X
l=0
hˆX(n; l)   h˜A(n; l)2 ;
=
X
l2Q
hˆX(n; l)  
GX
i=1
!(i; l)hˆA(n   i; l)

2
: (4.23)
Using the derived results in equations (4.20) and (4.21), the distributions of the statistical
test under the two hypotheses can be derived, respectively, by
H0 : Ts   (Q; ˜2H0)
H1 : Ts   (Q; ˜2H1);
(4.24)
where ˜2H0 = (
2
A + 
2
d) + ˜
2
l   2
GX
i=1
jw(i; l)j( i2A + 2d) and ˜2H1 = (2E + 2d) + ˜2l .
Based on the distributions of Ts in (4.24), the theoretical FAR P f a;1 and PD Pd;1 can be
derived by
P f a;1 = Pr(Ts > 1jH0) =
Q 1X
i=0
1
i!

1
˜2H0
i
e
  1
˜2H0 ; (4.25)
and
Pd;1 = Pr(Ts > 1jH1) =
Q 1X
i=0
1
i!

1
˜2H1
i
e
  1
˜2H1 ; (4.26)
where 1 is the threshold of decision-making for authentication. After determining the value
of Q, 1 can be calculated under a given value of P f a;1. It can be noticed that 1 is an adaptive
threshold varying with dierent values of Q.
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4.3.4 Multiple Observations of CIR Dierence
Traditionally, the final authentication decision is formed under the binary hypothesis testing
by individually comparing the current CIR with the previous one, which is to determine if an
eavesdropper interrupts the communication link. However, due to the presence of noise and the
movement of terminals, the robustness of spoofing detection is severely degraded by various
channel fading conditions. Therefore, we propose a new binary hypothesis testing based on
multiple observations of CIR dierence to form the final decision. Specifically, we assume
that the total number of CIR dierences used for the decision-making is Z, if at least K-out-
of-Z CIR dierences are larger than a threshold , the receiver determines a spoofing attack is
occurred, otherwise no eavesdropper is present. Thus, the authentication test can be formulated
by
H0 :
X
j
I
h
Ts; j > 
i
 K
H1 :
X
j
I
h
Ts; j > 
i
> K;
(4.27)
where j =  Z2 ;    ; 2; 1; 1; 2;    ; Z2 . I is a characteristic function, and I [x] is equal to one
if the statement x is true, otherwise equals zero. Herein Ts; j is defined as a statistical test
corresponding to the jth CIR dierence, which is expressed by
Ts; j =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
X
l2Q
hˆX(n; l)   hˆA(n + j; l)2 ; i f j =  1; 2;    ; Z2 ;X
l2Q
hˆX(n; l)   h˜A(n + j; l)2 ; i f j = 1; 2;    ; Z2 ; (4.28)
where hˆA is the historical CIR estimate from Alice, and h˜A is the predicted CIR that is achieved
based on the proposed long-range channel predictor. Figure 4.3 shows the procedure of achiev-
ing multiple CIR dierences, which indicates that the CIR dierences h are individually cal-
culated between the current CIR and one of its adjacent CIRs (i.e., one of historical CIRs or
predicted CIRs) in a window size Z.
Based on the AR model, we can further derive the distributions of the statistical test Ts; j
under the two hypotheses. In particular, when j =  1; 2;    ; Z2 , the statistical test is defined
as a sum of the squares of the dierence between current estimated CIR and the historical CIR
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Figure 4.3: The procedure of achieving multiple CIR dierences.
estimate for the lth path. Therefore, the statistical test Ts; j follows Gamma distribution. That
is,
H0 : Ts; j   (Q; 2H0; j)
H1 : Ts; j   (Q; 2H1);
(4.29)
where 2H0; j = 2(1    j jj)2A + 22d. By using the distributions in (4.29), the probabilities that
the statistical test Ts; j is larger than a threshold 2 under the two hypotheses, can be derived,
respectively, as
P f a;2 = Pr(Ts; j > 2jH0) =
Q 1X
i=0
1
i!

2
2H0; j
i
e
  2
2H0 ; j ; (4.30)
and
Pd;2 = Pr(Ts; j > 2jH1) =
Q 1X
i=0
1
i!

2
2H1
i
e
  2
2H1 : (4.31)
Similarly, when j = 1; 2;    ; Z2 , we can achieve the distributions of the statistical test Ts; j
based on the derived results in (4.24). That is,
H0 : Ts; j   (Q; ˜2H0; j)
H1 : Ts; j   (Q; ˜2H1):
(4.32)
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For simplification, we assume that only one past CIR estimate is used for predicting the future
one. Therefore, the variance ˜2H0; j is ˜
2
H0; j = 
2
A( j!(1; l)j j+1)2+(1 2)2A+2d(1 j!(1; l)j j+1)2.
Based on the distributions in (4.32), the probabilities that the statistical test Ts; j is larger
than a threshold 3 under the two hypotheses, can be derived, respectively, as
P f a;3 = Pr(Ts; j > 3jH0) =
Q 1X
i=0
1
i!

3
˜2H0; j
i
e
  3
˜2H0 ; j ; (4.33)
and
Pd;3 = Pr(Ts; j > 3jH1) =
Q 1X
i=0
1
i!

3
˜2H1
i
e
  3
˜2H1 : (4.34)
Consequently, under the developed hypothesis testing given in (4.27), theoretical FAR and
PD can be defined, respectively, by
P f a =
ZX
k=K+1
Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] +
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = kjH0

; (4.35)
and
Pd = 1  
KX
k=0
Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] +
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = kjH1

: (4.36)
Under the hypothesis H0, the closed-form expression for the FAR in equation (4.35) cannot be
easily derived, because the probability P f a;2 in (4.30) is not identical when dierent value of j
is chosen, as is the probability P f a;3 in (4.33). Fortunately, the closed-form expression for the
PD in (4.36) can be derived by using the results (4.31) and (4.34). More specifically, when the
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value of K is between 0 and Z2 (i.e., 0  K  Z2 ), the PD can be further expressed by
Pd = 1  
KX
k=0

Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] = 0;
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = kjH0

+ Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] = 1;
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = k   1jH0

+    + Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] = k;
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = 0jH0

= 1  
KX
k=0
 kX
v=0
 Z
2
v
!
(Pd;2)v(1   Pd;2) Z2 v 
 Z
2
k   v
!
(Pd;3)k v(1   Pd;3) Z2 k+v

: (4.37)
If the value of K is between Z2 + 1 and Z (i.e.,
Z
2 + 1  K  Z), the PD can be rewritten by
Pd =
ZX
k=K+1

Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] =
Z
2
;
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = k   Z2 jH0

+ Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] =
Z
2
  1;
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] = k   Z2 + 1jH0

+    + Pr
  1X
j=  Z2
I[Ts; j > ] = k   Z2 ;
Z
2X
j=1
I[Ts; j > ] =
Z
2
jH0

=
ZX
k=K+1
 Z2X
v=k  Z2
 Z
2
k   v
!
(Pd;2)k v(1   Pd;2) Z2 k+v 
 Z
2
v
!
(Pd;3)v(1   Pd;3) Z2 v

: (4.38)
Therefore, the total error rate can be expressed by summing the false alarm rate (or a Type
I error) and the missed detection rate (or a Type II error), that is,
PT = P f a + (1   Pd) : (4.39)
4.3.5 Parameter Optimization
Comparing multiple observations with the single observation of CIR dierence, there should
be a tradeo between the robustness of spoofing detection and the computational complexity
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as well as the latency of decision-making. In order to leverage between these aspects, a param-
eter  is defined as the ratio of the threshold K to the observation window size Z, i.e.,  = KZ .
The value of  is optimized based on minimizing the total error rate subject to false alarm
constraints. Mathematically, the optimization problem can be expressed by
opt = min

fPT g = min

n
P f a + (1   Pd)
o
;
s:t: 0 < P f a;2;P f a;3  0:1: (4.40)
Suppose the number of total CIR dierences Z is fixed, the optimal value of K can be found
using exhaustive search method in the simulations.
4.4 Simulation Results
4.4.1 Simulation Scenarios
In this section, the eectiveness of the proposed authentication scheme is verified by nu-
merical simulation. Specifically, an OFDM system is employed with QPSK modulation in all
simulation cases, and LS channel estimation is utilized for achieving CIR estimates based on
embedded comb-type pilots with the length of Np in the transmitted OFDM symbols.
As for the channel model, a multipath Rayleigh fading channel is modeled with sparse
sample-spaced significant taps and uniform power delay profile, and dierent path components
are statistically independent to each other with normalized average power. Additionally, since
Alice, Eve and Bob are located in spatially dierent locations in the communication networks,
the channel between Eve and Bob is assumed with dierent number of path components and
path positions from the channel link between Alice and Bob. The particular parameters related
to our simulations are list in Table 3.1.
4.4.2 Numerical Results and Discussion
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed authentication scheme is verified and
compared with that of the benchmark scheme. In the simulations, “scheme 1” and “scheme 2”
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refer to the channel predictor-based authentication based on single CIR dierence and multiple
CIR dierences, respectively.
In Figure 4.4, it is shown the PD versus dierent SNR values at P f a = 0.1. As it can be
seen from this figure, a spoofing attack can be successfully detected with a probability of one
in the two schemes when the SNR is higher than 5 dB. Moreover, compared with “scheme 1”,
“scheme 2” performs better at low SNR.
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Figure 4.4: Probability of detection versus SNRs at P f a = 0:1.
In Figure 4.5, the ROC is sketched at low SNR of 5 dB for the two schemes. As expected,
the probability of spoofing detection increases when the value of FAR increases. Moreover, it
can be seen from this figure that the performance of “scheme 2” is better than that of “scheme
1” at low FAR values.
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Figure 4.5: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) at SNR of 5dB.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an enhanced CIR-based physical layer authentication
schemes by exploiting a long-range channel predictor. Initially, a noise-mitigated threshold
has been utilized to eliminate the noise components of the CIR estimates, so that, the signifi-
cant multipath components were obtained and further exploited for the authentication analysis.
In addition, a channel prediction method has been employed by predicting future CIRs based
on the historical CIR estimates in order to overcome the eects of fast channel fading. Further-
more, based on the long-range channel predictor, multiple channel dierences were observed
simultaneously between the current CIR and one of its adjacent CIRs in an observation win-
dow. After that, the final decision in the authentication process was formed by exploiting the
multiple CIR dierences based on a new binary hypothesis testing. An optimization prob-
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lem has been defined in order to find the optimal value of the threshold by minimizing the
total error rate subject to constraints of false alarm. Finally, simulation results have shown the
eectiveness of the proposed authentication enhancement scheme.
Chapter 5
CIR-Based Authentication Enhancement
Using 2-D Quantization
In real mobile radio environments, the performance of spoofing detection for CIR-based
physical layer authentication is degraded significantly due to the large variation in the channel
amplitude over time. In contrast with the temporal variation of channel amplitude, the mul-
tipath delay spread is relatively stationary over long time intervals [18]. More importantly,
multipath delay spread profiles also represent the distinct properties of the wireless channels,
which can be exploited to distinguish between spatially separated users.
In this Chapter, a novel physical layer authentication enhancement scheme is proposed by
integrating additional multipath delay characteristics of wireless channels into the CIR-based
physical layer authentication framework. In order to simplify the decision rule for authentica-
tion, a two-dimensional quantization method is developed to preprocess the channel variations.
More specifically, two one-bit quantizers are used to quantize the temporal channel variations
in the dimensions of channel amplitude and path delay, respectively. Under a simple hypothe-
sis testing, a new test statistic is developed based on the sum of outputs of the two quantizers.
For performance analysis, theoretical FAR and PD are defined based on the developed test
statistic, and their closed-form expressions are derived as well. In order to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme, Monte-Carlo method is utilized and the numerical results are
compared with the closed-form derivations. Additionally, an optimization problem is defined
to find the optimal parameters for the proposed authentication technique by using exhaustive
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search method in the simulations.
5.1 Introduction
In wireless communications, the broadcast nature of the wireless channels brings significant
challenges for security provisioning between legitimate transmitters and receivers. Spoofing
is one important aspect of security threats, in which adversaries attempt to impersonate the
legitimate transceiver within a network in order to gain illegitimate advantages [1]. In order
to defend systems against spoofing attacks, the receiving end should be equipped with au-
thentication mechanisms which provide systems with the ability of validating the identities of
involved transmitting users. Traditionally, authentication mechanisms are accomplished by ex-
changing secret keys between authorized users, and the keys are generated based on complex
mathematical calculations. However, the computational complexity causes a practical prob-
lem associated with key distribution and scalability. Additionally, traditional authentication
techniques rely solely on the upper layers of the open systems interconnection (OSI) network
model, thereby the lack of physical layer protection makes them vulnerable against adversaries.
In order to address these shortcomings of the traditional authentication mechanisms, physical
layer authentication is emerging as a new promising technique by exploiting the physical link
properties to provide additional security protection [2].
The fundamental principle behind physical layer authentication is to exploit the channel
characteristics such as channel reciprocity, spatial decorrelation and temporal correlation, in
order to discriminate between transmitters placed at dierent positions. A variety of physical
layer authentication schemes have been proposed in [3, 8–12, 34, 53, 103, 104] by exploiting
the properties of wireless channels under various system models and dierent assumptions of
the available knowledge of channel state information (CSI). In order to achieve authentica-
tion schemes which are applicable in practical systems, these approaches have also taken into
account the environmental changes and/or the mobility of terminals in their design. The re-
sults presented in the literature have shown performance eectiveness of spoofing detection for
various cases.
In Chapter 3, we developed a robust physical layer authentication scheme by exploiting
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the inherent properties of CIR under a time-varying multipath fading channel. Nevertheless,
in high mobility environments, the performance of spoofing detection is degraded significantly
due to the fast variations in the channel amplitude over time. In contrast with the temporal
variation of channel amplitude, another characterization of wireless channels, i.e., the mul-
tipath delay spread, is relatively stationary over long time intervals [18]. More importantly,
multipath delay spread profiles are distinct from one location to another if the locations are
spatially separated. In [105], an enhanced physical layer authentication scheme was proposed
by integrating the multipath delay characteristics into the channel-based authentication frame-
work. As in [105], each channel amplitude and path delay was quantized, respectively, into
multiple number of levels in order to reduce the impact of rapid channel variation. However,
the use of multi-level quantization increases the computational complexity. Moreover, the other
shortcoming of the method proposed in [105] is its non-robust performance in the case of large
channel variations. Particularly, this approach exploits the total dierence between quantized
channel realizations (i.e., channel amplitude and delay) over two consecutive time intervals.
However, large channel variation induced by the movement of terminals and environmental
changes contributes the major part of the channel dierence, which results in a non-robust
decision-making for authentication.
In this Chapter, we propose a novel channel-based physical layer authentication enhance-
ment scheme by exploiting the inherent properties of channel amplitude and multipath time
delay spread. Due to the temporal correlation and spatial decorrelation of multipath channels,
the variations of channel amplitude and time delay are exploited to discriminate between the
legitimate transmitter and the spoofer. In order to simplify the decision rule for authentication,
a two-dimensional quantization algorithm is developed to preprocess the channel variations.
Particularly, two one-bit quantizers are used on the dierence of adjacent channel amplitudes
over time and the dierence between two successive time intervals of path delays, respectively.
Under a simple hypothesis testing, a new test statistic is developed based on the outputs of the
two one-bit quantizers. For performance analysis, the closed-form expressions for FAR and
PD are derived. The performance of the proposed scheme is validated in the simulations. In
order to find optimal parameters that satisfying our optimization problem, exhaustive search
method is utilized in the simulations.
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The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we provide the channel
model of the proposed authentication system, and a simple hypothesis testing based on a two-
dimensional quantization is described as well. Based on the developed authentication model,
the performance of the two-dimensional quantization scheme is analyzed under two hypotheses
in Section 5.3. The closed-form expressions for FAR and PD are derived in Section 5.4, and an
optimization problem is defined as well. In order to verify the statistical analysis, a benchmark
method is introduced and then numerical results are illustrated in Section 5.5. Lastly, this paper
is summarized in Section 5.6.
5.2 System Model
In our scenario, we consider the ubiquitous “Alice-Bob-Eve” model, where Eve serves
as a spoofer attempting to impersonate the legitimate transmitter Alice and inject messages
into the legitimate transmission from Alice to the intended receiver Bob. We assume that
two messages are received by Bob at two successive time slots. The first message is sent
from Alice while the second message is sent from an uncertain transmitter Alice or Eve. The
objective of physical layer authentication is exploiting the physical layer information obtained
by Bob to determine if the second message is still sent from Alice. Suppose Alice, Bob and
Eve are geographically located at dierent positions. According to propagation theory [32],
the characteristics of the propagation channel between Alice and Bob is independent of that of
the channel between Eve and Bob due to the rapid spatial decorrelation. Additionally, in real
mobile radio environments, the wireless channel is varying significantly with time. However,
the channel parameters, such as channel coecient and path delays, vary slowly on a symbol-
by-symbol basis. In other words, the channel coecient and path delay are highly correlated
to their counterparts at adjacent time instant, respectively. Therefore, this spatial decorrelation
and temporal correlation properties of wireless channels can be used to distinguish Alice from
Eve.
Next, a time-varying multipath channel model is first introduced, and then the temporal
channel variation is modeled on a symbol-by-symbol basis. Additionally, we assume that only
noisy version of CSI is available at Bob and it can be obtained using various channel estimation
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Figure 5.1: Channel model and channel variations in the dimensions of amplitude and time
delay.
techniques [106]. The modeling of channel estimates is described, and a binary hypothesis is
built based on a two dimensional quantization method.
5.2.1 Channel Model and Variations
Figure 5.1 shows our multipath channel model consisting of time-varying amplitude and
propagation delay. It is a discrete-time representation of the CIR model of a time-varying
multipath channel [107]. More specifically, the discrete-time CIR can be modeled as a su-
perposition of a certain number of paths, each characterized by its amplitude and delay, that
is,
c(n; ) =
L 1X
l=0
hl(n)(   l(n)); (5.1)
where L is the total number of channel paths; hl is the complex channel amplitude for the lth
path;  is the delay spread index, and l is the corresponding propagation delay with 0 < 1 <
   < L 1. () is the Dirac delta function. In a Rayleigh fading channel, the channel coecient
hl can be modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance 2hl .
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The paths are assumed to be statistically independent, and the average power is normalized,
i.e.,
L 1X
l=0
2hl = 1. For simplifying the analysis, we assume that 
2
h0
= 2h1 =    = 2hL 1 = 2h.
Moreover, the propagation delay is described by Poisson process that models the arrival
times of multipath components. Thus, the time interval between each pair of adjacent delays
has an exponential distribution with parameter , which is defined by
di(n) , i(n)   i 1(n); i = 1; 2; : : : ; L   1: (5.2)
It is important to note that the random variables fd1; d2;    ; dL 1g are assumed to be statistically
independent to each other.
In real mobile radio environments, the temporal channel variation varies slowly on a symbol-
by-symbol basis, although the motion of scatterers and terminals in the signal propagation en-
vironment results in time-varying multipath channels. In other words, the channel coecients
and propagation delays have the characteristics of high temporal correlation. Mathematically,
the temporal variation of the channel coecient hl can be well described by an autoregressive
model of order 1 (AR-1) [34], which is expressed by
hl(n + 1) = hl(n) +
q
(1   2)2hu(n); (5.3)
where the AR coecient  represents the correlation of two successive CIRs; and u is a zero-
mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance one, which is independent of hl.
Additionally, the temporal variation between adjacent propagation delays has not yet been
statistically studied to the best of our knowledge. In this Chapter, considering the distribution
of the interval between two time delays (which is exponentially distributed), we first model
the ith time interval di defined in equation (5.2) as a sum of the squares of two independent
normally distributed random variables. That is,
di(n) = (dR;i(n))2 + (dI;i(n))2; (5.4)
where dR;i and dI;i are two independent normal random variables with mean zero and equal vari-
ance 2d, i.e., dR;i; dI;i  N(0; 2d). Therefore, di has an exponential distribution with parameter
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 = 122d
, i.e., di  Exp( 122d ).
Based on the developed model of the time interval di in equation (5.4), the time-variant
propagation delay can be simply described by using the autoregressive models to model the
two independent random variables dR;i and dI;i. More specifically, the AR-1 model is also
employed here to describe the temporal process of dR;i and dI;i, respectively. Mathematically,
they are formulated by
dR;i(n + 1) = dR;i(n) +
q
(1   2)2dvR(n); (5.5)
and
dI;i(n + 1) = dI;i(n) +
q
(1   2)2dvI(n): (5.6)
where  is an AR coecient. vR and vI are two independent zero-mean complex Gaussian
random variables with equal variance one, which are independent of dR;i and dI;i.
5.2.2 Channel Estimates
In our scenario, we assume that only noisy version of CIR is available at Bob. Bob can
obtain estimated CIR from the received messages based on channel estimation techniques.
According to our channel model, a channel vector is obtained at Bob that consists of L in-
dependent channel coecients fhl; l = 0; 1; : : : ; L   1g and L   1 independent time intervals
fdi; i = 1; 2; : : : ; L   1g.
To model the channel coecient estimates at time instant n, we assume each channel co-
ecient is corrupted by an additive complex Gaussian noise. Thus, the lth channel coecient
estimate hˆl is formulated as a sum of its actual value and a noise component. That is,
hˆl(n) , hl(n) + w(n); l = 0; 1; : : : ; L   1: (5.7)
where w is the complex Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance 2w.
Moreover, using the same modeling of the time interval in equation (5.4), the time interval
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estimate at time instant n can be expressed by
dˆi(n) , (dˆR;i(n))2 + (dˆI;i(n))2; i = 1; 2; : : : ; L   1: (5.8)
where dˆR;i and dˆI;i are the estimation versions corresponding to dR;i and dI;i, respectively. Con-
sidering the contributions of estimation errors, dˆR;i and dˆI;i are modeled by
dˆR;i(n) , dR;i(n) + wR;i(n); (5.9)
and
dˆI;i(n) , dI;i(n) + wI;i(n); (5.10)
where wR;i and wI;i are independent estimation errors that are both normally distributed with
mean zero and equal variance 
2
w
2 . Since dR;i and dI;i are two independent normal random
variables, it can be concluded that the sum of two independent normal random variables dˆR;i
and dˆI;i are also independent normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2d + 
2
w=2,
i.e., dˆR;i; dˆI;i  N(0; 2d + 2w=2). Therefore, the distribution of the time interval estimate dˆi
can be derived, which has an exponential distribution with parameter 0 = 122d+2w
, i.e., dˆi 
Exp( 122d+2w
).
In our scenario, the received message at Bob is either from the legitimate transmitter Alice
or the spoofer Eve. As noted, the channel estimate from the previous received message is
confirmed by Bob, which is achieved from the legitimate link. In order to distinguish Alice
from Eve in the following sections, we define the subscripts “A” and “E” to represent the
dierent transmitters Alice and Eve throughout this Chapter.
5.2.3 Hypothesis Testing based on 2-D Quantization
In this subsection, our proposed physical layer authentication scheme is formulated as a
simple hypothesis testing problem, where a two-dimensional quantization approach is devel-
oped to simplify the decision rule for authentication. Specifically, two one-bit quantizers are
utilized to quantize the dierences between adjacent channel realizations in the dimensions of
channel amplitude and time intervals. Mathematically, two random variables S T and S Z are
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defined as the sum of outputs of one-bit quantizers QT and QZ , respectively. That is,
S T ,
L 1X
l=0
OT;l; (5.11)
and
S Z ,
L 1X
i=1
OZ;i; (5.12)
where
OT;l , QT

jTl(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0; jTl(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2  T ;
1; otherwise;
(5.13)
and
OZ;i , QZ

jZi(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0; jZi(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j  Z ;
1; otherwise:
(5.14)
Herein, QT [X] and QZ[X] are two one-bit quantizers. For the lth component, QT [X] produces
OT;l = 1 if input argument X is larger than a threshold T , otherwise OT;l = 0. Similarly, for
the ith time interval, QZ[X] produces OZ;i = 1 if X is larger than a threshold Z , otherwise
OZ;i = 0. The two thresholds T and Z have positive values. Thus, the values of S T and S Z can
be easily determined, respectively, i.e., 0  S T  L and 0  S Z  L   1. Moreover, Tl(n + 1)
and Zi(n+ 1) are the current estimated channel coecient and time interval from the legitimate
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or spoofing link, while hˆA;l(n) and dˆA;i(n) are their counterparts achieved previously from the
legitimate link.
Based on the developed two-dimensional quantization scheme, an authentication decision
is made under a simple binary hypothesis testing. That is,
H0 : S , S T + S Z  K
H1 : S , S T + S Z > K;
(5.15)
where S is the sum of the values of S T and S Z , and K is a non-negative integer between 0
and (2L   1). H0, the null hypothesis, stands for Alice as the claimant, while the alternative
hypothesis, H1, means the terminal is Eve.
5.3 Statistical Analysis of 2-D Quantization under Two Hy-
potheses
In this section, the proposed two-dimensional quantization scheme is statistically analyzed
under a binary hypothesis testing. In order to achieve the distributions of the outputs of two
binary quantizers under two hypotheses, we first need to find the distributions of the two quan-
tizer inputs.
5.3.1 Under Hypothesis H0
Under hypothesis H0, the current channel measurements at Bob are still achieved from the
legitimate link. Accordingly, the inputs to the two quantizers given in (5.13) and (5.14) are
expressed, respectively, by
T;H0 , jhˆA;l(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2; (5.16)
and
Z;H0 , jdˆA;i(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j: (5.17)
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To achieve the distribution of random variableT;H0 , we first derive the distribution of input
argument of the absolute square operator in (5.16). It is defined by
hAA , hˆA;l(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)
= (   1)hA;l(n) +
q
(1   2)2hAu(n)
+ wl(n + 1)   wl(n): (5.18)
Since random variables hA;l, wl and u have complex Gaussian distribution with mean zero,
hAA has zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution with variance 2(1   )2hA + 22w. Conse-
quently, the absolute square of hA follows exponential distribution, that is
T;H0 = jhAAj2  Exp
 1
2(1   )2hA + 22w

: (5.19)
Similarly, in order to achieve the distribution of Z;H0 , we first define the input argument of
the absolute value operator in equation (5.17) as dAA and derive its distribution. That is,
dAA , dˆA;i(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)
= (dˆA;R;i(n + 1))2 + (dˆA;I;i(n + 1))2   (dˆA;R;i(n))2   (dˆA;I;i(n))2
= (dˆA;R;i(n + 1)   dˆA;R;i(n)|                      {z                      }
G1
)  (dˆA;R;i(n + 1) + dˆA;R;i(n)|                      {z                      }
G2
)
+ (dˆA;I;i(n + 1)   dˆA;I;i(n)|                     {z                     }
G3
)  (dˆA;I;i(n + 1) + dˆA;I;i(n)|                     {z                     }
G4
): (5.20)
Since dˆA;R;i and dˆA;I;i are two independent normal random variables with mean zero and variance
2d + 
2
w=2, random variables G1, G2, G3 and G4 have zero-mean normal distribution with
dierence variances 2G1 , 
2
G2 , 
2
G3 and 
2
G4 , respectively. Based on the expressions given in
equations (5.5), (5.6), (5.9) and (5.10), the variances 2G1 , 
2
G2 , 
2
G3 and 
2
G4 can be derived,
respectively, by
2G1 = 
2
G3 = 2
2
dA(1   ) + 2w; (5.21)
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and
2G2 = 
2
G4 = 2
2
dA(1 + ) + 
2
w: (5.22)
As dA;R;i and dA;I;i are normally distributed with zero mean and same variance, we can obtain
that the expectations EfG1  G2g and EfG3  G4g are both zeros. Additionally, it is noticed that
the correlation coecient between random variablesG1 andG2 is equal to that betweenG3 and
G4. Using EfG1 G2g = EfG3 G4g = 0, it is concluded that G1, G2, G3 and G4 are independent
from each other.
Using the variances of G1, G2, G3 and G4 derived in equations (5.21) and (5.22), the func-
tion dAA in equation (5.20) can be further expressed by
dAA = G1 G2 +G3 G4
=
q
44dA(1   2) + 42dA2w + 4w

 G1q
22dA(1   ) + 2w|                    {z                    }
X1
 G2q
22dA(1 + ) + 
2
w|                    {z                    }
X2
+
G3q
22dA(1   ) + 2w|                    {z                    }
X3
 G4q
22dA(1 + ) + 
2
w|                    {z                    }
X3

: (5.23)
Note that X1, X2, X3 and X4 are four independent Gaussian random variables with mean
zero and variance one. Based on the distribution given in [108, eq.(6.5)], the probability density
function (PDF) of random variable X1X2 + X3X4 can be derived by
fX1X2+X3X4(x) =
1
2
e 
jxj
2 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1
2e
x
2 ; x < 0;
1
2e
  x2 ; x  0:
(5.24)
Using the distribution given in equation (5.24), we can conclude that dAA has a Laplace
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distribution, and the absolute of dAA follows exponential distribution. That is,
dAA  Laplace

0;
q
44dA(1   2) + 42dA2w + 4w

; (5.25)
and
Z;H0 = jdAAj  Exp
 1q
44dA(1   2) + 42dA2w + 4w

: (5.26)
To sum up, under hypothesis H0, random variables T;H0 and Z;H0 are both exponentially
distritbuted with dierent parameters. That is,
T;H0  Exp
 1
2(1   )2hA + 22w

; (5.27)
Z;H0  Exp
 1q
44dA(1   2) + 42dA2w + 4w

: (5.28)
Based on the obtained distributions in equations (5.27) and (5.28), under hypothesis H0,
the probabilities that two quantizers have one output value can be derived, respectively, by
PT;H0 , P(QT [jTl(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2] = 1jH0)
= P(T;H0 > T )
= e
  T
2(1 )2hA+2
2
w ; (5.29)
and
PZ;H0 , P(QZ[jZi(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j2] = 1jH0)
= P(Z;H0 > Z)
= e
  Zp
44dA
(1 2)+42dA
2
w+
4
w : (5.30)
Consequently, the probabilities that two quantizers have zero output values can be ex-
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pressed as well, respectively, by
P(QT [jTl(n + 1) hˆA;l(n)j2]=0jH0)
= 1   PT;H0
= 1   e
  T
2(1 )2hA+2
2
w ; (5.31)
and
P(QZ[jZi(n + 1) dˆA;i(n)j2]=0jH0)
= 1   PZ;H0
= 1   e
  Zp
44dA
(1 2)+42dA
2
w+
4
w : (5.32)
5.3.2 Under Hypothesis H1
Under hypothesis H1, the current received signal at Bob is from the spoofer Eve. First of
all, we also define two new random variables to express the dierences of successive channel
coecients and time intervals, respectively. That is,
T;H1 , jhˆE;l(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2; (5.33)
and
Z;H1 , jdˆE;i(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j; (5.34)
where hˆE;l is denoted as the lth channel coecient from Eve, and dˆE;i is the ith time interval
estimate from Eve.
To achieve the distribution of T;H1 , we first derive the distribution of the input argument
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of the absolute square operator in (5.33). It is defined by
hEA , hˆE;l(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)
= hE;l(n + 1)   hA;l(n) + wl(n + 1)   wl(n): (5.35)
since hE;l, hA;l and wl are independent zero mean complex Gaussian random variables, hEA
also has zero mean complex Gaussian distribution with variance 2hE + 
2
hA
+ 22w. Thus, we
can easily obtain that the square absolute of hE follows exponential distribution, that is,
T;H1 = jhEAj2  Exp
 1
2hE + 
2
hA
+ 22w

: (5.36)
Similarly, in order to achieve the distribution of Z;H1 , we first define the input argument of
the absolute value operator in equation (5.34) as dAE and derive its distribution. That is,
dEA , dˆE;i(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)
= dˆ2E;R;i(n + 1) + dˆ
2
E;I;i(n + 1)   dˆ2A;R;i(n)   dˆ2A;I;i(n)
= (dˆE;R;i(n + 1)   dˆA;R;i(n))  (dˆE;R;i(n + 1) + dˆA;R;i(n))
+ (dˆE;I;i(n + 1)   dˆA;I;i(n))  (dˆE;I;i(n + 1) + dˆA;I;i(n)); (5.37)
since dˆE;i and dˆA;i are independent exponential random variables, we can obtain the distribu-
tion of dEA based on the results in subsection 5.3.1. Hence, the absolute of dEA also has
exponential distribution, that is,
Z;H1 = jdEAj  Exp
 1
2dE + 
2
dA
+ 2w

: (5.38)
To sum up, under hypothesis H1, the absolute square of dierence of channel coecients
and the absolute of dierence of time intervals are both exponentially distritbuted with dierent
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parameters. That is,
T;H1  Exp
 1
2hE + 
2
hA
+ 22w

; (5.39)
Z;H1  Exp
 1
2dE + 
2
dA
+ 2w

: (5.40)
Using the achieved results in equations (5.39) and (5.40), under hypothesis H1, the proba-
bilities that two quantizers have one output values can be derived, respectively, by
PT;H1 , P(QT [jTl(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2] = 1jH1)
= P(jhˆE;l(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2 > T )
= e
  T
2hE
+2hA
+22w : (5.41)
and
PZ;H1 , P(QZ[jZi(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j2] = 1jH1)
= P(jdˆE;i(n + 1)   dˆA;i(n)j > Z)
= e
  Z
2dE
+2dA
+2w : (5.42)
Consequently, the probabilities that two quantizers have zero output values can be ex-
pressed, respectively, by
P(QT [jTl(n + 1) hˆA;l(n)j2]=1jH1)
= 1   PT;H1
= 1   e
  T
2hE
+2hA
+22w : (5.43)
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and
P(QZ[jZi(n + 1) dˆA;i(n)j2]=1jH1)
= 1   PZ;H1
= 1   e
  Z
2dE
+2dA
+2w : (5.44)
5.4 Performance Analysis for Authentication
In this section, the performance in terms of FAR and PD are analyzed and their closed-form
expressions are derived as well. In order to find optimal parameters, an optimization problem
is defined and the optimal values are obtained by using exhaustive search method.
5.4.1 Derivation of FAR and PD
To analyze the authentication performance, we define FAR and PD based on our defined
binary hypothesis testing given in (5.15). In particular, FAR and PD are defined, respectively,
by
P f a , P(S > KjH0)
= P(S = K + 1 or S = K + 2 or    S = 2L   1jH0)
= P(S = K + 1jH0) + P(S = K + 2jH0)
+    + P(S = 2L   1jH0)
=
2L 1X
k=K+1
P(S = kjH0); (5.45)
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and
Pd , P(S > KjH1)
= 1   P(S  KjH1)
= 1   P(S = 0 or S = 1 or    S = KjH1)
= 1  

P(S = 0jH1) + P(S = 1jH1)
+    + P(S = KjH1)

= 1  
KX
k=0
P(S = kjH1): (5.46)
In order to derive FAR and PD shown in equations (5.45) and (5.46), we can use the results
given in equations (A.3) and (A.4) from Appendix A. In our case, the probabilities PT and PZ in
equations (A.3) and (A.4) are expressed based on dierent equations under the two hypotheses
H0 and H1. In particular, PT;H0 and PZ;H0 in equations (5.29) and (5.30) are used in the derivation
of FAR, while PT;H1 and PZ;H1 in (5.41) and (5.42) are used in the derivation of PD.
According to Appendix A, we also consider two cases for the derivations of FAR and PD
based on dierent value of K. Specifically, in the case that K is smaller than L   1, the FAR
and PD can be further derived, respectively, by
P f a =
2L 1X
k=K+1
P(S = kjH0)
=
L 1X
k=K+1
P(S = kjH0) +
2L 1X
k=L
P(S = kjH0)
=
L 1X
k=K+1
kX
v=0
 
L
v
!
(PT;H0)
v(1   PT;H0)L v

 
L   1
k   v
!
(PZ;H0)
k v(1   PZ;H0)L 1 k+v
+
2L 1X
k=L
L 1X
v=k L
 
L
k   v
!
(PT;H0)
k v(1   PT;H0)L k+v

 
L   1
v
!
(PZ;H0)
v(1   PZ;H0)L 1 v; (5.47)
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and
Pd = 1  
KX
k=0
P(S = kjH1)
= 1  
KX
k=0
kX
v=0
 
L
v
!
(PT;H1)
v(1   PT;H1)L v

 
L   1
k   v
!
(PZ;H1)
k v(1   PZ;H1)L 1 k+v: (5.48)
Additionally, when K is equal or larger than L 1, the closed-form expressions for the FAR
and PD are expressed, respectively, by
P f a =
2L 1X
k=K+1
P(S = kjH0)
=
2L 1X
k=K+1
L 1X
v=k L
 
L
k   v
!
(PT;H0)
k v(1   PT;H0)L k+v

 
L   1
v
!
(PZ;H0)
v(1   PZ;H0)L 1 v; (5.49)
and
Pd = 1  
KX
k=0
P(S = kjH1)
= 1  
 L 1X
k=0
P(S = kjH1) +
KX
k=L
P(S = kjH1)

= 1  
 L 1X
k=0
kX
v=0
 
L
v
!
(PT;H1)
v(1   PT;H1)L v

 
L   1
k   v
!
(PZ;H1)
k v(1   PZ;H1)L 1 k+v
+
KX
k=L
L 1X
v=k L
 
L
k   v
!
(PT;H1)
k v(1   PT;H1)L k+v

 
L   1
v
!
(PZ;H1)
v(1   PZ;H1)L 1 v

: (5.50)
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5.4.2 Parameter Optimization
As it can be seen from the derived equations of FAR and PD in subsection 5.4.1, we need to
choose the parameters properly so that a high PD and low FAR can be achieved simultaneously.
Towards this goal, the objective is to find the values of T , Z and K which maximize the
PD subject to a false alarm constraint at the receiver Bob. Mathematically, our optimization
problem can be expressed by
max Pd
subject to P f a  
T ; Z  0
0  K < 2L   1; (5.51)
where  is a constant value between 0 and 1. Generally, FAR P f a is normally set below 0:1 for
secure wireless communications. Two subfigures in Fig. 5.2 show the PD and FAR, respec-
tively, under various threshold values of T and Z , where the value of threshold K is fixed. As
it can be seen from this figure, PD and FAR are both increasing when the values of T and Z
decrease. Therefore, we can first fix the value of , the optimal values T , 

Z , and K
 can be
found by using exhaustive search method in the simulations.
5.5 Benchmark Method and Simulation Results
In this section, in order to evaluate the proposed scheme, a benchmark method is developed
and its performance in detecting spoofers is analyzed as well. For achieving optimized per-
formance in spoofing detection, exhaustive search method is used to find the optimal values of
parameters in the simulations. Additionally, numerical results are given to verify the theoretical
analysis and show the eectiveness of the proposed authentication scheme.
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Figure 5.2: Probability of detection and false alarm rate under various threshold values of T
and Z , respectively.
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5.5.1 Performance Analysis for Benchmark Method
In this subsection, a benchmark scheme is developed for performance comparison in spoof-
ing detection. The benchmark method is also formulated as a binary hypothesis testing prob-
lem. Mathematically, a test statistic for the benchmark scheme is developed based only on the
dierence of adjacent channel coecients, that is,
S B ,
L 1X
l=0
OB;l; (5.52)
where
OB;l , QB

jTl(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0; jTl(n + 1)   hˆA;l(n)j2  B;
1; otherwise;
(5.53)
Similarly, QB[X] is an one-bit quantizer that produces OB;l = 1 if X is larger than a threshold
B, otherwiseOB;l = 0. Based on the developed test statistic, an authentication decision is made
under a binary hypothesis testing, that is,
H0 : S B  KB
H1 : S B > KB;
(5.54)
where KB is a threshold of the decision making for authentication in the benchmark scheme,
and it is a non-negative integer between 0 and L. H0, the null hypothesis, stands for Alice as
the claimant, while the alternative hypothesis, H1, means the terminal is Eve.
Based on the derived distributions in equations (5.27) and (5.39), under the two hypotheses,
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the probabilities that the quantizer QB[] has one output value can be derived, respectively, by
PB;H0 , P(QB[jTl(n + 1)   hˆAl (n)j2] = 1jH0)
= P(jhˆAl (n + 1)   hˆAl (n)j2 > T )
= e
  B
2(1 )2hA+2
2
w ; (5.55)
and
PB;H1 , P(QB[jTl(n + 1)   hˆAl (n)j2] = 1jH1)
= P(jhˆEl (n + 1)   hˆAl (n)j2 > T )
= e
  B
2hE
+2hA
+22w : (5.56)
Consequently, under the two hypotheses, the probabilities that the quantizer has zero output
values can be expressed, respectively, by
P(QB[jTl(n + 1)   hˆAl (n)j2] = 0jH0)
= 1   PB;H0
= 1   e
  B
2(1 )2hA+2
2
w ; (5.57)
and
P(QB[jTl(n + 1)   hˆAl (n)j2] = 0jH1)
= 1   PB;H1
= 1   e
  B
2hE
+2hA
+22w : (5.58)
By using the derived result (A.1) in Appendix A, PD and FAR are defined and derived,
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respectively, by
P f a , P(˜ > BjH0)
=
LX
k=KB+1
P(˜ = kjH0)
=
LX
k=KB+1
 
L
k
!
(PB;H0)
k(1   PB;H0)L k; (5.59)
and
Pd , P(˜ > BjH1)
=
LX
k=KB+1
P(˜ = kjH1)
=
LX
k=KB+1
 
L
k
!
(PB;H1)
k(1   PB;H1)L k: (5.60)
In order to achieve optimized performance, the optimal values of B and KB can be deter-
mined by maximizing the PD subject to a false alarm constraint at Bob. Mathematically, the
optimization problem corresponding to the benchmark method can be expressed by
max Pd
subject to P f a  
B  0
0  KB < L: (5.61)
The optimal values of B and KB, i.e., B and K

B, can be found as well by using exhaustive
search method in the simulations.
5.5.2 Numerical results
In this subsection, numerical simulations are used to verify the eectiveness of the pro-
posed authentication scheme, and the performance of the proposed scheme is compared with
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Table 5.1: Optimal values of parameters under dierent values of 

SNR=5dB SNR=10dB
T 

Z 

B K
 KB 

T 

Z 

B K
 KB
0.01 2.54 3.61 2.44 1 1 1.04 1.80 0.96 1 1
0.02 2.30 3.26 2.19 1 1 0.94 1.65 0.86 1 1
0.03 2.14 3.15 2.03 1 1 0.87 1.61 0.80 1 1
0.04 2.05 2.94 1.92 1 1 0.83 1.54 0.76 1 1
0.05 1.94 2.98 1.84 1 1 0.81 1.43 0.72 1 1
0.06 1.93 2.63 1.77 1 1 0.79 1.36 0.70 1 1
0.07 1.84 2.69 1.71 1 1 0.76 1.35 0.67 1 1
0.08 1.79 2.62 1.65 1 1 0.75 1.28 0.65 1 1
0.09 1.78 2.43 1.61 1 1 0.73 1.26 0.63 1 1
0.1 1.70 2.53 1.56 1 1 0.70 1.28 1.09 1 0
that of the benchmark method. In order to study the eect of propagation delays in authenti-
cation performance, we assume that the two correlation coecients are  = 0:8 and  = 0:99
throughout the simulations. Additionally, the number of channel paths L is fixed to be 5. For
Monte-Carlo experiments, 106 independent trails are used to obtain the average results.
We first use the exhaustive search method to find the optimal values of parameters based on
the optimization problems defined in (5.51) and (5.61), respectively. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2
show the optimal values of dierent thresholds under various values of  and SNR, respectively.
As it can be seen from the two tables, the optimal values are varying under dierent  and
SNRs. In table 5.1, it indicates that the optimal values T , 

Z and 

B gradually decrease when
the value of  becomes larger. From Table 5.2, the values of T , 

Z and 

B are also decreasing
when SNR increases. As observed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, optimal value K is always 1
while the value of KB becomes smaller at lager  or SNR.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the FAR for dierent values of  under the correspondingly calculated
optimal values of thresholds. As for the proposed and benchmark schemes, the values of FAR
is approximately equal to the values of , as it was expected. In Figure 5.4, it shows the FAR
versus dierent SNRs based on the correspondingly optimized threshold values. As expected,
the value of FAR is approximately equal to  when SNR value is changing. Figures 5.3 and 5.4
indicate that the PD is maximized while the false alarm constraint is approximately met with
equality.
Figure 5.5 shows the PD versus various values of  under two dierent SNRs. As expected,
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Table 5.2: Optimal values of parameters under dierent SNRs
SNR (dB)
 = 0:05  = 0:1
T 

Z 

B K
 KB 

T 

Z 

B K
 KB
4 2.39 3.39 2.26 1 1 2.09 2.90 1.92 1 1
6 1.64 2.36 1.50 1 1 1.40 2.18 1.28 1 1
8 1.12 1.86 1.03 1 1 0.99 1.58 0.87 1 1
10 0.81 1.43 0.72 1 1 0.70 1.28 1.09 1 0
12 0.59 1.23 0.95 1 0 0.53 1.02 0.80 1 0
14 0.46 1.05 0.74 1 0 0.42 0.85 0.62 1 0
16 0.38 0.91 0.60 1 0 0.33 0.81 0.51 1 0
18 0.33 0.82 0.52 1 0 0.29 0.71 0.44 1 0
20 0.30 0.75 0.46 1 0 0.27 0.63 0.39 1 0
the derived close-form expressions of PD are overlapping with the Monte-Carlo simulation
results. As it can be seen from this figure, the proposed scheme outperforms the benchmark
method. When the value of  is fixed to be 0:1 and SNR is 10 dB, the probability of spoof-
ing detection can reach to 0:65 in the proposed scheme that is 0:06 higher than that of the
benchmark method.
In Figure 5.6, the PD is plotted for various SNRs under two dierent values of . The
closed-form expressions of the proposed and benchmark schemes are overlapping with the
Monte-Carlo simulation results, respectively. As observed, the proposed scheme outperforms
the benchmark method especially at higher SNRs. Additionally, the performance in the case of
 = 0:1 is better than that under  = 0:05, which can also be concluded from Figure 5.5.
5.6 Summary
In this Chapter, a novel channel-based physical layer authentication enhancement scheme
has been proposed by exploiting the inherent two-dimensional properties of multipath fading
channels. Specifically, the characteristics of channel amplitude and multipath time delay spread
are integrated in order to enhance the authentication performance in the presence of spoofers.
A two dimensional quantization algorithm has been proposed to preprocess the channel vari-
ations. Particularly, two one-bit quantizers were adopted to quantize the temporal channel
variations in the dimensions of channel amplitude and time delay, respectively. By exploiting
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Figure 5.3: False alarm rate versus dierent values of  under the optimized threshold values.
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the one-bit quantizers, the proposed authentication scheme has been formulated as a simpler
hypothesis testing problem. For performance analysis, FAR and PD have been defined and
their closed-form expressions have been derived as well. To assess the performance of the
proposed authentication scheme, Monte-Carlo method has been used and the numerical results
were compared with the theoretical derivations. Additionally, the optimal parameters of the
proposed authentication technique were determined by utilizing exhaustive search method.
Chapter 6
Channel-based Authentication
Enhancement Using AF Cooperative
Relays
Traditional channel-based physical layer authentication techniques suer from the prob-
lem of unreliable spoofing detection at low SNR. To address this issue, we propose a novel
physical layer authentication scheme by exploiting the advantages of AF cooperative relaying
in this Chapter. The essence of proposed scheme is to select the best relay among multiple
AF relays, such that legitimate transmitter would experience better channel conditions than a
spoofer. To achieve this goal, two best relay selection schemes are developed by maximizing
the SNR ratios of the legitimate link to the spoofing link at the destination and relays, respec-
tively. In the sequel, we derive closed-form expressions for the outage probabilities of eective
SNR ratios at the destination. Additionally, our proposed authentication scheme is formulated
as a hypothesis testing problem in order to discriminate the legitimate transmitter from the
spoofer. A new test statistic is developed based on normalized channel dierence between two
adjacent end-to-end channel estimates at the destination. The performance of the proposed
authentication scheme is compared with that of a direct transmission scheme. According to
numerical results, the proposed scheme outperforms the benchmark method in terms of outage
and spoofing detection.
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6.1 Introduction
One major objective of information security is to protect information and systems from var-
ious malicious attacks. Authentication is a critical aspect of information security, which pro-
vides the process of verifying the identity of transmitters to prevent against spoofing attacks. In
wireless communications, spoofing attack is one of the most serious security threats due to the
absence of physical connections between a transmitter-receiver pair [19]. In order to address
this issue, traditional cryptographic techniques have been established based on the exchange
of secret keys between legitimate users. Generally, cryptographic algorithms are designed by
relying on the computational hardness of mathematical functions. However, the computational
complexity leads to a practical issue associated with key distribution and scalability. Addi-
tionally, traditional authentication approaches have been developed mainly based on the higher
layers of protocol stack, which are vulnerable against adversaries due to the lack of physical
layer protection. Due to these shortcomings, physical layer authentication has attracted signif-
icant attention in recent years, which is emerging as a new promising paradigm by exploiting
the inherent characteristics of wireless channels for additional security protection [102].
A variety of channel-based physical layer authentication schemes has been proposed in the
literature [8–10, 34, 104] by comparing adjacent channel estimates under a binary hypothesis
testing in order to discriminate legitimate transmitter from potential adversaries. However,
the detection performance of traditional channel-based physical layer authentication mecha-
nisms is severely degraded under low SNR condition. In order to overcome this issue, multiple
antenna techniques have been utilized [53]. By using multiple antennas, the dimension of sig-
nal space is increased, which in turn, results in improvements in authentication performance.
However, as a result of cost and size limitations of multiple antennas, these scenarios are rarely
implemented in practice.
Alternatively, cooperative relaying is another promising solution to the aforementioned is-
sue of the existing channel-based authentication schemes. It is accomplished via user coopera-
tion at the physical layer, through which signals are allowed to be transmitted between source
and destination with the help of other nodes. Dierent variety of improving physical layer
security through cooperating relays have been proposed in the literature [72, 73, 76, 118–126].
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These approaches considered various design problems under dierent assumptions of CSI.
Exploiting the advantages of cooperative relaying, researchers have showed improvements in
physical layer security in terms of preventing eavesdropping attacks. However, the benefits
of cooperative communications have not yet been fully utilized for physical layer protection
against spoofing attacks to the best of our knowledge. Inspired by previous work that adopted
user cooperation in physical layer security and its promised advantages, we develop a novel
channel-based physical layer authentication scheme using cooperative relays in this Chapter.
Among those aforementioned relay-assisted physical layer security schemes, three cooper-
ative transmission protocols are primarily considered, which are AF, DF and CJ. Specifically,
the AF scheme is designed in which relays simply amplify the source signals and then retrans-
mit them to the destination. In the DF scheme, relays first decode the source signals and then
encode and forward them to the destination. As for the CJ scheme, the source transmits the
data signal while all relays transmit jamming signals to interfere with eavesdroppers. Com-
pared with DF and CJ, the AF relay scheme is more preferable for channel-based physical
layer authentication due to its low-complexity processing at the relay nodes and destination as
well. In this Chapter, we focus on the AF scheme.
Additionally, in order to obtain an ecient and practical physical layer authentication
scheme through cooperative relays, relay selection is of significant importance. It refers to
the process of choosing only one or more than one relay to help transmit messages between
the source and destination. Accordingly, relay selection strategies can be generally classi-
fied into two categories, i.e., multiple-relay selection and single-relay selection. Compared
to the multiple-relay selection, the single-relay selection is preferable in various scenarios
[58, 59, 127]. Based on the selection of only one relay out of multiple available ones, single-
relay selection schemes provide the best path between the source and destination. Although
only one relay participates in the cooperative transmission, full order diversity can be achieved
and the overhead is minimized due to orthogonal channels. Among existing best relay selection
strategies for AF relaying systems, the instantaneous end-to-end SNR, which is seen as a well-
defined system parameter, was widely utilized as a relay selection criterion [59]. However,
in resource-constrained systems such as ad-hoc and sensor networks, only partial knowledge
of the channel links is available to nodes. In [127], Krikidis et al. proposed a relay selection
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algorithm based only on the instantaneous SNR of the channel link between the source and
relays.
In this Chapter, a novel channel-based physical layer authentication scheme is proposed
based on an AF cooperative relaying system. Only one relay out of multiple AF relays is cho-
sen to provide the best end-to-end path between two legitimate end nodes in the presence of
a spoofer. To achieve this goal, two best relay selection schemes are developed based on the
notion of maximizing the instantaneous SNR ratios of the legitimate link to the spoofing link
at the destination and relays, respectively. More specifically, in the first scheme, the best relay
node is selected based on the maximum end-to-end SNR ratio. In order to reduce the computa-
tional complexity and resource consumption, the second scheme is developed based only on the
first-hop instantaneous SNR ratio. For statistical analysis, we derive closed-form expressions
for the outage probabilities of these two eective SNR ratios at the destination, respectively.
Additionally, our proposed authentication scheme is formulated as a binary hypothesis testing
problem, and a new test statistic is developed based on the normalized channel dierence be-
tween two adjacent end-to-end channel estimates at the destination. The performance of our
proposed authentication scheme is compared with that of a direct transmission scheme in terms
of outage and spoofing detection.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, the system model based
on an AF cooperative relaying is described, and the benchmark scheme is explained as well.
Section 6.3 illustrates the proposed best relay selection schemes. The closed-form expressions
for the two outage probabilities are derived in Section 6.4, and the performance of spoofing de-
tection is analyzed as well. In order to verify the statistical analysis, we illustrate the numerical
results in Section 6.5, and summarize this Chapter in Section 6.6.
6.2 System Model Based on AF Cooperative Relaying
The proposed physical layer authentication using AF cooperative relays is shown in Figure
6.1, which consists of one legitimate transmitter (Alice), one destination (Bob) and M trusted
available relay nodes in the presence of one spoofer (Eve). All nodes are located in spatially
dierent positions and equipped with single antenna. From Figure 6.1, Alice delivers data
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Figure 6.1: Our cooperative system with multiple relays under the “Alice-Bob-Eve” scenario.
The best relay is selected based on the proposed relay selection schemes.
through the selected best relay to the intended receiver Bob. However, Eve serves as a spoofer
attempting to impersonate the transmission from Alice, and sends spoofing signals to Bob
via the best relay over dierent time slot. In order to study the performance of physical layer
authentication through cooperative relays, we assume severe channel conditions between Alice
and Bob. Also, we assume that Eve has the knowledge of the transmission protocol between
Alice and Bob.
It is noteworthy to mention that traditional channel-based physical layer authentication is
achieved based on channel temporal correlation in the legitimate link and spatial decorrelation
between the legitimate and spoofing channels. In our scenario, we assume that the spacing
between any nodes is large enough, thereby the wireless links between dierent nodes are
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independent to each other. Also, the channel coecient of each single-hop link is highly
correlated over time and the temporal correlation can be described by an autoregressive model
of order 1 (AR-1). Based on these two facts, Eve can be discriminated from Alice at Bob
by comparing current channel estimate with the previous one. Mathematically, traditional
channel-based physical layer authentication scheme can be formulated as a binary hypothesis
testing problem. That is,
H0 : hˆ(n) = hˆ(n   1)
H1 : hˆ(n) , hˆ(n   1);
(6.1)
where H0, the null hypothesis, stands for Alice as the source, while the alternative hypothesis,
H1, means the source is the spoofer Eve. Moreover, hˆ(n   1) and hˆ(n) are both channel coe-
cient estimates at Bob, which are achieved from the previous and current symbols, respectively.
Next, a benchmark scheme is first described, and then our AF cooperative relaying scheme
is explained. Particularly, the direct transmission scheme is employed as the benchmark scheme,
in which the source transmits signals directly to the destination without the help of relays. Ad-
ditionally, the designs of AF schemes can be found in [72,118,126,128], however, our system
model and problem description are dierent from these existing schemes.
6.2.1 Direct Transmission (DT)
In this subsection, the direct transmission (DT) scheme is described as the benchmark
scheme. Specifically, the transmitted signal x with unit power (i.e., Efjxj2g = 1 where Efg
denotes the expectation operator) is received directly by Bob, and the received signals at Bob
from Alice/Eve can be written, respectively, by
yAB =
p
PA + PRhABx + nAB; (6.2)
and
yEB =
p
PE + PRhEBx + nEB; (6.3)
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where yAB and yEB are the received signals at Bob from Alice and Eve, respectively. Corre-
spondingly, hAB and hEB are actual channel coecients of the legitimate and spoofing links, re-
spectively. Over a Rayleigh fading channel, hAB and hEB can be modeled as complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and dierent variances 2AB and 
2
EB, respectively. Moreover,
nAB and nEB are zero-mean complex Gaussian noises with equal variance ˜2n. Additionally, PA,
PE and PR are the transmit powers of Alice, Eve and relays, respectively.
Based on the expressions of the received signals at Bob, the instantaneous SNRs of the
legitimate and spoofing links can be expressed, respectively, by
AB ,
(PA + PR)jhABj2
˜2n
; (6.4)
and
EB ,
(PE + PR)jhEBj2
˜2n
: (6.5)
Since the channel coecients hAB and hEB are both modeled as zero-mean complex Gaussian
random variables with dierent variances, the corresponding SNRs AB and EB are exponen-
tially distributed with dierent values of parameter . Herein,  is denoted as the reciprocal
of the averaged SNR. The averaged values of AB and EB can be calculated, respectively, i.e.,
¯AB ,
(PA+PR)2AB
˜2n
and ¯EB ,
(PE+PR)2EB
˜2n
.
6.2.2 Amplify-and-Forward (AF)
As it can be seen from Figure 6.1, our AF-based cooperative transmission is conducted in
two stages. In stage one, the source (Alice or Eve) broadcasts signal x to M relays at the first
transmission slot. From dierent sources Alice/Eve, the received signals at the ith relay Ri can
be expressed, respectively, by
yARi =
p
PAhARi x + nARi ; (6.6)
and
yERi =
p
PEhERi x + nERi ; (6.7)
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where yARi and yERi are the received signals at relay Ri from Alice and Eve, respectively. Cor-
respondingly, hARi and hERi are the actual channel coecients of the links between the relay Ri
and Alice/Eve, respectively. The channel coecients hARi and hERi follow zero-mean complex
Gaussian distributions with dierent variances 2ARi and 
2
ERi , respectively. Additionally, nARi
and nERi represent zero-mean complex Gaussian noises with equal variance 
2
n.
Consequently, the instantaneous SNRs of the links between the relay Ri and dierent
sources Alice/Eve can be expressed, respectively, by
ARi ,
PAjhARi j2
2n
; (6.8)
and
ERi ,
PE jhERi j2
2n
: (6.9)
Herein, the instantaneous SNRs ARi and ERi are also exponentially distributed with dierent
parameters. Accordingly, the averaged values of ARi and ERi are derived by ¯ARi , PA
2
ARi=
2
n
and ¯ERi , PE
2
ERi=
2
n, respectively.
In stage two, the selected relay forwards the received signal to Bob at the second transmis-
sion slot. We assume that relays forward their signals over orthogonal channels, and forwarded
signal from each relay to the destination is the multiplication of the received signal with an
amplification factor K. Considering dierent sources Alice or Eve, K is defined, respectively,
by
KARi =
s
1
PA2ARi + 
2
n
; (6.10)
and
KERi =
s
1
PE2ERi + 
2
n
; (6.11)
where KARi and KERi are the amplification factors applied on the received signals at relay Ri
from Alice or Eve, respectively.
Consequently, the received signals at the destination Bob from Alice/Eve can be expressed,
6.3. Best Relay Selection 107
respectively, as
yARiB =
p
PRhRiBKARiyARi + nRiB
=
p
PAPRKARihARihRiBx +
p
PRKARihRiBnARi + nRiB|                        {z                        }
nD
; (6.12)
and
yERiB =
p
PRhRiBKERiyERi + nRiB
=
p
PEPRKERihERihRiBx +
p
PRKERihRiBnERi + nRiB|                         {z                         }
nD
; (6.13)
where yARiB and yERiB are the received signals by Bob from dierent sources Alice/Eve through
the relay Ri. Correspondingly, hRiB is the actual channel coecient of the link between the
relay Ri and Bob, which is modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean
and variance 2RiB. Also, nRiB is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with variance 
2
n. In
addition, nD is the eective noise.
Consequently, based on the expressions of the received signals at Bob, the instantaneous
end-to-end SNRs of the legitimate and spoofing links through the relay Ri can be derived,
respectively, by
ARiB ,
PAjhARi j2
2n
 PRjhRiBj
2
PRjhRiBj2 + (PA2ARi + 2n)
; (6.14)
and
ERiB ,
PE jhERi j2
2n
 PRjhRiBj
2
PRjhRiBj2 + (PE2ERi + 2n)
: (6.15)
The essence of our proposed authentication scheme using AF cooperative relays is to select
the best relay such that Alice would experience better channel conditions than Eve. Towards
this goal, we propose two best relay selection schemes in the next section.
6.3 Best Relay Selection
In this section, two best relay selection schemes are developed. The best relay node is
chosen based on the notion of maximizing the instantaneous SNR ratios of the legitimate link
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to the spoofing link at the destination and relays, respectively. The instantaneous SNR ratios
are derived based on the defined system model in the previous section.
More specifically, our first relay selection scheme is developed based on the instantaneous
end-to-end SNR ratio of the legitimate link to the spoofing link at the destination through the
ith relay node. By using the instantaneous end-to-end SNRs given in (6.14) and (6.15), the
instantaneous end-to-end SNR ratio  i is expressed by
 i =
ARiB
ERiB
=
PAjhARi j2
PE jhERi j2
 PRjhRiBj
2 + (PE2ERi + 
2
n)
PRjhRiBj2 + (PA2ARi + 2n)
: (6.16)
However, taking into account all end-to-end links for the best relay selection increases the
operational complexity and leads to a high resource consumption as well. Thus, the second
relay selection scheme is developed based only on the knowledge of the first-hop link between
the relays and dierent sources Alice/Eve. In our second relay selection scheme, the instan-
taneous first-hop SNR ratio Zi is derived by using the instantaneous SNRs given in (6.8) and
(6.9). That is,
Zi =
ARi
ERi
=
PAjhARi j2
PE jhERi j2
: (6.17)
Since the instantaneous SNRs ARi and ERi are exponentially distributed and they are in-
dependent to each other, the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the instantaneous first-hop SNR ratio Zi can be derived, respectively, by
fZi(z) =
¯ARi ¯ERi
(z¯ERi + ¯ARi)2
; (6.18)
and
FZi(z) = P(Zi  z) =
z¯ERi
z¯ERi + ¯ARi
: (6.19)
It is interesting to note that the instantaneous end-to-end SNR ratio through the ith relay,
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i.e.,  i; i = 1;    ;M, is related to the instantaneous first-hop SNR ratio at the ith relay, i.e.,
Zi; i = 1;    ;M, through the following equation,
 i = Zi Wi; (6.20)
where Wi is defined by
Wi =
PRjhRiBj2 + (PE2ERi + 2n)
PRjhRiBj2 + (PA2ARi + 2n)
: (6.21)
In order to analyze the performance of the proposed relay selection schemes, we define
an eective end-to-end SNR ratio as our performance metrics. Particularly, in the first relay
selection scheme, the best relay is the one for which the end-to-end SNR ratio is maximum.
Mathematically, the eective end-to-end SNR ratio of the first relay selection scheme is ex-
pressed by
S EF =  k where k = argmax
i
 i: (6.22)
On the other hand, the best relay in the second scheme is the one for which the first-hop
SNR ratio is maximum. Accordingly, the eective end-to-end SNR ratio of the second relay
selection scheme is formulated by
S EF =  k where k = argmax
i
Zi: (6.23)
In the next section, the performance of the proposed authentication scheme based on devel-
oped relay selection approaches is analyzed in terms of outage and spoofing detection, respec-
tively.
6.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, the performances of outage and spoofing detection are analyzed respectively.
The outage of eective end-to-end SNR ratios is defined based on equations in (6.22) and
(6.23), and the closed-form expressions of the two outage probabilities are derived accordingly.
Additionally, the authentication performance in terms of FAR and PD is defined and discussed
as well.
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6.4.1 Outage Analysis of First Relay Selection Scheme
In our scenario, the outage probability is defined as a probability of the eective end-to-
end SNR ratio below a threshold . Mathematically, the outage probability of the first relay
selection scheme can be formulated as
Pout , P(S EF  )
= P (max f 1; 2; : : : ;  Mg  )
=
MY
i=1
P( i  ); (6.24)
where S EF is the eective end-to-end SNR ratio of the first scheme that is defined in (6.22).
From the equation (6.24), the outage probability can be achieved based on the CDF of random
variable  i. Using the definition of  i in equation (6.16), the CDF of  i can be expressed by
F i(z) , P( i  z)
= P
PAjhARi j2
PE jhERi j2
 PRjhRiBj
2 + (PE2ERi + 
2
n)
PRjhRiBj2 + (PA2ARi + 2n)
 z

= P
PAjhARi j2
PE jhERi j2
 z PRjhRiBj
2 + (PA2ARi + 
2
n)
PRjhRiBj2 + (PE2ERi + 2n)

: (6.25)
Using the derived CDF of the SNR ratio Zi given in equation (6.19), F i(z) in (6.25) can be
further expressed as
F i(z) = EhRiB
8>>>>><>>>>>:
z
PR jhRiBj2+(PA2ARi+
2
n)
PR jhRiBj2+(PE2ERi+
2
n)
¯ERi
z
PR jhRiBj2+(PA2ARi+
2
n)
PR jhRiBj2+(PE2ERi+
2
n)
¯ERi + ¯ARi
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
= EhRiB
(
z¯ERi
z¯ERi + ¯ARi
 jhRiBj
2 +Gi
jhRiBj2 + Li
)
; (6.26)
where Gi as well as Li are defined for simplicity, respectively, as
Gi ,
1
PR
(PA2ARi + 
2
n); (6.27)
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and
Li ,
1
PR
PA2ARi + 2n
z¯ERi + ¯ARi
z¯ERi +
PE2ERi + 
2
n
z¯ERi + ¯ARi
¯ARi

: (6.28)
Since the power of absolute value of channel coecient jhRiBj2 is exponentially distributed,
equation (6.26) can be further simplified as
F i(z) =
z¯ERi
z¯ERi + ¯ARi

1 + EhRiB
(
(Gi   Li)
jhRiBj2 + Li
) 
=
z¯ERi
z¯ERi + ¯ARi

1 +
Z 1
0
(Gi   Li)
(x + Li)2RiB
e
  x
2RiB dx

: (6.29)
The integral term inside the equation (6.29) can be expressed in terms of exponential inte-
gral function, i.e., Ei(x) =   R 1 x 1t e tdt, as followsZ 1
0
(Gi   Li)
(x + Li)2RiB
e
  x
2RiB dx
=
Gi   Li
2RiB
Z 1
Li
2RiB
1
t
e
 (t  Li
2RiB
)
dt
=   (Gi   Li)e
Li=2RiB
2RiB
Ei

  Li
2RiB

: (6.30)
Using the expression of the integral term in (6.30), the CDF of  i can be expressed in closed
form as
F i(z) =
z¯ERi
z¯ERi + ¯ARi

2666666666641   (Gi   Li)e
Li
2RiB
2RiB
Ei

  Li
2RiB
377777777775 : (6.31)
By substituting the CDF of  i in equation (6.24), the closed form expression of the outage
probability can be expressed by
Pout =
MY
i=1
¯ERi
¯ERi + ¯ARi

2666666666641   (Gi   Li)e
Li
2RiB
2RiB
Ei

  Li
2RiB
377777777775 : (6.32)
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6.4.2 Outage Analysis of Second Relay Selection Scheme
In this subsection, we derive the outage probability of the second relay selection scheme.
In the second relay selection scheme, the relay with the largest end-to-end SNR ratio is not
always chosen due to the lack of CSI of the links between relays and Bob. Using the law of
total probability, outage probability in this case can be expressed as
Pout , P(S EF  )
=
MX
k=1
P(S EF  jk = argmax
i
Zi)P(k = argmax
i
Zi)
=
MX
k=1
P( k  jk = argmax
i
Zi)P(k = argmax
i
Zi)
=
MX
k=1
P( k   and k = argmax
i
Zi); (6.33)
where S EF is the eective end-to-end SNR ratio of the second scheme that is defined in (6.23).
Replacing  k with ZkWk according to the equation (6.20), the outage probability above can be
equivalently expressed as
Pout =
MX
k=1
P(ZkWk   and k = argmax
i
Zi)
=
MX
k=1
P(ZkWk   and Zk  Zi; i , k)
=
MX
k=1
EZk

P(Wk  Zk and Zk  Zi; i , kjZk)

:
(6.34)
The last line in the chain of equations (6.34) is achieved by fixing the random variable
Zk in the kth summand of the second line and then finding statistical expectation with respect
to Zk in the kth summand. Due to the fact that all the random variables Zi; i = 1;    ;M and
Wi; i = 1;    ;M are statistically independent, the outage probability in (6.34) can be simplified
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as
Pout =
MX
k=1
EZk
 MY
i=1;i,k
P(Zi  Zk)  P(Wk  Zk jZk)

=
MX
k=1
EZk
 MY
i=1;i,k
Zk¯ERi
Zk¯ERi+¯ARi
 P(Wk Zk jZk)

: (6.35)
Let S denote the subset of M relays for which the average channel power between Alice
and relay is better than that between Eve and the relay, i.e., PA2ARi > PE
2
ERi , and S¯ denote its
complement. Additionally, the CDF of the random variable Wi; i = 1;    ;M has been derived
in the Appendix A. As a consequence, the outage probability in (6.35) can be recast by using
the derived results in the Appendix A. That is,
Pout=
X
k2S
EZk
 MY
i=1;i,k
Zk¯ERi
Zk¯ERi+¯ARi
P(Wk  Zk jZk)

+
X
k2S¯
EZk
 MY
i=1;i,k
Zk¯ERi
Zk¯ERi+¯ARi
P(Wk  Zk jZk)

=
X
k2S
Z (PA2ARk+2n)
PE
2
ERk
+2n
0
MY
i=1;i,k
zk¯ERi
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
dzk|                                                                 {z                                                                 }
I1;k
 
X
k2S
Z (PA2ARk+2n)
PE
2
ERk
+2n

MY
i=1;i,k
zk¯ERi
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
e
 

zk
(PA
2
ARk
+2n) (PE2ERk+
2
n)
(1  zk )
2
RkB
P2R dzk|                                                                                               {z                                                                                               }
I2;k
+
X
k2S¯
Z 
(PA
2
ARk
+2n)
PE
2
ERk
+2n
MY
i=1;i,k
zk¯ERi
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
e
 

zk
(PA
2
ARk
+2n) (PE2ERk+
2
n)
(1  zk )
2
RkB
P2R dzk
|                                                                                             {z                                                                                             }
I3;k
+
X
k2S¯
Z (PA2ARk+2n)
PE
2
ERk
+2n
0
MY
i=1;i,k
zk¯ERi
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
dzk|                                                                 {z                                                                 }
I4;k
:
(6.36)
In order to find a closed-form solution for outage probability in (6.36), we first find the
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fractional decomposition of the following function, that is,
fk(zk),
MY
i=1;i,k
zk¯ERi
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
,
¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
+
MY
i=1;i,k
(zk¯ERi)  
MY
i=1;i,k
(zk¯ERi + ¯ARi)
MY
i=1;i,k
(zk¯ERi + ¯ARi)
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
: (6.37)
Since the degree of the polynomial in the denominator of the multiplicative term in the
second line of (6.37) is less than that of the polynomial in the numerator of the same term,
using partial fraction decompositions, it can be easily decomposed as
MY
i=1;i,k
(zk¯ERi)  
MY
i=1;i,k
(zk¯ERi+¯ARi)
MY
i=1;i,k
(zk¯ERi+¯ARi)
=
MX
i=1;i,k
ak;i
zk¯ERi+¯ARi
; (6.38)
where ak;i is defined for simplicity as
ak;i ,
MY
l=1;l,k
(  ¯ARi
¯ERi
¯ERl)
MY
l=1;l,k;l,i
(  ¯ARi
¯ERi
¯ERl + ¯ARl)
: (6.39)
By substituting (6.38) in (6.37), the function fk(zk) can be equivalently expressed as
fk(zk) =
¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
+
MX
i=1;i,k
ak;i
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
: (6.40)
By using the equation (6.40), I1;k and I4;k in the equation (6.36) can be derived in closed
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form. It is interesting to note that the closed-form expression for I4;k is same as that for I1;k.
Therefore, I1;k and I4;k can be derived by
I1;k = I4;k =
Z vk
0
fk(zk)dzk
=
1
¯ERk
  ¯ARk ¯ERk
zk¯ERk + ¯ARk
#vk
0
+
MX
i=1;i,k
¯ARk
¯ERk
 ak;i
¯ERi
(
¯ARk
¯ERk
  ¯ARi
¯ERi
)2
ln
 zk + ¯ARi¯ERi
zk +
¯ARk
¯ERk
#vk
0
 
MX
i=1;i,k
¯ARk
¯ERk
 ak;i
¯ERi
( ¯ARi
¯ERi
  ¯ARk
¯ERk
)
 1
zk +
¯ARk
¯ERk
#vk
0
= 1   'k   
vk + 'k    +
MX
i=1;i,k
ak;i('k   )
¯ERi('i   'k)2
 ln
 ('k   )(vk + 'i   )
('i   )(vk + 'k   )

 
MX
i=1;i,k
ak;i('k   )
¯ERi('i   'k)
 1
vk + 'k     
1
'k   
!
; (6.41)
where vk and 'i are defined for simplicity, respectively, as
vk ,
(PA2ARk + 
2
n)
PE2ERk + 
2
n
; (6.42)
and
'i ,  +
¯ARi
¯ERi
: (6.43)
In what follows, we will find closed-form expressions for I2;k and I3;k, respectively. Simi-
larly, using the decomposed function fk(zk) in (6.40), I2;k can be expressed as
I2;k =
Z vk

fk(zk)  e
 
k
zk
 k
1  zk dzk
= ek
Z vk

¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
e
k k
zk  dzk
+ ek
MX
i=1;i,k
Z vk

ak;i
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
e
k k
zk  dzk; (6.44)
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where k and k are defined for simplicity, respectively, as
k ,
(PA2ARk + 
2
n)
P2R
2
RkB
; (6.45)
and
k ,
PE2ERk + 
2
n
P2R
2
RkB
: (6.46)
Using the change of the variable t = zk   , the first term of I2;k in (6.44) can be simplified
and derived based on the result in (C.3) in the Appendix B. That is,
Z vk

¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
e
k k
zk  dzk
=
Z vk 
0
'k   
(t + 'k)2
e
k k
t dt
=
('k   )
'k
e
k k
'k
"
k   k
'k
Ei
 (k k)(vk+'k )
'k(vk   )

+
vk   
vk + 'k     e
(k k)(vk+'k )
'k (vk )
#
; (6.47)
where vk >  and (k   k) < 0.
Moreover, using the changes of the variables t = zk    and s = 1t , the second term of
I2;k in (6.44) can be equivalently recast and derived based on the integrals [129, eq.(3.352.2)]
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and [129, eq.(3.353.1)]. That is,
MX
i=1;i,k
Z vk

ak;i
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERke
k k
zk 
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
dzk
=
MX
i=1;i,k
Z vk 
0
ak;i
¯ERi
t + 'i
 'k   
(t + 'k)2
e
k k
t dt
=
MX
i=1;i,k
Z 1
1
vk 
ak;i
¯ERi
s
1 + 'is
 'k   
(1 + 'ks)2
e(k k)sds
=
MX
i=1;i,k
('k   )ak;i
¯ERi
 Z 1
1
vk 
 'i
('i 'k)2
1 + 'is
e(k k)sds
+
Z 1
1
vk 
'k
('k 'i)2
1 + 'ks
e(k k)sds +
Z 1
1
vk 
 1
('k 'i)
(1+'ks)2
e(k k)sds

=
MX
i=1;i,k
('k   )ak;i
¯ERi
 e k k'i
('i   'k)2Ei
(k   k)(vk + 'i   )
'i(vk   )

  1
('k   'i)2 e
k k
'k Ei
 (k   k)(vk + 'k   )
'k(vk   )

+
1
'2k('i   'k)

'k(vk   )
vk + 'k     e
k k
 vk + (k   k)e
k k
'k Ei
(k   k)(vk + 'k   )
'k(vk   )

: (6.48)
By combining the derived results shown in equations (6.47) and (6.48), the closed-form
expression for I2;k can be written as
I2;k = ek
 ('k   )
'k
e
k k
'k
"
k   k
'k
Ei
(k k)(vk+'k )
'k(vk   )

+
e
(k k )(vk+'k )
'k (vk )
1 + 'kvk 
#
+
MX
i=1;i,k
('k   )ak;i
¯ERi
 e k k'i
('i   'k)2Ei
(k k)(vk+'i )
'i(vk   )

  e
k k
'k
('k   'i)2Ei
(k k)(vk+'k )
'k(vk   )

+
1
'2k('i   'k)

'k(vk   )
vk + 'k     e
k k
 vk + (k   k)e
k k
'k
 Ei
(k k)(vk+'k )
'k(vk   )

; (6.49)
where vk >  and (k   k) < 0.
Similarly, using the decomposed function fk(zk) in (6.40) and changes of the variables t =
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   zk as well as s = 1t , I3;k can be derived by
I3;k =
Z 
vk
fk(zk)  e
 
k
zk
 k
1  zk dzk
= ek
 Z 
vk
¯ARk ¯ERk
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
e
k k
zk  dzk +
MX
i=1;i,k
Z 
vk
ak;i
zk¯ERi + ¯ARi
 ¯ARk ¯ERke
k k
zk 
(zk¯ERk + ¯ARk)2
dzk

= ek
 Z  vk
0
'k   
(t   'k)2 e
k k
t dt +
MX
i=1;i,k
Z  vk
0
ak;i
¯ERi
'i   t 
'k   
(t   'k)2 e
k k
t dt

= ek

'k   
'2k
Z 1
1
 vk
1
(s   1
'k
)2
e (k k)sds +
MX
i=1;i,k
Z 1
1
 vk
ak;i
¯ERi
s
'is   1 
'k   
('ks   1)2 e
(k k)sds

:
(6.50)
Using the same integrals given in [129, eq.(3.352.2)] and [129, eq.(3.353.1)], the closed-
form expression for I3;k can be written by
I3;k = ek

'k   
'2k

'k(   vk)
vk + 'k   e
k k
vk 
+ (k   k)e
k k
'k Ei
 (k   k)(vk + 'k   )
'k(   vk)

+
MX
i=1;i,k
('k   )ak;i
¯ERi
  e k k'i
('i   'k)2Ei
 (k k)(vk+'i )
'i(vk   )

+
e
k k
'k
('k   'i)2Ei
 (k k)(vk+'k )
'k(vk   )

  1
'2k('i   'k)

'k(vk   )
vk + 'k     e
k k
 vk + (k   k)e
k k
'k
 Ei
 (k k)(vk+'k )
'k(vk   )

; (6.51)
where vk <  and (k   k) < 0.
Since I1;k and I4;k have same closed-form expression, the outage probability in equation
(6.36) can be simplified by using only terms I1;k (6.41), I2;k (6.49) and I3;k (6.51). Consequently,
the closed-form expression of the outage probability for the second scheme can be expressed
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by
Pout =
X
k2S
I1;k  
X
k2S
I2;k +
X
k2S¯
I3;k +
X
k2S¯
I1;k: (6.52)
Figure 6.2 illustrates the outage probabilities of two proposed relay selection schemes ver-
sus the transmit power ratio of Alice to Eve (i.e., PAPE ) under the comparison of the closed-form
expressions and Monte-Carlo experiments. In this figure, AF1 and AF2 represent the pro-
posed first and second relay selection schemes, respectively. As expected, the closed-form
expressions of two outage probabilities given in equations (6.32) and (6.52) coincide with the
corresponding Monte-Carlo results. Additionally, the performance of AF1 is slightly better
than that of AF2 when PAPE is larger than 2 dB. Although AF1 performs slightly better than AF2
in terms of outage probability, AF2 provides great performance with lower complexity and
resource consumption.
6.4.3 Authentication Analysis
In this subsection, the authentication performance in terms of FAR and PD is defined and
analyzed. Basically, channel-based physical layer authentication is achieved based on the chan-
nel temporal correlation in the legitimate link and spatial decorrelation between dierent links.
In our proposed authentication scheme based on AF cooperative relaying, a new test statistic is
developed in order to discriminate Alice from Eve under the binary hypothesis testing defined
in equation (6.1). More specifically, the test statistic TAF is defined based on the normalized
channel dierence between two adjacent end-to-end channel estimates at the destination. That
is,
TAF ,
jhˆX(n)   hˆARbB(n   1)j2
jhˆARbB(n   1)j2
; (6.53)
where hˆX(n) = fhˆARbB(n); hˆERbB(n)g is defined as current end-to-end channel coecient estimate
of the link between an unknown transmitter (Alice or Eve) and Bob through relay Rb. Herein,
the subscript Rb represents the selected best relay Rb which is determined and updated based
on our proposed relay selection schemes. Also, hˆARbB(n   1) is previous end-to-end channel
coecient estimate of the legitimate link via the best relay Rb.
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of outage probabilities based on closed-form expressions and Monte-
Carlo simulations.
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Furthermore, the end-to-end channel coecient estimates hˆARbB and hˆERbB can be modeled
as a sum of the actual value and a noise component, respectively. That is,
hˆARbB(n) , hARb(n)hRbB(n) + "ARbB(n); (6.54)
and
hˆERbB(n) , hERb(n)hRbB(n) + "ERbB(n); (6.55)
where "ARbB and "ERbB are the estimation errors. Based on LS channel estimation [106], the
variances of "ARbB and "ERbB are derived, respectively, by
2"ARbB
,
2n
2
RbB
PA
+
2n(PA
2
ARb + 
2
n)
PAPR
; (6.56)
and
2"ERbB
,
2n
2
RbB
PE
+
2n(PE
2
ERb + 
2
n)
PEPR
; (6.57)
where 2RbB is the variance of the channel link between the selected best relay and Bob.
Since the performance of the proposed authentication scheme is evaluated by comparing
with that of the direct transmission scheme, a test statistic is developed for the direct transmis-
sion scheme as well. Specifically, the test statistic is defined based on the normalized channel
dierence between adjacent channel coecient estimates. Mathematically, the test statistic
TDT is expressed by
TDT ,
jhˆX(n)   hˆAB(n   1)j2
jhˆAB(n   1)j2
; (6.58)
where hˆX(n) , fhˆAB(n); hˆEB(n)g. Herein, hˆAB and hˆEB are the estimated channel coecients of
the legitimate and spoofing links, respectively. Similarly, the channel coecient estimates can
be modeled, respectively, by
hˆAB(n) , hAB(n) + "AB(n); (6.59)
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and
hˆEB(n) , hEB(n) + "EB(n); (6.60)
where "AB and "EB are the estimation errors, which are independent to each other. Based on LS
channel estimation, the variances of "AB and "EB can be expressed, respectively, by
2"AB ,
1
(PA + PR)2AB
; (6.61)
and
2"EB ,
1
(PE + PR)2EB
: (6.62)
According to the developed test statistics TAF in (6.53) and TDT in (6.58), FAR and PD can
be defined, respectively, by
P f a , P(T > aujH0); (6.63)
and
Pd , P(T > aujH1); (6.64)
where T , fTAF ;TDT g. Herein, au is the threshold for decision making of authentication.
Generally, FAR is normally set below 0:1 for secure wireless communications. Consequently,
the threshold au can be calculated by using the Monte-Carlo method under a given value of
FAR. Based on the achieved threshold value, PD can be calculated based on Monte-Carlo
simulations as well.
6.5 Simulation Results
In this section, the performance of our proposed authentication scheme based on coopera-
tive AF relay system is evaluated using the numerical results. In our scenario, one legitimate
6.5. Simulation Results 123
transmitter (Alice) communicates with the intended receiver (Bob) through M trusted relay
nodes in the presence of one spoofer (Eve). A two-dimensional coordinate system is consid-
ered in the simulations, and for simplicity, Alice, Eve, Bob and relays are located at dierent
intervals along a horizontal line. The Alice-relay distances are assumed to be smaller than the
Eve-relay distances. In order to study the eects of distances, the channel coecients between
any two nodes are modeled by using frequency non-selective Rayleigh fading with a path loss
exponent, i.e., hi j  Nc(0; d i j ). Herein, di j is the Euclidean distance between nodes i and j,
and  is the path loss exponent that is assumed to be a constant throughout the simulations. In
our simulations, we fix Alice and Bob locations at (0; 0) and (10; 0), respectively. Moreover,
the transmit powers of the relays and Eve are fixed to one. Additionally, Noise variance 2n
is assumed to equal to -40 dB, and the path loss is  = 3. For Monte-Carlo experiments, 106
independent trails are used to obtain the average results.
In order to compare the authentication performance based on our proposed AF cooperative
schemes against the direct transmission scheme, two examples are considered by studying the
eects of Alice-Eve distance and the number of available relays, respectively. In the simu-
lations, AF1 and AF2 represent the proposed authentication schemes based on the first and
second relay selection methods, respectively, while DT is corresponding to the direct transmis-
sion scheme.
6.5.1 Example 1 : Eect of Alice-Eve distance
In Example 1, we will study the eect of distances between Alice and Eve on the perfor-
mances of outage and spoofing detection, respectively. Particularly, four available relays are
considered and fixed at the locations (5; 0), (5; 1), (5; 2) and (5; 3), respectively. The position
of Eve is moved from ( 1; 0) to ( 10; 0). Figure 6.3 illustrates the outage probability of the
eective SNR ratio versus the distances between Alice and Eve under dierent values of trans-
mit power ratio. It shows that the outage probabilities under three schemes are decreasing
dramatically when Eve is moving away from Alice. As expected, the outage performances for
our proposed schemes AF1 and AF2 are significantly better than that for DT under dierent
values of transmit power ratio. Additionally, comparing AF2 with AF1, AF2 performs worse
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Figure 6.3: Outage probabilities versus Alice-Eve distance under dierent values of transmit
power ratio.
than AF1 when Eve is at a farther position to Alice, but the outage probability of AF2 is lower
than -30 dB under dierent Alice-Eve distances.
Figure 6.4 shows the probability of spoofing detection versus the distances between Alice
and Eve under dierent values of transmit power ratio. As expected, the probability of spoofing
detection under three schemes increases when the position of Eve is moving away from Alice.
The performance of the proposed two schemes is significantly better than that in the direct
transmission especially at lower transmit power ratio. Additionally, AF1 performs best among
three schemes, and the proposed schemes are much better than DT when Eve is close to Alice.
The PD of AF2 is higher than 0.8 at dierent Alice-Eve distances. In Figure 6.5, we fix
the value of transmit power ratio to be 5 dB, and study the spoofing detection for dierent
Alice-Eve distances under two values of FAR. As expected, the PD of three schemes increases
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correspondingly under higher value of FAR. In our proposed two schemes, the probability of
spoofing detection is always larger than 0:7. However, for DT, the probability is just 0:2 when
the Alice-Eve distance equals to 1.
6.5.2 Example 2 : Eect of the number of available relays
In this example, we will study the eect of the number of available relays on the analysis
of outage probability and probability of spoofing detection. To achieve this, we consider six
available relays in our scenario which are placed in order at (5; 0), (5; 1), (5; 2), (5; 3), (5; 4)
and (5; 5), respectively. Moreover, the position of Eve is fixed at ( 5; 0). The performance of
the outage for the eective SNR ratio is depicted in Figure 6.6 versus the number of available
relays. Note that the number of N available relays in Example 2 are set based on the first N
relays, where N = 1; 2; : : : ; 6.
Figure 6.6 shows the outage probability for the number of available relays under dierent
values of transmit power ratio. As expected, the outage probability of DT is independent of
the number of relays. As it can be seen from this figure, the outage probability dramatically
decreases with the increasing number of available relays under two proposed schemes. When
more available relays are considered, AF1 and AF2 both perform much better than DT. At
higher transmit power ratio, the outage probability of AF1 decreases to 10 4 when the number
of available relays is N = 6, which is 21 dB lower than that of DT, and also 10 dB lower than
that of AF2.
In Figure 6.7, the transmit power ratio is fixed at 5 dB. This figure illustrates the spoofing
detection for the number of available relays under two dierent values of FAR. As expected,
the probability of spoofing detection for DT is independent of the number of available relays,
and the values are approximately 0:38 at P f a = 0:08 and 0:42 at P f a = 0:1, respectively. As
for the two proposed schemes, the PD increases when the number of available relays becomes
larger. When the number of relays is N = 6 and the FAR is P f a = 0:1, the PD can reach to 0:98
and 0:89 in AF1 and AF2, respectively. Even at lower FAR value, the PD is still larger than 0:7
under our proposed schemes where N is no smaller than 3.
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6.6 Summary
In this Chapter, we have proposed a novel channel-based physical layer authentication
scheme based on an AF cooperative relaying system. To achieve our goal, the best relay was
chosen to provide the best end-to-end path between two legitimate communication ends in the
presence of a spoofer. Specifically, two relay selection schemes have been proposed by maxi-
mizing the SNR ratios of the legitimate link to the spoofing link at the destination and relays,
respectively. For statistical analysis, we defined our performance metrics in terms of the outage
of eective SNR ratios and probability of spoofing detection. One of the main contributions
was that the closed-form expressions for the two outage probabilities have been derived. Under
a binary hypothesis testing, a new test statistic has been developed to analyze the performance
of spoofing detection. By using Monte-Carlo method, the performance of the proposed scheme
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was evaluated and compared with that of the direct transmission scheme. Numerical results
have shown the eectiveness on the improvement in performance of the proposed scheme.
Chapter 7
Continuous Physical Layer Authentication
Using PCP-OFDM System
Traditional authentication techniques for wireless communications are facing great chal-
lenges, due to the open radio propagation environment and limited options of transmission
techniques. In this Chapter, a new continuous physical layer authentication system based on
an adaptive OFDM platform is proposed to enhance the security of tractional OFDM systems.
A PCP sequence, which introduces an additional signaling link to carry the time-varying trans-
mission parameters, is employed in each OFDM symbol for authentication purpose. Moreover,
PCP sequences are generated with the same time and frequency domain characteristics as data-
carrying OFDM signals in order to conceal the system parameters from adversaries. With
the proper recovery of system parameters and interference cancellation, only legitimate users
can successfully decode the PCP sequence and recover necessary parameters for demodulating
OFDM data. In addition, a cross-layer optimization approach, which trade-os between the
stealth, system robustness and transmitting eciency, is introduced to continuously generate
optimal PCPs according to dynamic communication conditions. Finally, numerical simulation
is employed to evaluate the performance of our proposed authentication system.
131
132 Chapter 7. Continuous Physical Layer Authentication Using PCP-OFDM System
7.1 Introduction
Wireless communications is facing additional issues and new challenges in defending against
various types of security risks compared with traditional wired networks [130, 131]. One ma-
jor challenge for secure wireless networks is the broadcast nature of radio propagation due to
the lack of direct physical connection between the transmitter and receiver. Moreover, limited
options of transmission techniques at the physical layer brings potential security issues. To
address wireless security issues, traditionally, cryptographic techniques relying on the higher
layers of the protocol stack provide an eective solution based on complex mathematical cal-
culations [31, 132]. However, due to the physical layer transparency, information protected by
these traditional security approaches can often be deciphered using exhaustive trial. Therefore,
they are inecient and vulnerable to various malicious attacks. Recently, the physical prop-
erties of the wireless transmission are recognized as a powerful and under-utilized source to
provide additional security protection and enhance security performance of wireless commu-
nications systems.
Alternatively, OFDM has been adopted in various latest wireless and telecommunications
standards, due to its spectral eciency, high achievable data rates, and robust performance
in multipath fading environments. However, OFDM signals are transparent to potential ad-
versaries, as OFDM-based communications systems lack built-in security capabilities. More
specifically, since OFDM employs pilot tones or preamble symbols for channel estimation,
equalization and synchronization at the receiver, the implementations of OFDM are highly
susceptible to signal jamming attacks [88–90]. Additionally, due to the distinct time and fre-
quency characteristics of OFDM signals, physical layer transmission parameters of OFDM
signals can be blindly estimated by any user within the same network, and no prior information
of the signals is required for them [91,92]. Consequently, secure OFDM-based transmission is
critical for designing wireless security mechanisms.
In this Chapter, we propose a new continuous physical layer authentication system based
on PCP-OFDM, where PCP is introduced to replace the traditional CP and bring an additional
signaling link at the physical layer to convey current system parameters and the identity of
dierent transceivers [133, 134]. Specifically, transmitter can use the PCP sequences to adjust
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its operating parameters continuously and share the link adaptation information with the legit-
imate receiver. PCPs are generated with the same time and frequency domain characteristics
as the OFDM data-carrying symbols, thus, they are concealed to unauthorized users. For the
analysis of system performance pertaining to security and eciency, the stealth, system ro-
bustness and transmitting eciency are considered. The stealth of a communications system
describes how covert the authentication scheme is to prevent against eavesdropping users [7],
while the system robustness is defined how reliable the signal can be recovered by the legiti-
mate receiver. The performance trade-o between stealth, system robustness and eciency is
investigated from a cross-layer view. An optimization method is developed to adapt the sys-
tem parameters continuously. Eventually, numerical simulation is employed to evaluate the
performance of our proposed authentication system.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 and 7.3, the design of our
proposed continuous physical-layer authentication using the PCP-OFDM system is illustrated.
In Section 7.4, performance analysis in terms of stealth and robustness is investigated, followed
by a cross-layer optimization method. Numerical results of MATLAB simulation are discussed
in Section 7.5 to validate the proposed authentication scheme. This Chapter is then summarized
in Section 7.6.
7.2 Transmitter Design of Continuous Physical Layer Au-
thentication System
Figures 7.1 shows the transmitter block diagram of our proposed continuous physical layer
authentication system based on PCP-OFDM. Compared with the traditional OFDM system
shown in Figure 2.6 in Chapter 2, PCP-OFDM employs PCP instead of traditional CP [133],
which introduces an additional signaling link to convey time-varying physical layer parame-
ters such as modulation method and number of subcarriers. In our proposed authentication
system, a notable dierence is an authentication module which is used to continuously direct
the adjustment of the physical layer parameters. The adjustment decision is made based on a
cross-layer optimization that considers the tradeos between the stealth, system robustness and
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transmitting eciency. The overall system optimization will be introduced later in Section 7.4.
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Figure 7.1: Transmitter block diagram of the proposed continuous authentication system.
7.2.1 PCP-OFDM Transmitter
The transmitter of PCP-OFDM system is designed as same as that of the traditional OFDM
system, except the prefixed part. As for the data-carrying part, We consider one OFDM
data symbol consisting of N subcarriers, and source data are grouped and mapped into X =
[X(0); X(1); : : : ; X(N   1)]T . With inverse discrete Fourier transformation, the transmitted data
symbol x = [x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(N   1)]T in the discrete time domain can be written by
x(n) =
r
1
N
N 1X
m=0
X(m)e j2m
n
N ; n = 0; 1;    ;N   1: (7.1)
Before transmitting an OFDM symbol, PCP is generated and inserted as prefix with size of
P. As a result, two adjacent PCP-OFDM symbols with total length of N + 2P can be expressed
by
x˜ = [cp1(0); cp1(1); : : : ; cp1(P   1); x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(N   1); cp2(0); cp2(1); : : : ; cp2(P   1)]T ;(7.2)
where cp1 = [cp1(0); cp1(1); : : : ; cp1(P   1)]T and cp2 = [cp2(0); cp2(1); : : : ; cp2(P   1)]T are two
PCP sequences preceded and succeeded to the data symbol, repectively. They are identical if
there is no change of the operating parameters, otherwise they are dierent. Additionally, to
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completely mitigate the impact of ISI, we assume that the length of PCP (i.e., P) has to be
longer than the channel delay spread.
7.2.2 PCP Generation
To avoid distinct time and frequency characteristics between PCPs and OFDM data, herein
PCP sequences are generated using an OFDM modulator. Specifically, an N-length sequence
with P sparse input, Cp = [Cp(0);Cp(1); : : : ;Cp(N   1)]T , passes through an OFDM mod-
ulator, and only the first P samples of Cp are used to generate a P-length PCP sequence
cp = [cp(0); cp(1); : : : ; cp(P   1)]T . That is,
cp(k) = 
r
1
P
P 1X
m=0
Cp(m)e j2m
k
P ; k = 0; 1;    ; P   1; (7.3)
where the parameter  =
p
N=P is the normalization factor to maintain the generated PCP with
same power as the OFDM data, and it is assumed to be an integer.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the sparse input Cp passed through the OFDM modulator [135].
Herein a random frequency shift of l = random[0;N/P   1] is employed to dierentiate PCPs
such that no distinct frequency domain features is introduced. Therefore, two random PCP se-
quences in the frequency domain are orthogonal to each other, which represent adaptive trans-
mission parameters for continuous authentication. Take two random PCP sequences in the fre-
quency domain Cp1 = [Cp1(0);Cp1(1); : : : ;Cp1(P 1)]T and Cp2 = [Cp2(0);Cp2(1); : : : ;Cp2(P 
1)]T as an example. Due to the orthogonality of Cp1 and Cp2, we have
CHp1Cp2 =
1
P
P 1X
k=0
Cp1(k)Cp2(k) = 0: where p1 , p2: (7.4)
Accordingly, two PCP sequences in the time domain cp1 and cp2 in equation (7.2) can be
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Figure 7.2: Sparse input to OFDM modulator used for PCP sequence generation.
generated based on the equation (7.3),
cp1(k) = 
r
1
P
P 1X
m=0
Cp1(m)e j2m
k
P ; (7.5)
cp2(k) = 
r
1
P
P 1X
m=0
Cp2(m)e j2m
k
P : (7.6)
Consequently, according to the equation (7.4), the orthogonality of cp1 and cp2 can be
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proved by
cHp1cp2 =
1
P
P 1X
k=0
cp1(k)cp2(k)
=
2
P2
P 1X
k=0
 P 1X
m1=0
Cp1(m1)e j2m1
k
P


 P 1X
m2=0
Cp2(m2)e
  j2m2 kP

=
2
P2
P 1X
m1=0
P 1X
m2=0
Cp1(m1)Cp2(m2)
P 1X
k=0

e j2m1
k
P  e  j2m2 kP

=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
2
P2
P 1X
m1=0
Cp1(m1)Cp2(m1)  P = 0; i f m1 = m2;
2
P2
P 1X
m1=0
P 1X
m2=0
Cp1(m1)Cp2(m2)  0 = 0; i f m1 , m2:
(7.7)
Equation (7.7) indicates that two random PCP sequences are orthogonal to each other in
both the frequency and time domains simultaneously. The orthogonality of two random PCP
sequences guarantees successful detection of PCP sequences at the receiver.
7.3 Receiver Design of Continuous Physical Layer Authenti-
cation System
Figures 7.3 shows the receiver block diagram of our proposed continuous authentication
system using PCP-OFDM. Compared with traditional OFDM receiver, a frequency-domain
equalization and time-domain interference cancellation are used. Additionally, the PCP detec-
tion is discussed and the correct detection rate is derived in this section.
7.3.1 PCP-OFDM Receiver
In multipath fading environments, due to the channel dispersive nature, the desired OFDM
data symbol and two adjacent PCP sequences are overlapped within the duration of one re-
ceived OFDM symbol. As a result, ISI and inter-carrier interference (ICI) are introduced,
where ISI is from the adjacent symbols and ICI is from the current symbol. Herein, we con-
sider a typical scenario of static multipath channel for PCP-OFDM receiver design, and the
138 Chapter 7. Continuous Physical Layer Authentication Using PCP-OFDM System
FFT FEQ P/SDecision
ICI
Estimation
ISI
Estimation
+-
Output
S/P
Sync.
&
Timing
Channel Estimation &
PCP Detection
Figure 7.3: Receiver block diagram of the proposed continuous authentication system.
channel vector with length of L is defined by
h = [h0; h1; : : : ; hL 1]T : (7.8)
Consequently, transmitting the signal given in equation (7.2), the received signal y in the
time domain can be written by
y = h  x˜ + w; (7.9)
where  denotes cyclic convolution, and w is an additive white Gaussian noise vector with the
size of (N + 2P + L   1).
For the analysis of interference cancellation, we define two zero padded PCP sequences in
an observation period of N-samples [133]. That is,
Rcp1 = [ 0; : : : 0 ;|   {z   }
(N L+1)Samples
cp1(P   L + 1); : : : ; cp1(P   1)|                                   {z                                   }
(L 1)Samples
]T ; (7.10)
Rcp2 = [cp2(0); : : : cp2(L   2);|                      {z                      }
(L 1)Samples
0; : : : ; 0|    {z    }
(N L+1)Samples
]T : (7.11)
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Based on our previous work in [133,134,136], three NN matrices, i.e.,C,CT , andCH, are
used to reconstructed ISI and ICI. More specifically, the first matrix C represents the channel
seen by the OFDM symbol, i.e,
C =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
h0 0    0 0    0
h1 h0    0 0    0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
:::
: : : 0
hL 1 hL 2    h0 0    0
0 hL 1    h1 h0    0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
:::
: : :
:::
0 0    0 hL 1    h0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
: (7.12)
As for the succeeding symbol, the second matrix CT is the tail of the channel response
which leads to ISI, i.e.,
CT =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
0    0 hL 1 hL 2    h1
0    0 0 hL 1    h2
:::
: : :
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
0    0 0 0    hL 1
0    0 0 0    0
:::
: : :
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
0    0 0 0    0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
: (7.13)
The third matrix CH represents head response of the channel for ICI interference cancella-
tion, i.e.,
CH =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
h0 0    0 0    0
h1 h0    0 0    0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
:::
: : : 0
hL 2 hL 3    h0 0    0
0 0    0 0    0
:::
:::
: : :
:::
:::
: : :
:::
0 0    0 0    0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
: (7.14)
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Additionally, two signal vectors y1 and y2 are defined and constructed from the received
signal y = [y(0); : : : ; y(P 1); y(P); : : : ; y(P+N  1); y(P+N); : : : ; y(P+N + L 2); : : : ; y(2P+
N + L   1)] for ISI and ICI cancellation. In particular, y1 expresses the received OFDM data
symbol in the observation period of N-samples, while y2 contains the remaining tail from the
OFDM data symbol and the components from the succeeding PCP. That is,
y1 = [y(P); : : : ; y(P + N   1)]T
= Cx + CTRcp1 + wN ; (7.15)
and
y2 =

y(P + N) ; : : : y(P + N + L   2);|                                       {z                                       }
(L 1)Samples
T
0; : : : ; 0]|      {z      }
(N L+1)Samples
= CTx + CHRcp2 + wN : (7.16)
where wN is the noise vector applied on the samples.
Consequently, ISI term can be removed by subtracting the preceding PCP (i.e., CTRcp1)
from y1, while ICI term (i.e., CTx) can be achieved by subtracting CHRcp2 from y2.
Using the two signal vectors, the ideal signal for demodulation can be expressed by [133]
yIdeal = y1   CTRcp1 + y2   CHRcp2: (7.17)
Note that the “ideal” channel matrix can be achieved by adding two matrices C and CT ,
i.e.,
C + CT = Ccycl; (7.18)
where Ccycl is the ideal channel matrix resulted in a cyclic convolution between the transmitted
signal and the channel.
If the channel estimate is accurate, (7.17) can be expressed by
yIdeal = Ccyclx + wN : (7.19)
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In the traditional CP-OFDM system, Ccycl can be diagonalized by N  N (I)FFT matric
[137], i.e.,
Ccycl = FHNDN(HN)FN ; (7.20)
where FN is the FFT matrix and FHN is the IFFT matrix. DN(HN) is the N  N diagonal matrix
with the channel frequency response as its diagonal elements. For the equalization, applying a
FFT matrix on the equation (7.19) results to
FNyIdeal = FNfFHNDN(HN)FNgFHNX + wN
= DN
 
H0N

X0; (7.21)
where H0N is the estimated channel frequency response.
Finally, the zero-forcing demodulation process could be completed by
X0 = D 1N (H
0
N)fFNyIdealg: (7.22)
7.3.2 PCP Detection
For authenticated user, PCP detection must be achieved to recover necessary transmission
parameters for OFDM demodulation. As proved before, PCP sequences are orthogonal with
each other in order to guarantee successful detection. Therefore, PCP can be detected by cor-
relating the received PCP with MP orthogonal PCP candidates in a local library at the receiver
side. The one resulted in a correlation peak is recognized as the transmitted PCP. Herein,
perfect timing, phase and frequency synchronization is assumed. Specifically, the correlation
function can be mathematically expressed by
R(m) =
P 1X
k=0
yp(k) cp;m(k); (7.23)
where yp is the received PCP, and cp;m is the mth locally generated PCP sequences.
For simplifying the analysis of PCP detection, a white Gaussian channel is used. Therefore,
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equation (7.23) can be written by
R(m) =
P 1X
k=0
(cp(k) + wp(k)) cp;m(k)
=
P 1X
k=0
cp(k)cp;m(k) + wp(k)c

p;m(k): (7.24)
where wp is the zero-mean white complex Gaussian noise with variance 2w.
It is worth mentioning that, the correlation between two random PCP sequences is
P 1X
k=0
cp;i(k)cp; j(k) =
8>>><>>>: P; i f i = j;0; i f i , j: (7.25)
Consequently, the correlation peak of equation (7.24) can be derived by
R(m) =
8>>><>>>: P + n1; i f i = j;0 + n2; i f i , j: (7.26)
where n1 is the interference to the auto-correlation function, and n2 is the interference to the
cross-correlation between the received PCP and the rest of (MP   1) PCP sequences. Both are
complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance 2n = P
2
w, and they are statistically
independent to each other.
Therefore, PCP can be successfully detected by the receiver if
jP + n1j > jn2j: (7.27)
Based on the equation in (7.27), the correct detection rate of each test in the PCP detection
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can be expressed by
Prcp;m = Pr(jP + n1j > jn2j) = Pr
 jn2j2
2
<
jP + n1j2
2

= E

1   e  2 jP+n1 j2

= 1   En1;R;n1;I

e 

2 [(n1;R+P)
2+n21;I ]

= 1   En1;R

e 
1
2(n1;R+P)
2

 En1;I

e 
1
2n
2
1;I

; (7.28)
where n1 is written as n1 = n1;R + j n1;I, where n1;R and n1;I are statistically independent, and
both are following zero-mean Normal distribution, i.e., n1;R; n1;I  N(0; 2) with 2 = 2n2 .
Additionally,  = 2
2n
.
According to the law of the unconscious statistician, the expectation of a measurable func-
tion g(X) of a random variable X given the PDF function fX(x), can be written by Efg(X)g =R 1
 1 g(x) fX(x)dx. Therefore, two expected values in equation (7.28) can be derived as follows,
i.e.,
En1;R
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e 
1
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2

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Z 1
 1
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and
En1;R

e 
1
2n
2
1;I

=
Z 1
 1
e 
1
2n
2
1;I  1p
22
e 
n21;I
22 dn1;I
=
q
2 1
2( 2+
1
22
)p
22
Z 1
 1
1q
2 1
2( 2+
1
22
)
e
  n
2
1;I
2 1
2( 2 +
1
22
) dn1;I
=
r
1
2 + 1
: (7.30)
Therefore, the correct detection rate in equation (7.28) can be derived by
Prcp;m = 1  
1
2 + 1
e 
P2
2(2+1)
= 1   1
2
e
  P
22w : (7.31)
7.4 Performance Analysis for Cross Layer Authentication
In this section, a cross-layer authentication system is designed to derive the optimal PCP
parameters under dynamic network conditions. In the proposed system, security is achieved
by continuously adapting the configuration of the physical layer with the assistance of time-
varying PCP sequences. To optimize the overall system performance, three important factors
need to be considered, that is,
a) Stealth performance, i.e., the stealth of PCP sequences;
b) System robustness performance, i.e., the correct detection rate of PCP-OFDM system;
c) Cross-layer optimization, i.e., co-design PCP signaling link and OFDM system.
7.4.1 Stealth Performance
From the perspective of an eavesdropper, an illegal receiver will try to recover all the in-
formation from the PCP-OFDM signal blindly. Since the transmission parameters are carried
by PCP in the proposed system, an adversary will naturally try to recover the PCP information
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first.
Since the PCP sequence and the following OFDM data are all generated by using the same
OFDM modulator, thereby both have the identical time and frequency characteristics. More
specifically, large number of orthogonal random sequences are used to generate PCP sequence
cp. According to central limit theorem, both the real and imaginary part of PCP sequence are
approximately following Normal distribution with zero mean and variance
2cp
2 , i.e., cp;R; cp;I 
N(0;
2cp
2 ). As a result, the envelope of PCP sequence jcpj approximately follows Rayleigh
distribution, i.e., jcpj  Rayleigh(
q
2cp
2 ).
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Figure 7.4: Auto-correlation of PCP-OFDM, CP-OFDM and AWGN.
Furthermore, the statistic characteristics of PCP-OFDM can also be analyzed by observing
the autocorrelation function. Due to the periodic replication structure in CP-OFDM, the auto-
correlation of CP-OFDM signal in time domain would have two peaks, one locates at 1 = 0,
the other locates at 2 = N. Based on the dierence j1   2j, the useful symbol boundary of
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CP-OFDM could be detected. In contrast, the autocorrelation of PCP-OFDM is very similar
to the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), which has only one peak at  = 0. Figure 7.4
illustrates the auto-correlation of PCP-OFDM, CP-OFDM and AWGN. Obviously, as depicted
in Figure 7.4, even if the PCP-OFDM signals can be detected by detection methods such as
energy detection, it is extremely dicult to detect the symbol boundary of the signals.
7.4.2 System Robustness Performance
The robustness of the PCP-OFDM system can be evaluated by two factors, i.e. detection
error rate for the PCP signalling link, and the symbol error rate (SER) for the data carrying
part. Therefore, the overall system robustness can be modeled by
E(P;MP) = 1  

Pre;cp + (1   Pre;cp)Pre;s

; (7.32)
where Pre;cp is the overall PCP detection error rate, and Pre;s is the SER of OFDM data carrying
signal.
Specifically, the overall PCP detection error rate Pre;cp can be expressed by
Pre;cp = 1   Prcp ; (7.33)
where Prcp is the overall PCP correct detection rate. According to the equation (7.27), the
overall PCP correct detection rate Prcp is defined by
Prcp = Pr

jP + N1j > jN2j and jP + N1j > jN3j and    jP + N1j > jNMp j

= Pr

jP + N1j > max(jN2j; jN3j; : : : ; jNMp j)

= Pr

jP + N1j2 > max(jN2j2; jN3j2; : : : ; jNMp j2)|                              {z                              }
fZ

: (7.34)
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Herein, the CDF of function fZ = max(jN2j2; jN3j2; : : : ; jNMp j2) can be derived by
FZ(z) = Pr

max(jN2j2; jN3j2; : : : ; jNMp j2)  z

= Pr

jN2j2  z and jN3j2  z and    jNMp j2  z

= Pr

jN2j2  z

 Pr

jN3j2  z

   Pr

jNMp j2  z

=

1   e  2 z
Mp 1
=
Mp 1X
i=0
 
Mp 1
i
!
 ( 1)i  e  2 zi: (7.35)
Using the derived CDF of fZ above, the overall PCP correct detection rate in equation (7.34)
can be further derived by
Prcp = E
 Mp 1X
i=0
 
Mp 1
i
!
 ( 1)i  e  2 jP+N1 j2i

= E

1  
 
Mp 1
1
!
 ( 1)1  e  2 jP+N1 j2 +
 
Mp 1
2
!
 ( 1)2  e 2 2 jP+N1 j2
+    + 1  ( 1)Mp 1  e (Mp 1) 2 jP+N1 j2

: (7.36)
According to the equation (7.28) and derived results given in (7.31), we can achieve that
E

e i

2 jP+N1 j2

= EN1;R

e i

2 (N1;R+P)
2

 EN1;I

e i

2N
2
1;I

=
1
(i + 1)
e
  iP
(i+1)2w : (7.37)
Consequently, the close-form expression of the overall PCP correct detection rate can be
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derived by
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e
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: (7.38)
Additionally, based on dierent modulation method, the SER of OFDMdata carrying signal
can be evaluated numerically.
7.4.3 Cross-layer Optimization
In our proposed cross-layer authentication scheme, the PCP sequence is changing contin-
uously to enhance the authentication performance of PCP-OFDM system. The PCP changing
should guarantee the communications performance as well. Therefore, the performances in
terms of robustness and transmitting eciency, which are both aected by introducing of PCP,
are used as important metrics to direct the PCP changing. Denoting that the set of all available
PCP configurations at time t is

t = f(P1;MP1); (P2;MP2); (P3;MP3); (P4;MP4); :::g : (7.39)
To implement continuous authentication, transmitter needs to change the configuration of
PCP continuously. We denote that the probability of using the configuration (Pi;MPi) is Prci,
thus, fPrc1; Prc2; Prc3; Prc4; :::g is the probability set corresponding to the PCP configuration
set. In order to maintain the best system performance, it is necessary for the transmitter to find
the optimal transmission policy from all available scenarios. The optimization process can be
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formulated by
U(t) = max
8>><>>:X
i
Prci
 
EtN(Pi;MPi) + RD 
N
Pi + N
!9>>=>>; ;
s:t:
X
i
Prci = 1 and Prci  0; (7.40)
where RD is the received data rate of PCP-OFDM signal. EtN(Pi;MPi) is the normalized robust-
ness performance of PCP with the ith configuration at time t, defined by
EtN(Pi;MPi) =
Et(Pi;MPi)  min

t
(E)
max

t
(E)  min

t
(E)
; (7.41)
where E = fE(P1;MP1); E(P2;MP2); E(P3;MP3); E(P4;MP4); : : :g.
Based on the equation (7.40), the proposed system can adapt its operating parameters con-
tinuously and share system adaptation information with the legitimate receiver using the phys-
ical layer PCP signaling link.
7.5 Simulation Results
In this section, simulation results are presented to confirm the eectiveness of our proposed
authentication system. Herein, the traditional CP-OFDM is employed in the comparison of
system performance. More specifically, PCP-OFDM symbols are generated based on our de-
sign of transmitter in Figure 7.1, where the numbers of data subcarriers and the corresponding
lengths of PCP are N = f128; 256; 512g and P = f32; 64; 128g, respectively. The OFDM signals
are modulated with 4-QAMmodulation, and CP has same length as PCP sequences in the same
case. Moreover, the size of local PCP library (Mp) is 31 in the simulations. Additionally, Three
dierent channel mode, one AWGN channel, and two multipath Rayleigh fading channels are
used. Under a sampling frequency of 10 MHz, one multipath channel has a length of 3 with
the maximum Doppler shift 10 Hz, and the length of the other multipath channel is 5 with the
maximum Doppler shift 100 Hz.
The error rate of PCP detection is illustrated under dierent lengths of PCP sequences in
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Figure 7.5. Since data recovery at the receiver in our proposed system relies on correct PCP
detection, low error rate of PCP detection was expected. As it can be seen from Figure 7.5, low
error probability of PCP detection is achieved in the range of low SNR values, and larger size
of PCP sequence can perform even lower error probability. In addition, this Figure shows that
the closed-form exprsseion of PCP detection error rate derived in equations (7.33) and (7.38)
coincides with the corresponding Monte-Carlo results as it was expected.
Figure 7.6 shows the overall error detection probability with dierent lengths of PCP under
a multipath fading channel, and the performance of our proposed system is compared with that
of the traditional CP-OFDM system. For fairness, the size of CP is adjusted accordingly as the
length of PCP is changing based on the cross-layer optimization process. This figure shows
that the overall error detection rate is not aected by changing the lengths of guard interval
(i.e., the lengths of CP or PCP). Additionally, traditional CP-OFDM system performs slightly
better in overall error detection than our proposed system when SNR is larger than 10 dB,
but similar to CP-OFDM, our proposed system provides robust system performance under a
multipath fading channel.
Figure 7.7 illustrates the overall error detection rate under three dierent channels. As a
comparison, the error probability of the traditional CP-OFDM system is numerically evalu-
ated as well. Herein, the size of PCP sequence is fixed to be 128. As it can be seen from
Figure 7.7, when the SNR value is increasing, the performance in the overall error detection
for PCP-OFDM and CP-OFDM decreases exponentially under an AWGN channel, while the
performance approximates to a linear decrease under multipath Rayleigh fading channels. Ad-
ditionally, under the AWGN channel, the overall error probability of PCP-OFDM performs
similar to that of the traditional CP-OFDM. The performance dierence between PCP-OFDM
and CP-OFDM is negligible under multipath fading channels.
7.6 Summary
A new continuous physical layer authentication based on a novel adaptive OFDM system
with time-varying transmission parameters has been proposed in this Chapter. In the proposed
system, continuous authentication has been achieved through the transmission parameter adap-
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Figure 7.5: PCP detection error rate under dierent lengths of PCP.
tation, which was enabled by the additional signalling link between the transmitter and receiver.
The PCP sequences were designed with the same time and frequency domain characteristics to
avoid detection by adversary. By using PCP, time-varying physical layer transmission param-
eters of an OFDM system can therefore be securely transmitted between the legitimate users.
The robustness, stealth and system capacity of the proposed PCP-OFDM system have been
analyzed in this Chapter. Lastly, the security performance of the proposed PCP-OFDM system
has been verified through numerical simulations.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This final chapter summarizes our contributions and points out several topics for future
study.
8.1 Conclusions
In wireless communications, the notion of physical layer security exploiting the security
mechanisms of physical level, is a new promising paradigm for secure wireless networks. Al-
though physical layer security has the potential of significantly enhancing the security level
of wireless systems by exploring unique features of wireless medium, it is fair to acknowl-
edge that the eectiveness and robustness of existing physical layer security approaches are
challenged under severe channel conditions in practice. In this dissertation, we have mainly
investigated the physical layer authentication to enhance the security performance of wireless
systems.
In Chapter 2, security challenges of wireless communications have been illustrated first,
and then addressed based on a comprehensive literature survey of existing wireless security
techniques. Moreover, the system modeling of conventional OFDM has been introduced, and
the security vulnerabilities of wireless OFDM systems have been discussed as well.
In Chapter 3, we have proposed a robust physical layer authentication scheme for wireless
communications based on a hypothesis testing of the inherent properties of CIR in a time-
varying multipath environment. The variation between two consecutive CIRs from a transmit-
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ter of interest was monitored at the receiver in order to distinguish between dierent transmit-
ters for authentication purpose. To improve the authentication performance, we developed a
new test statistic based on the dierence between noise-mitigated CIRs in order to minimize
the impact of noise and interference from the wireless environment. To achieve this goal, a
SNR-dependent threshold was utilized to eliminate the excessive noise in the estimated CIRs
prior to conducting the authentication process. An adaptive threshold for authentication de-
cision has also been achieved based on the developed test statistic. The theoretical FAR and
PD have been analyzed to evaluate the robustness of the proposed authentication scheme. Ad-
ditionally, an OFDM system were employed to validate the proposed scheme and the related
theoretical analysis.
In Chapter 4, an enhanced CIR-based physical layer authentication scheme has been pro-
posed to address the issue of unreliable spoofing detection caused by fast channel variation.
Specifically, channel prediction technique has been employed to predict future CIRs that were
further exploited in the authentication analysis. Moreover, multiple CIR dierences were ob-
served by the receiver in a long range based on the channel predictor in order to increase the
robustness of decision procedures. In order to find optimal value of the threshold in decision
rule, an optimization problem has been defined based on minimizing the total error rate under
false alarm constraints. Finally, the performance of the proposed scheme have been validated
by using Monte-Carlo method.
Another channel-based physical layer authentication enhancement scheme has been pro-
posed in Chapter 5. Particularly, the characteristics of channel amplitude and multipath time
delay spread were integrated in order to enhance the authentication performance. A two di-
mensional quantization method has been developed to preprocess the channel variations. More
specifically, two one-bit quantizers were used to quantize the temporal channel variations in the
dimensions of channel amplitude and path delay, respectively. By exploiting the one-bit quan-
tizers, the proposed authentication scheme has been formulated as a simply hypothesis testing
problem. For performance analysis, FAR and PD have been defined based on the developed
test statistic, and their closed-form expressions have been derived as well. In order to evaluate
the performance of the proposed scheme, Monte-Carlo method has been utilized and the results
were compared with that of the closed-form derivations. Additionally, the optimal parameters
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that satisfying our optimization problem were found by using exhaustive search method in the
simulations.
In Chapter 6, motivated by the advantages of cooperative transmissions, a novel physical
layer authentication scheme has been proposed by exploiting the advantages of AF cooperative
relaying. The essence of the proposed scheme was to select the best relay among multiple
AF relays, such that legitimate transmitter would experience better channel conditions than
a spoofer. Towards this goal, two best relay selection schemes have been developed based
on the notion of maximizing the SNR ratios of the legitimate link to the spoofing link at the
destination and relays, respectively. For performance analysis, we defined our performance
metrics based on the outage of eective SNR ratios and the probability of spoofing detection.
The closed-form expressions of the outage probabilities for proposed relay selection schemes
have been derived. The performance of the proposed authentication scheme were compared
with that of a DT scheme. According to numerical results, the proposed scheme outperformed
the benchmark method in terms of the outage and spoofing detection.
In Chapter 7, a new continuous physical layer authentication technique with time-varying
transmission parameters has been investigated to enhance the security of wireless OFDM sys-
tem. A PCP sequence, which introduced an additional signaling link to carry the time-varying
transmission parameters, has been employed in each OFDM symbol for physical layer authen-
tication. The new PCP sequences were generated with the same time and frequency domain
characteristics as data-carrying OFDM signals to reduce the interception probability. With the
proper recovery of system parameters and interference cancellation, only legitimate users can
successfully decode the PCP sequence and obtain necessary parameters to decode OFDM data.
In addition, a cross layer design approach, which leveraged the dependency among PCP con-
figurations, authentication performance and transmitting performance, has been developed to
continuously generate optimal PCPs according to dynamic communication conditions. Numer-
ical simulations have shown the improvement in the system performance in terms of system
robustness, security and stealth.
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8.2 Future Work
There are several topics related to the presented research worthwhile for further study.
Some of them are listed as follows:
 On the topic of CIR-based physical layer authentication in wireless communications, we
investigated the inherent properties of CIR to achieve robust authentication performance.
However, other physical layer attributes can be also explored and combined with CIR
characteristics to enhance the authentication performance.
 In the proposed relay selection strategy for cooperative wireless communications, the
best relay has been chosen among a collection of trusted relays. However, malicious
nodes may impersonate authenticated relays in order to get access to the transmitted in-
formation and forward false messages to the destination. Considering a practical scenario
without the assumption of a complete trust between relay nodes, cooperative jamming or
cryptographic techniques can be exploited in relay selection to prevent malicious threats.
 Regarding to the enhancement of secure transmissions based on wireless OFDM sys-
tems, we proposed a continuous physical layer authentication technique to prevent pas-
sive eavesdroppers. Other security threats can also bring severe issues to the legitimate
transmissions over wireless OFDM networks, thereby our work can be extended to a
general scenario by exploiting the physical layer information to secure against several
attacks.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the Probability P(S = k)
We assume that a random variable S is a sum of two random variables S T and S Z, i.e.,
S = S T + S Z . S T and S Z are independent to each other and their values are determined from
two intervals, that is, 0  S T  L and 0  S Z  L   1, respectively. Therefore, we can easily
obtain that 0  S  2L   1. In this Appendix, we derive the probability of S equal to a fixed
value k, where k is a non-negative integer between 0 and 2L   1.
First of all, we derive the probabilities P(S T = i) and P(S Z = j) where i and j are two
non-negative integers with 0  i  L and 0  j  L   1. Based on the definitions of S T and S Z
in equations (5.11) and (5.12), the probabilities P(S T = i) and P(S Z = j) can be derived by
P(S T = i) =
 
L
i
!
(PT )i(1   PT )L i; (A.1)
and
P(S Z = j) =
 
L   1
j
!
(PZ) j(1   PZ)L 1  j; (A.2)
where PT is the probability of the output of quantizer QT [] equal to one, and PZ is the proba-
bility of the output of quantizer QZ[] equal to one.
Since the value of S is the sum of S T and S Z and 0  k  2L   1, two cases are considered
to derive the probability P(S = k). Particularly, if 0  k  L   1, the probability P(S = k) can
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be expressed by
P(S = k) = P(S T = 0; S Z = k) + P(S T = 1; S Z = k   1)
+    + P(S T = k; S Z = 0)
= P(S T = 0)P(S Z = k) + P(S T = 1)P(S Z = k   1)
+    + P(S T = k)P(S Z = 0)
=
 
L
0
!
(1   PT )L
 
L   1
k
!
(PZ)k(1   PZ)L 1 k
+
 
L
1
!
PT (1   PT )L 1
 
L   1
k   1
!
(PZ)k 1(1   PZ)L k
+    +
 
L
k
!
(PT )k(1   PT )L k
 
L   1
0
!
(1   PZ)L 1
=
kX
v=0
 
L
v
!
(PT )v(1   PT )L v 
 
L   1
k   v
!
(PZ)k v(1   PZ)L 1 k+v; (A.3)
If L  k  2L   1, the probability P(S = k) can be derived by
P(S = k) = P(S T = k   L + 1; S Z = L   1)
+ P(S T = k   L + 2; S Z = L   2)
+    + P(S T = L; S Z = k   L)
= P(S T = k   L + 1)P(S Z = L   1)
+ P(S T = k   L + 2)P(S Z = L   2)
+    + P(S T = L)P(S Z = k   L)
=
 
L
k   L + 1
!
(PT )k L+1(1   PT )2L k 1
 
L   1
L   1
!
(PZ)L 1
+
 
L
k   L + 2
!
(PT )k L+2(1   PT )2L k 2 
 
L   1
L   2
!
(PZ)L 2(1   PZ)
+    +
 
L
L
!
(PT )L
 
L   1
k   L
!
(PZ)k L(1   PZ)2L k 1
=
L 1X
v=k L
 
L
k   v
!
(PT )k v(1   PT )L k+v 
 
L   1
v
!
(PZ)v(1   PZ)L 1 v: (A.4)
Appendix B
Derivation of CDF of Wi
In this part, we derive the CDF of the random variable Wi defined in (6.21). The CDF of
this random variable can be expressed as
P(Wi  w) = P
PRjhRiBj2 + (PE2ERi + 2n)
PRjhRiBj2 + (PA2ARi + 2n)
 w

= P

PRjhRiBj2(1   w)  w(PA2ARi + 2n)   (PE2ERi + 2n)

: (B.1)
Depending on whether PA2A;Ri is smaller than or equal to PE
2
E;Ri or if it is greater than
PE2E;Ri , two dierent cases are possible. For the case that PA
2
A;Ri > PE
2
E;Ri , by considering
the dierent possibilities, the CDF of Wi can be easily shown to be as follows
P(Wi  w) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1 w  1
1   e
w(PA
2
ARi
+2n) (PE2ERi+
2
n)
 (1 w)P2R2RiB
PE2ERi+
2
n
PA2ARi+
2
n
< w < 1
0 0  w  PE
2
ERi
+2n
PA2ARi+
2
n
:
(B.2)
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Moreover, under the condition that PA2A;Ri  PE2E;Ri , CDF of Wi is equal to
P(Wi  w) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1 w  PE
2
ERi
+2n
PA2ARi+
2
n
e
w(PA
2
ARi
+2n) (PE2ERi+
2
n)
 (1 w)P2R2RiB 1 < w <
PE2ERi+
2
n
PA2ARi+
2
n
0 0  w  1:
(B.3)
Appendix C
Derivation of Integral F(t)
We define a definite integral function F(t) as
F(t) =
Z u
0
1
(t + p1)2
e
 p2
t dt; (C.1)
where u > 0, p1 > 0 and p2 > 0.
Using the change of variable s = 1t , we can derive that
F(t) =
Z 1
1
u
1
(1s + p1)
2
e p2s
ds
s2
=
Z 1
1
u
1
(1 + p1s)2
e p2sds; (C.2)
and using the change of variable g = 1 + p1s, we can further derive that based on [129,
eq.(3.351.4)],
F(t) =
1
p1
e
p2
p1
Z 1
1+ p1u
1
g2
e 
p2
p1
gdg
=
1
p1
e
p2
p1
 
p2
p1
Ei

  p2
p1
(1 +
p1
u
)

+
e 
p2
p1
(1+ p1u )
1 + p1u
!
: (C.3)
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